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PART I
THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING
COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
1.

Collingwood:

COLLINGWOOD AND HIS INTERPRETERS
His Life, His Writings, and His Era.

Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) was the youngest
of four children and the only son of W. G. Collingwood (FYC,
6).

His parents were artists, amateur archeologists, and

friends of John Ruskin.

The elder Collingwood was first

Ruskin's student, later his personal secretary and confidant,
and after Ruskin's death in 1900 he became his biographer.
The young Robin grew up in an atmosphere heavily influenced
by the Ruskinean ideal of the universal man (FYC, 1, 17-36,
1
143-46).
Like Ruskin himself and also the young J. S. Mill,
Collingwood was educated at home until he was thirteen (partially due to the poverty of his parents); and also like Mill,
he was started on classical languages at an early age--Latin
at four and Greek at six (A, 1).

He was able to read the

English proofs for his father's books by the age of five (FYC,
7), and by the time he started at Rugby at thirteen he could
1
An appreciation of the degree to which Collingwood
valued Ruskin's thought can be gained by a reading of Collingwood's own assessment of it in his early essay, "Ruskin's
Philosophy," delivered as an address at the Ruskin Centenary
Conference, 1919, but published in 1922 and reprinted in EPA,
1-41.
1

2

read and speak German and French almost as easily as English
(A, 6).

At Rugby he taught himself enough Italian to read

Dante in his spare time (A, 7).

As a child he also accom-

panied his parents on archeological expeditions:

he claims

to have attended his first "dig" as a three-week old infant
--in the toolbag of his parents (A, 80).
From Rugby Collingwood won a scholarship to University College, Oxford, which he attended from 1908 until he
graduated in 1912 with "Firsts" in both Classical Moderation
and Literae Humaniores.

He was hired as a tutor at Pembroke

College while still wearing his scholar's robes from final
examinations. 2 By 1913 he was given an independent hand at
excavations on Roman ruins in England, and was already being
regarded by Haverfield (his Oxford mentor in the subject) as
his successor.

After the outbreak of war in 1914 he entered

the British Admiralty Intelligence where he remained until the
end of the war in 1918.

During this time he wrote the manu-

script for Religion and Philosophy, which was published in
1916. 3 In 1918 he married Ethel Graham, moved his quarters
to a country house, and began an extremely active academic
life as lecturer and tutor in both philosophy and Roman and
British History.

In 1934 he was relieved of some of this bur-

den of tutoring and teaching when he was appointed to the
2R. B. McCallum, "Robin George Collingwood," Proceedings of the British Academy, XXIX (1944), p. 463.
3 Ibid., p. 464.

3

chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy.

From

1918 to 1934 he published four books--Roman Britain (1923, revised edition in 1934), Speculum Mentis (1924), The Archeology
of Roman Britain (1930), and An Essay on Philosophical Method
4
(1933)--and numerous short articles and monographs.
The last-mentioned book was produced during a leave
of absence from his teaching responsibilities in 1932, due to
a prolonged illness (A, 117-18)--the beginning of the illhealth against which the remainder of his life was to be an
heroic struggle (FYC, 12).

Between 1935 and 1941, when here-

signed his professorship, Collingwood managed to find time to
do the writing on archeology, history and philosophy that form
the bulk of his later published writings--Roman Britain and
the English Settlements (1936, with J. N. L. Myres), The Principles of Art (1938), An Autobiography (1939), and An Essay
on Metaphysics (1940). 5
Most of the material posthumously published as The
Idea of Nature (1945) and The Idea of History (1946) was also
written during this period, in the form of lectures (IN, v;
IH, v-vi).

The New Leviathan (1942), the final work published

during his lifetime, was written under extreme stress, Colling4 T. M. Knox, "Notes on Collingwood's Philosophical
Work, with a Bibliography," Proceedings of the British Academy,
XXIX (1944), pp. 469-75.
5 Ibid.

4
wood's state of health rapidly deteriorating, and England
being torn by war; its final chapters, he notes, were written during the bombardment of London (NL, v; LPC, 316). · In
1939 Collingwood felt well enough to sign on as First Mate on
a sailing yacht, the Fleur de
of France to Greece

~'

for a trip from the coast

and the Greek islands--the other members

of the crew being mostly Oxford students.

His account of that

journey--the First Mate's Log--was published in 1940 by Oxford
University Press in a limited edition.

In 1942 his marriage

with Ethel Graham was dissolved at his wife's request (they
had two children, a son and a daughter), and he married Kathleen Frances Edwardes, who bore him a daughter (EPH, x-xi).
But his health never fully regained its vigor, and he was
forced to retire to Coniston, to the house he inherited from
his father, where he died in 1943 of pneumonia. 6
The years through which Collingwood lived and worked
at Oxford were among the most violent and revolutionary that
Europe has seen, and certainly the most profoundly threatening that England has endured.

His work spans the first half

of the twentieth century, bracketed at one end by the First
World War and the Russian Revolution, and at the other by
World War II and the Fascist holocaust.

At Oxford the in-

tellectual climate was no less subject to violent upheavals.
When Collingwood began there in 1908, the 19th century British
6McCallum, p. 468; cf. IH, xxi.

5

idealist movement begun by T. H. Green, with F. H. Bradley
and B. Bosanquet its most respected spokesmen, had just about
spent itself, and a realist reaction headed by Cook Wilson was
already in full swing (A, 15-21).

By the time he retired his

professorship in 1941 realism had given way to logical positivism (A, 52).

H. J. Paton writes that at Oxford, in the

period between the wars, "Collingwood and I were the only representatives of our generation--a slender bridge between predecessors at least ten years older and successors at least
ten years younger." 7
In his Autobiography Collingwood corroborates this remark when he writes that in the area of archeology he was the
only remaining Oxford resident trained by Haverfield as a
Romano-British specialist, and therefore felt an obligation to
keep alive that branch of studies which was left vacant when
Haverfield died in 1919, because most of his students had died
during World War I

(A, 120).

In such highly troubled waters Collingwood felt himself to be the vessel not only of Oxford Romano-British archeology but also of philosophy.

In philosophy the burden was

even greater, and in carrying it (alone, he felt) Collingwood
was buffeted by all the prevailing winds of his era.

Conse-

7H. J. Paton, "Fifty Years of Philosophy," in Contem~orary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed. by H. D.. Lewis
New York, 1956/1961), p. 345.

6

quently even though his early works (Religion and Philosophy,
Speculum Mentis, and even the Essay on Philosophical Method)
have led to his rejection by contemporaries as a latter day
idealist, the body of his later writings continues to arouse
the interest of people of very different philosophical persuasions--perhaps because many of the sources of these persuasions were also influential on Collingwood himself.
Thus in the last of his books published during his
lifetime, The New Leviathan, one finds evidence relating him
to most of the major contemporary schools of thought.
example:

(1)

pragmatism:

For

"Reason is always essentially prac-

tical; because to be reasonable means to be interested in
questions beginning with 'why'; and this happens because people
crave for reassurance against the fallibility of their knowledge" (NL, 14.31); (2) phenomenology and existentialism:
"Man as mind is whatever he is conscious of being" (NL, 1.84;
emphasis his); (3) linguistic analysis:

"Language is not a

device whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind
is communicated to another's, but an activity prior to knowledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into
existence" (NL, 6.41); and (4) even Marxism:

"Is there no-

where such a thing as 'purely theoretical thinking'?

There

is; but it is not real thinking, and it does not lead to real
knowledge . .

Real thinking . . . always starts from prac-

tice and returns to practice; for it is based on 'interest'
in the thing thought about" (NL, 18.13).

7
Perhaps because such diverse inclinations are reflected
in his philosophy, he has been claimed for, and damned by, most
of these same schools of thought--and this is reflected in the
diversity of interpretations concerning his philosophy in the
growing body of secondary literature about him.

Here one finds

him claimed not only by representatives of the traditions just
mentioned, but also (incredibly enough) logical positivism,
radical empiricism, idealism, cultural anthropology, and systems theory.

His roots have been located in Ruskinean moral-

ism, German Hegelianism, English and/or Italian idealism, and
Cook Wilsonean realism.

Affinities have been found between

his philosophy and that of Ryle, Strawson, Wittgenstein, Dewey,
Husserl, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Sartre.

And his best work

has been said to be in history, the philosophy of history,
esthetics, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, and the history of ideas.
In spite of all these affinities, and in spite of the
remarkable breadth of his interests in this age of specialization, he fits neatly into none of the contemporary schools of
thought, and succeeded in developing no appreciable following
of his own (cf. MHD, vii-viii, and FYC, vii, 137-46).

This is

at least partially a matter of choice on Collingwood's part:
he sought no following, refused to engage in public debate,
and preferred taking his case in writing directly to the public (A, 56, n. 1, and A, 118).

It is also partly due to the

8

circumstances of his life:

with positivism and analytic phil-

osophy coming into prominence in his own university, and
Fascism and Communism vying for dominance in the political
arena around him, Collingwood's attempts to steer an independent course led to his estrangement from nearly all of his
contemporaries.

Even those close to him felt a little irri-

tated at him for being "rather too quick in claiming all knowledge as his portion" 8 and often those who disagreed with him
to his face were told, as it were, to "bathe in Jordan." 9
And finally, his isolation is very much the result of the diversity and incompleteness of his output, which makes it difficult to find a single insight that unifies all of his multifaceted output, or even to find a capstone to complete the
arch.
But whatever the reason for the difficulty in achieving a clear focus in the surviving portrait of Collingwood's
thought, a portion of the blame for this difficulty must be
shared by the first interpretative authority to reflect on
the whole of Collingwood's output, and to this problem we must
now turn.
8
9

Paton, p. 345.
McCallum, p. 466.

9

2.

T. M. Knox and the "Radical Conversion Hypothesis."
Before Collingwood died in 1943 he named T. M. Knox,

a friend and former student, as his literary executor.
Collingwood's will authorized his executor to publish only as
much of his unpublished writings as met high standards--thus
leaving to Knox's judgment what the public should see of the
unfinished works (IH, v).

This material included Collingwood's

lecture notes on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of
nature, and ethics, and essays on philosophical theology and
cosmology with which he closed lectures on ethics and on the
philosophy of nature respectively (IN, v; IH, v-vi; CRM, 397).
In addition to this material there was an incomplete sketch
of The Principles of History which Collingwood hoped to be
his magnum opus, but which is now forever lost--and a large
number of other unspecified materials, not available for pub. .
.
10
11.c
1.nspect1.on.
10 In 1969 I wrote to the Delegates of the Clarendon
Press, Oxford, for information about the status of these manuscripts. They forwarded my letter to Collingwood's widow (his
second wife), who replied to me as follows: "Dear Mr. Shipley,
The Clarendon Press, Oxford, has passed your letter on to me.
There are a considerable number of unpublished papers of R. G.
Collingwood in my possession. Within the next year or so I
hope to deposit these in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. A number of manuscripts will be reserved for some years. The inc~mplete, unpublished Principles of History is lost.
Yours
S1.ncerely, Kate Collingwood." In May of 1972 I received word
from the Bodleian Library that they still had not received any
of the manuscripts promised to them by Mrs. Collingwood, and
stating that they had been unable to contact her by mail. In
June of 1979 I received word from the Bodleian Library that
they had recently received the manuscripts from Mrs. Collingwood, and that they filled the~uivalent of five boxes

10
Under the titles of The Idea of Nature and The Idea
of History Knox published only the nearly completed lectures
on cosmology and history.
ciples of History

He appended a part of

The Prin-

(actually only a portion of the first

third of what Collingwood had planned to write (IH, vi) and
several completed essays (delivered originally as lectures)
as "epilegomena" in The Idea of History, but omitted doing
the same for The Idea of Nature on the grounds that Collingwood seems to have become dissatisfied with it:

for the

sketch of his own cosmology which had closed his original
lectures, Collingwood had substituted a shorter concluding
passage when he set about revising these lectures for publication sometime after 1939 (IN, v. ).11
measuring 14 x 11 x 4 inches "and are packed tight." A partial listing of their contents included translations, letters,
lectures, and notes on everything from idealism and realism
to the epistemology of logic and English folklore. Most of
the material is open to inspection by scholars but, according
to the terms set by Mrs. Collingwood, is not to be photocopied.
11 There is something odd about Knox's editorial judgment in this matter. Knox argues (as we shall see in a moment)
that Collingwood's best work was done between 1928 and 1936,
and that after his radical conversion to historicism between
1936 and 1938 his judgments were unsound and not to be trusted
in matters philosophical. On these grounds Knox published the
lectures on the philosophy of history and the philosophy of
nature, and included the terminal essays on history that form
the "epilegomena" to The Idea of History. But on these
grounds the essay on cosmology-which closed Collingwood's
lectures on the philosophy of nature in 1934 and 1937 is a prod~ct of his mature, middle period.
But instead of publishing
~t as an "epilegomenon" to The Idea of Nature Knox accepts
Collingwood's later, possibre-judgment (which is supposedly
unsound) to omit this terminal essay. Instead Knox published
the short concluding piece which argues that science "depends

11
When Knox published The Idea of History in 1946 he
he added an "Editor's Preface" in which he not only explained significant editorial details about the manuscripts,
but also proposed an interpretation of the whole of Collingwood's philosophy, on the basis of which he evaluated the
posthumously published works, and placed them in their setting
within the context (as he saw it) of Collingwood's entire published output.

Therefore the significance of the totality of

Collingwood's published works to date has rested upon Knox's
judgment in both constitutive and retrospective senses:

con-

stitutive because two important works, including their present
form, were directly due to his editorial labors; and retrospective insofar as his account of Collingwood's development
is both (a) the only evidence that the public has for the
"high standards" that Knox used in deciding which works should
be suppressed and which deserved publication, and (b) the only
justification of these standards, based on the interpretation
of the group of writings that Collingwood did publish in his
own lifetime, that Knox offered for extending that total output.
Knox's interpretation of Collingwood's development can
be outlined as follows:
~n

historical thought for its existence" (IH, 177). But this
1s inconsistent with the editorial policy of The Idea of
History.
--- ---- --

12
(1)

Dividing Collingwood's writings into three

groups, Knox finds in the "juvenilia" (Religion and Phil_osophy (1916) and Speculum Mentis (1924) evidence of seep-

.
.
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ticlsm
an d d ogmatlsm:

religious scepticism insofar as re-

ligion is described (in Speculum Mentis) as an erroneous mistaking of imagining for thinking, and philosophical dogmatism
insofar as only philosophy is asserted as providing the full
truth for which religious assertion is only the symbol (IH,
xiv-xv).

Knox says that the shift from the earlier work (in

which religion, theology and philosophy are identified) to
the position in Speculum Mentis marks the ascendancy of a
dogmatic strain in Collingwood's thought which "affected its
content and . . . was linked with a change in his attitude to
religion, always one of his strongest interests" (IH, xv).
(2)

By 1932, during the "middle period" (as in Col-

lingwood's masterpiece, the Essay on Philosophical Method of
12 Knox does not specify what he means by dogmatism
and scepticism. But it seems that for Knox (1) one may understand by "dogmatism" the imposition of an external source
or standard of truth on the internal doctrines of a body of
knowledge; and (2) "scepticism" to mean the failure or refusal to provide a criterion for truth or falsity within a
body of knowledge. That is why historicism is a scepticism
for Knox: history cannot provide a criterion of truth or
falsity for philosophy. Therefore any criterion of truth
which proceeds from, or is grounded in, presuppositions which
are themselves unquestioned and/or unquestionable, is dogmatic;
and any body of knowledge resting on presuppositions which cannot themselves be judged to be true or false is sceptical.
Cf. IH, xvii.
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1933) the mature and undamaged mind of Collingwood embraced
metaphysics as a separate and distinct study of the one, the
true, and the good (IH, xi).

This would have allowed for a

truth-criterion (hence escaping scepticism) not itself based
on the unquestioning acceptance of religious doctrine (hence
not dogmatic).

Knox thinks this much is indicated in Col-

lingwood's essay, "Faith and Reason," which in assigning independent functions to each faculty escaped the ascription of
a monopoly of truth to any discipline (dogmatism) as well as
the denial of a truth universal and valid for all thought
(scepticism) (IH, xvi).
(3)

But in the 1940 Essay on Metaphysics (and the re-

mainder of his later philosophy, his third period) Collingwood lapsed back into the latent scepticism and dogmatism of
his youth by denying the independent status of metaphysics
(which is reduced to history).

His "reform of metaphysics"

is based upon reducing the metaphysician's task to the historical work of discovering the "absolute presuppositions"
of science in a given era.

Since these absolute presupposi-

tions were characterized by Collingwood as (a) themselves
neither true nor false, and (b) religious in nature, they indicate a radical change in Collingwood's mature position.
This time Collingwood proposed a philosophical scepticism and
a religious dogmatism.

Absolute presuppositions are dogmatic

as unquestionable and religious (that is, held by an act of

14

"unquestioning acceptance" or of "natural piety"--i.e. faith);
and they indicate a kind of scepticism insofar as they

~est

on no higher criterion of truth and are themselves neither
true or false (IH, xv-xvi).
Knox groups The Idea of History and The Idea of Na~

in the second, mature period, and The Principles of Art

overlapping the second and the third.

He claims to have doc-

umentary evidence that in Collingwood's second period he
still held that metaphysics as an autonomous branch of knowledge was possible, and that in the third period not only is
metaphysics declared to be an historical science, but "philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being converted into his tory" (Ill, x; cf. xi-xii) .
Unfortunately the work from which these quotations
are taken is

The Principles of History

which was never com-

pleted, never published, and is now lost and so incapable of
being publicly examined; so there is at present no documentary evidence to verify these statements.

Even assuming that

Knox is a reliable authority, it is impossible to evaluate
these fragments without the full textual context--to see in
what ways Collingwood meant them to be taken, or qualified
them, or posited them as provisional assertions to be later
corrected and modified, etc.

In future chapters we shall

find direct evidence in Collingwood's writingR that he often
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employed a dialectical strategy of positing a remark as a
starting point, then modifying the remark, and finally contradicting it altogether--all in the span of one essay.

Un-

less we are to remain "scissors and paste" historians, and
therefore show that we have not learned even the first lesson
that Collingwood wished to teach us, we cannot take Knox's
fragments from

Collingwood's "nachlass" manuscripts uncri-

tically.
We are therefore left with Knox's arguments, based on
available evidence, concerning Collingwood's radical change
of mind--which Knox says occurred somewhere between 1936 and
1938 (IH, xi).

The failure to acknowledge this change of mind

is one of the reasons Knox rejects Collingwood's Autobiography
as a reliable account of his development--the other being
that in the Autobiography Collingwood seems to wish his readers to believe that he had worked out his theory of absolute
presuppositions and the purely historical character of metaphysics

prior to 1932 and the Essay on Philosophical Method.

Regarding the latter point (1) Collingwood made no such claim
in the Autobiography--he says only that "these ideas . . .
became clear to me soon afterward," i.e. after returning to
Oxford in 1918, and he says nothing about any reduction of
philosophy to history (Knox even hedges by calling the claim
about the dating of the discovery of absolute presuppositions
an "inference" that Collingwood wished his readers to make
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from the text); and (2) even if the claim were made, it is
arguable that it has its roots in doctrines already present
not only in his early period, but in the works of his mature
middle period as well.
Supposing that one were to have unimpeachable evidence
that there was a radical change of mind as Knox says there
was:

what reasons does Knox assign for it?

Preface" he gives no less than three:

In his "Editor's

(1) Collingwood's mind

changed (beginning in 1932, "tiny blood-vessels began to
burst in the brain, with the result that the small parts of
the brain affected were put out of action" (IH, xxi);

(2) he

changed his mind himself (he came to think, like Croce, that
"philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being
converted into history" because "the sceptical and dogmatic
trends, present in Collingwood's earlier thought, triumphed
over the temporary defeat they had sustained between 1932 and
1936" (IH, xi)); and (3) Collingwood was an inconsistent,
even fickle 13 thinker ("Collingwood believed in the coincidentia oppositorum, as many passages in his writings testify.
I am suggesting that his own later philosophy provides a
striking illustration of this phenomenon" (IH, xvii).

"He

brought a powerful mind to bear on whatever happened to be
engrossing his energies . . . and he seems to have been in13 Knox does not use the term, "fickle."
is mine; the accusation is Knox's.

The term

17
clined to draw the conclusion that philosophy was simply identical with whatever he happened to be studying most intensively at the time" ( IH, xv)).
None of these reasons are acceptable.

(1)

The ad

hominem "brain pathology" explanation, while certainly verified by documentary evidence, is not detailed enough

to make

any accurate assessment of what portions of Collingwood's
brain (to say nothing of his mind or judgment) were affected.
The evidence in fact seems to point to brain damage in the
motor areas:

writing to Croce in January of 1939, Colling-

wood says that "just a year ago .
by a stroke which deprived
I am

making~od

recovery:

I was partly paralyzed

me of the power of speech . . . .
I can use my hand and foot moder-

ately well, and can speak now well enough for the purposes of
my profession" (LPC, 316).

Even if we were to assume that

Knox's acquaintance with Collingwood was so intimate that he
could detect hemorrhagic capillaries in Collingwood's brain
as early as 1933, why should we accept such an account as
philosophically relevant?
healthy enough
~

Why indeed, when Collingwood was

to write the "second book in his series,"

Principles of Art (the first being the 1933 Essay on Phil-

osophical Method) prior to his first debilitating stroke in
1938, and healthy enough after his stroke to act as First
Mate on a sailing schooner which voyaged for some months in
1939 in the Mediterranean--and to write a lively account of
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the experience?

And why again when he was clear-headed enough

to write not only the Essay on Metaphysics, which so scandalizes Knox, but also The New Leviathan, a work which many critics felt would alone earn him a respected place in philosophical literature?

John Passmore's two-sentence estimate of the

situation is worth quoting:
It is sometimes suggested by Idealist admirers of Collingwood that the brain disease from which he began to suffer
in 1933 is reflected in his ultimate heterodoxies. When
one contemplates the speculative freedom of these later
works, one can only wish that his contemporaries could
have been similarly afflicted.l4
(2)

Asserting that Collingwood's youthful scepticism

and dogmatism ovenv-helmed his better judgment is less a change
of mind than a relapse; interestingly enough, Knox suggests
that both Collingwood's earlier and later philosophy represent

lapses into a youthful realism, while it is only his

middle period which steered clear of the "shoals of scepticism and the

billows of dogmatism" (IH, xviii, xiv).

But the

clear evidence of the Autobiography is that as of 1939 Collingwood interpreted the whole of his philosophy as a response to the threat of "realism."

It is incredible to think,

therefore, that his literary executor could seriously entertain the hypothesis that in the end he merely surrendered to
its doctrines.

Since Collingwood was an historian of unim-

peachable ability, who knew well how to use evidence, and was
14

John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London,
1957), p. 306 n. 1; quoted by Rubinoff, CRM, 376 n. 17.
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fully aware that autobiography is history in which the subject happens to be oneself, if no radical change of mind is
recorded in the Autobiography it is unlikely to be because of
a lapse of memory, but rather because Collingwood meant to deceive his readers.

For what reason?

Knox fails to provide

us with any.
(3) Knox's accusations of deliberate inconsistency
and vacillation by preoccupation also cannot go without challenge.

While it is easy to find passages which discuss the

coincidentia oppositorum (e.g. SM, 197-98, 249), there are
others which confine it to the scientific level of thought,
where it is contrasted with the synthesis of opposites (e.g.
SM, 310).

If by a "coincidence of opposites" Knox means

the simultaneous affirmation of a pair of contradictory
statements, then if Collingwood asserted this he did indeed, as Knox charges, turn traitor to his profession as
philosopher.

But the burden of proof for this is on Knox:

charges of "dogmatism and scepticism" do not constitute sufficient evidence for the simultaneous acceptance of a pair
of contradictory statements.

But if by "opposites" Knox does

not mean contradictories but contraries, then what sense does
the charge make that his later philosophy is a prime instance
of it?

For it is just as true that Collingwood accepted a

coincidence of opposites as contraries in his mature middle
period--e.g. in the Essay on Philosophical Method, where the
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"overlap of classes" is described in terms of relations of
opposition and relations of distinction (EPM, 74-75).
Furthermore the charge of inconsistency by preoccupational vacillation (what I have called "fickleness") is
self-refuting.

Knox prefaced this remark with the observa-

tion that it was the power of Collingwood's mind that caused
him to become so engrossed in his subject matter that he simply identified philosophy with whatever he happened to be
working on at the time.

But the charge does not bespeak a

powerful mind but a weak one--drifting this way and that according to what "happens" to occupy it.

This suggests an er-

ratic and drifting route for Collingwood's rudderless vessel.
Opposed to this charge (perhaps the most insulting that Knox
levels at him) we have Collingwood's autobiographical account
of the logic of his philosophical program, which leaves little
room for topics to merely "happen" to occupy his interest.
He writes there that he planned a series of books, beginning with the Essay on Philosophical Method and continuing
with The Principles of Art, and that he planned (as of 1939)
to devote all his remaining time and energy to completing
the series (A, 117-19).

The interpreter faced with a choice

between Knox's version and Collingwood's own account of the
development of his thought might prefer Knox's, but then he
must supply convincing reasons for rejecting Collingwood's.
But Collingwood's version promises to be systematic, and Knox's
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to be haphazard and disjointed.

Therefore an interpreter can-

not be blamed for choosing Collingwood's on these grounds
alone.
But when stripped of its pathophysiological banalities
and uncritical appeal to unexaminable evidence, there is a
positive service that Knox's Preface performs.

Knox shows

that one of the crucial problems in Collingwood's mature philosophy, one that may lie deeper than the more apparent problem of the relationship of philosophy to history, is the issue of the functions and autonomy of metaphysics and religion;
Knox's "scepticism-dogmatism" argument rests precisely on the
relative priority or independence of reason and faith.

We

shall see in the next section how Collingwood's views on religion and metaphysics set his interpreters at odds with each
other.

We have Knox to thank for calling attention to this

dimension of the problem.
Since Knox's Preface, three principal interpreters of
Collingwood's mature philosophy have grappled with its central
paradox.

Of these three, one--Alan Donagan--accepts as deci-

sive Knox's conclusion that Collingwood's thought suffered a
drastic reversal sometime between 1936 and 1938 (LPC, 1).
But Donagan rejects Knox's "brain-damage" reason for this reversal, and argues rather that philosophically acceptable reasons must be found for it (which he claims to provide) (LPC,
12-18).

Of the other two, Louis 0. Mink comes close to
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acknowledging a radical change of mind, insofar as he accepts
a greatly reduced version of the reversal and locates it much
earlier--between 1916 and 1924, when Collingwood discovered
"dialectic," first applied in Speculum Mentis (MHD, 20).
Lionel Rubinoff, on the other hand, roundly attacks what he
aptly calls "The Radical Conversion Hypothesis" initially
woven by Knox and later embroidered by Donagan (CRM, 21).
Rubinoff dismisses Knox's reference to Collingwood's illness
as being "of no philosophical relevance" (CRM, 18), and appears to be the only major interpreter to take the Autobiography seriously.
In the next section we shall take up the interpretations offered by these and several other notable commentators
on Collingwood's philosophy, and in the final section of this
chapter we shall try to sketch how the interpretation that
will be offered in succeeding chapters differs from theirs.
3.

Collingwood's Interpreters:

An Overview.

In 1972 there appeared a collection of fourteen essays (all previously unpublished) entitled Critical Essays on
the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, edited by Michael Krausz
and published by Oxford University Press.

Aside from its con-

tents (which represent fairly well the current state of the
question concerning his philosophy), the mere appearance of
this book could not help but both please and displease the
late Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy.
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On the one hand it defies his express wishes on the
matter.

Towards the end of his life Collingwood's ill health

forced him to recognize the possibility that he might n~t be
able to finish all the projects that he had set for himself.
He therefore wrote his Autobiography "to put on record some
brief account of the work I have not yet been able to publish, in case I am not able to publish it in full" (A, 118).
In it he wrote this request not to be the subject of scholarly inquiry:
I am nearly fifty, and cannot in any case hope for more
than a few years in which I can do my best work. I take
this opportunity, therefore, of saying that I will not be
drawn into discussion of what I write . . . . Some readers may wish to convince me that it is all nonsense . .
. . Some may wish to show me that on this or that detail
I am wrong. Perhaps I am; if they are in a position to
prove it, let them write not about me but about the subject . . . . And if there are any who think my work good,
let them show their approval of it by attention to their
own. So, perhaps, I may escape otherwise than by death
the last humiliation of an aged scholar, when his juniors
conspire to print a volume of essays and offer it to him
as a sign that they now consider him senile. (A, 118-19).
The appearance of this volume of essays indicates that it was
only by death that Collingwood escaped that "last humiliation."
But on the other hand the book is scarcely a humiliation to the memory of the late Collingwood.

On the contrary

it illustrates to a surprising degree the extent to which Collingwood's thought is still very much alive--a liveliness that
could not have but pleased the philosopher-historian who argued
so eloquently for the notion of history as a process of re-
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thinking past acts of thought still living in the present
(IH, 218).

The contributors to this volume realized that

they were defying his wishes, but as students of his philosophy they found his works, as one of them so succinctly
put it, "too incisive to dismiss and too unclear to adopt"
(Mink, in MHD, vii) and therefore demanding interpretation
to an unusual degree.
To a reader familiar with Collingwood primarily as
the author of The Idea of History, and who accepts the account of Collingwood's development as given by T. M. Knox
in the Preface, this collection of critical essays would
come as something of a surprise.

He would be startled at

the wide range of topics on which Collingwood wrote systematic treatises of some brilliance and originality:

besides

philosophy of history, the topics discussed in essays in
this volume include esthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophical method, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of nature, ethics, social and political philosophy,
and even philosophy of education.

He would also be surprised

to find no less than half of the essays dealing with Collingwood's views on metaphysics:

as we have just seen, Knox had

found these views dogmatic, sceptical, and in general scandalously inferior to Collingwood's best efforts in philosophy
and history (IH, xv-xvii).

He would also be startled at the

evidence presented by some of the authors for Collingwood's
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anticipation of issues the importance of which have only recently begun to be appreciated:

a case in point bein~ Stephen

Toulmin's essay comparing Collingwood to Thomas Kuhn, whose
essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, is still being
seriously debated by philosophers and historians of science
(CEPC, 201-21).

The central thesis of the latter was dis-

cussed by Collingwood some twenty years earlier in An Essay
on Metaphysics (cf. EM, 48, 74-76).
But it is disconcerting to encounter the evidence,
cited by many of the contributors to this volume, supporting
Knox's argument for the ultimate inconsistency of
wood's philosophy.

Colling~

What is disconcerting about it is that it

still appears to be impossible for the reader to assume any
consistent or even comfortable posture toward this prickly
and ill-assimilated man.

As represented by his three prin-

cipal interpreters (Donagan, Rubinoff, and Mink) he remains
something of a puzzling figure. Did his attempts to work out
a reconciliation between philosophy and history fail insofar
as at various times he subordinated the one to the other-especially in his final, allegedly historicist phase?

Are

Collingwood's earlier "idealist" reflections on the nature of
philosophical thinking truly "repudiated" by his final analytic philosophy of mind?

Was his revolutionary logic of pre-

supposition, question and answer really at variance with contemporary logic?

Or is there some comprehensive framework
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detectable in Collingwood's writings--a context which he
sketched out in his youth and into which all his later, more
detailed writings fit as parts of a systematic whole?
A case in point is Collingwood's views on religion-the subject of his earliest publications and by most accounts
one of Collingwood's deepest and most enduring interests.

We

have seen that in Knox's view the place of faith and religion
is of

prime importance in evaluating Collingwood's alleged

dogmatism and scepticism.

In the lead essay of Krausz's col-

lection, however, Collingwood's views on the religious doctrine of the fall and redemption of man are singled out by
Alan Donagan as "less blasphemous than laughable" when used
to interpret what "any ordinary Christian believes that Christian redemption is redemption from" (CEPC, 19).

The passage

Donagan cites is from Speculum Mentis, and in it Collingwood
is using the fall as a metaphor symbolizing man's lapse into
forbidden knowledge (the error of abstraction--the separation
of subject and object), and redemption as God's acceptance of
this burden of human error as His own--presumably in the person of Jesus (SM, 302-03).

For the view of the "ordinary

Christian" Donagan chooses to compare this passage to one from
John Bunyan's Grace Abounding and The Pilgrim's Progress,
which speaks of the burden of human suffering that is the lot
of every man.

Donagan's objection is that no attempt at a

literal paraphrase of religious metaphor can absorb the truth
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of passages like the latter without remainder; but this is
what Collingwood thought philosophy could do for religious
truth CCEPC, 18).
Now it is the measure of the difference between Donagan and Lionel Rubinoff that the same passage that Donagan
holds up for ridicule is later cited by Rubinoff as "one of
the most important passages in all of his writings" (CEPC,
101).

Rubinoff's reading of Collingwood is almost a literal

rendering of passages such as this one from The Idea of
History:
The task of religious thought and religious practice (for
in religion the theoretical and practical activities are
fused into one) is to find the relation between these two
supposed conceptions of myself as finite and God as infinite . . . . (I)n religion the life of reflection is
concentrated in its intensest form, and . . . the special
problems of theoretical and practical life all take their
special forms by segregation out of the body of the religious consciousness, and retain their vitality only so far
as they preserve their connexion with it and with each
other in it (IH, 314-15).
Rubinoff argues that Collingwood's use of the religious metaphor of the fall and redemption are apt precisely because Collingwood's entire philosophy is a sustained attempt at reconciliation of all the divergent tendencies within man--subject
vs. object, thought vs. action, faith vs. reason, history vs.
philosophy, etc.--and the first level on which that reconciliation takes place is that of religion, with Christianity as
its highest manifestation (CEPC, 106).
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The two articles by Donagan and Rubinoff therefore
take radically opposing views on the same issue, and their
divergent interpretations extend to the whole of Collingwood's
philosophy.

Donagan argues that the collapse of Collingwood's

program for an idealistic metaphysics of the Absolute (in his
early philosophy as expressed in Speculum Mentis and An Essay
on Philosophical Method) left him with a crippled historicist

substitute and no viable philosophy of religion (CEPC,

18).

Rubinoff holds that for Collingwood not only is abso-

lute idealism the only philosophy adequate to the Christian
solution to the twin problems of alienation and irrationalism
that plague the modern world, but religion itself (at least
as Christianity) is a necessary condition of the possibility
of all other forms of experience--presumably (using the
scheme of Speculum Mentis) art, science, history, and philosophy (CEPC, 86-88).
The reader's suspicion that Donagan and Rubinoff have
their own, divergent meanings for the expression, "absolute
idealism," is partly confirmed by the fact that Donagan formulates the position in terms of an anti-realist or antiabstraction principle (viz. that all abstractions are partial
truths and to that extent erroneous) which is explicit in
Collingwood's early writings, while for Rubinoff the term refers to the "unified life of the mind," the divisions of which
mark the various subject-object alienations within contempor-
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ary consciousness.

If these positions appear as obverse and

reverse of the same coin, the way to distinguish heads from
tails would be that Rubinoff accepts, and Donagan denies, that
something describable as "the absolute standpoint" is possible.
In his book, The Later Philosophy of

~·

G. Colling-

wood, Donagan forcefully (if not always persuasively) argues
that the reason that Collingwood abandoned the idealistic position of his youth is that he came to realize, from his analysis of mental functions in The Principles of Art (1938) that
all thinking is conceptual and hence abstract. 15 But this
position renders anything like "absolute knowledge" (an absolute identity between subject and object) impossible, and
therefore represents a "repudiation" of his earlier idealism,
in which abstraction (the cardinal doctrine of realism--on
Donagan's reading of Collingwood) is regarded as the root of
all error, and itself a falsification (LPC, 14, 47-50, 285-89;
cf. CEPC, 18).

The philosophy of mind that survives self-

destruction by contradiction forms Collingwood's "later philosophy" which parallels conclusions of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and anticipates Gilbert Ryle's concept of mind (cf. LPC, 37,
42-43).
15 The references that Donagan cites at LPC, 14 and
47-54 to support this assertion--namely, PA, 254 and NL, 7.22,
7.3-7.31, and 7.38--do not make the claim that "all thinking
is conceptual and hence abstract." See below, pp. 562-76.

30
Donagan reconstructs this philosophy of mind around
four principles:

(1) the Principle of Intentionality ("if

a man is conscious he must be

conscious of something");

(2) the Principle of Order ("if a man is conscious of one of
his own acts of consciousness, then it is not by that act
itself, but by another act of consciousness which may be
said to be of a higher order"); 16 (3) the Law of Primitive
Survivals ("when a function of consciousness (B) is brought
into existence having a lower-order function (A) as its object, unless the lower-order function (A) continues to exist
in its primitive state, the higher-order function (B) cannot
exist at all"); and (4) the Law of Contingency ("the earlier
terms in a series of mental functions do not determine the later") (LPC, 27-29).

In the resulting hierarchy of levels of

consciousness, Donagan argues, there is no upper limit (LPC,
2~

91-92); therefore there is no such thing as 'absolute know-

ledge" as an upper 1 imi t to knowledge ( cf. LPC, 258) .
16 None of Donagan's references to Collingwood's texts
for evidence for the "principle of order" support Donagan's
formulation and subsequent employment of this principle: at
LPC, 28 and more directly at LPC, 105 and 168, Donagan cites
NL, 4.31, 5.91 and 5.92 as evidence that Collingwood's philosophy of mind "was fundamentally anti-Cartesian; . . . he
repudiated Descartes' doctrine that acts of consciousness are,
as it were, self-illuminating" (LPC, 25). In Donagan's view,
Collingwood came to hold that no act of consciousness can
have itself as an object (LPC, 108, 167-68). For Collingwood's views on self-consciousness and Cartesianism, see NL,
1.84-1.85, 5.34-5.39; IH, 141, 291-94, 297, 306; PA, 206,
222-23, 247-52.
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Lionel Rubinoff, on the other hand, argues persuasively (if not always forcefully) in his own book, Collingwood
and the
--

Reform of Metaphysics, that such a position could never

satisfy Collingwood, whose whole philosophy is an extended argument for rapprochement--including the rapprochement of subject and object in absolute knowledge.

There was no "radical

conversion" in Collingwood's development, Rubinoff argues, because Collingwood remained true to the idealistic program
laid out in Speculum Mentis (CRM, 23).

Taking his clue from

the description in Speculum Mentis of the three ways that the
"prize of truth" can be awarded (to one, to two or more, or to
none of the competing forms of experience), Rubinoff constructs a framework of "three ontological levels of experience" on which all of Collingwood's writings can be located.
At the first level, consciousness assumes an absolute distinction between subject and object, and views the whole
of reality as an expression of whatever experience it is
presently identified with . . . . At the second level, the
distinction between subject and object remains but each
experience now regards itself as only one among a variety
of equally valid standpoints. At the third level the
subject-object distinction has been finally overcome and
some recognition is given to the fact that the forms of
experience, rather than being coordinate species of a
genus, are on the contrary a scale of overlapping forms.
On the basis of these distinctions the implicit rationale
of Collingwood's published works may now be reconstructed.
According to this reconstruction each work may be seen
as exemplifying one or another type of philosophy operating on one or more of the three levels of experience
( CRM , 2 9 - 3 0 ) .
Rubinoff's strategy in answering the charges of Knox
and Donagan, therefore, is to locate the source of one of a

32
pair of conflicting assertions on one level of this ontological schema, and the other on a different level.

Thus

when Collingwood asserts in The New Leviathan that there
is no upper limit to the levels of consciousness he is
speaking at the "second level" in which new forms of experience are always possible because they are regarded
merely as coordinate species of a genus.

But when Colling-

wood asserts in Speculum Mentis that absolute knowledge
forms the upper limit of forms of experience, he is speaking from the "third level" at which subject and object are
identified, the "absolute standpoint" (cf. CRM, 69-73,
369-72).

Where Collingwood's project seems to falter, Ru-

binoff calls up a reserve battery of idealistic arguments,
from Hegel to Husserl, and from Bradley to Bosanquet and
Blanshard. 17 And the summit of Collingwood's idealistic
efforts is a description of mind as "pure act" 18 --which
stands in stark contrast to Donagan's static hierarchy of
levels of abstract concepts, related by the logic of the
Principia Mathematica.

17 The most noteworthy use of idealistic arguments in
Rubinoff's book are the sections dealing with the logic of
the "concrete universal" (interestingly enough in the chapter
on "Philosophy as Absolute Knowledge") and with the theory of
mind as pure act. CRM, 150-83, 315-22.
18Rubinoff uses in this portion of his argument Collingwood's translation of G. de Ruggiero's Modern Philosophy.
CRM, 315-22.
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To the extent that he, too, finds a temporarily schizophrenic Collingwood unacceptable, Louis 0. Mink sides with
Rubinoff--but not by calling up the arguments of Hegelian
idealism.

-wood,

In his perceptive and refreshingly tactful book,

Mind, History, and Dialectic:

-

The Philosophy of R. G. Colling-

Mink asserts with Rubinoff, and against Donagan, that

Collingwood is a dialectical philosopher rather than an analytical one.

But he holds, in direct opposition to Rubinoff,

that Collingwood "retained dialectic and abandoned the absolute" (MHD, 78).

And like Donagan, Mink finds Collingwood's

religious philosophy the least interesting of all his thought.
Mink goes so far as to say that Collingwood had no sympathy
for the philosophy of religion, and that Religion and Philosophy was Collingwood's only non-dialectical book (MHD, 16,
20, 260 n. 7).

But Mink is no subscriber to Donagan's thesis

that Collingwood's later philosophy of mind represents a complete break with his earlier philosophical program as exemplified in Speculum Mentis and made explicit in the Essay on
Philosophical Method (MHD, ix, 16, 20).
Mink employs his considerable interpretative skills
in bringing out the "recessive" themes in Collingwood's philosophy.

In doing so he tries to display the "figure in the

carpet" (a tri-partite dialectic of experience, of concepts,
and of mind) that makes it possible to soften many of the apparent absurdities and contradictions in Collingwood's phil-
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osophy (MHD, 80; cf. MHD, 52, 118, 237).

In his essay for the

Krausz collection, for example, he takes up Collingwood's
famous description of history as the "rethinking of past acts
of thought" and shows that each term of the expression requires qualifications in the light of Collingwood's "dialectic of process."

In Mink's reconstruction "history" in this

expression must be taken as a philosophical rather than an
empirical concept, and is thus subject to the characterization of philosophical concepts that Collingwood gave in his
Essay on Philosophical Method.

As a philosophical concept it

has a dialectical structure, which means that the elements
designated by the term "history" are related in a developing series or a "scale of forms" (CEPC, 157-72).
Mink describes such a dialectical system as having
four properties:

it is (1) connective (the terms in the ser-

ies are related generically to a single essence or general
description), (2) cumulative (members of the series are preserved and modified in successive forms), (3) asymmetrical
(no member is the mere duplicate of another, but rather differs both in degree and in kind from the others), and (4)
non-deterministic (in the series a prior term is necessary
but not a sufficient condition for the generation of its successor).

Mink argues that since intellectual history (e.g.

the history of science, art, or religion) deals with a subject which involves acts that are purposively connected,
cumulative in effect, non-cyclic and non-deterministic in
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their growth, it is clear that it answers to a dialectical
system.

All history (in the philosophical sense) is there-

fore the re-thinking (i.e. the dialectical analysis) of past
acts of thought (CEPC, 172-76).
But while these efforts by sympathetic admirers of
Collingwood's philosophy may go a long way towards giving the
reader an understanding of the intricacies and articulations
of Collingwood's philosophy, their solutions to its central
paradox would fail to satisfy many of the other contributors
to the Krausz volume--and especially as that paradox is stated
in the Essay on Metaphysics.

Thus W. H. Walsh points out that

when Collingwood wrote in that work that "absolute presuppositions" (the true object of the metaphysician's search rather
than the "pure being" of the ontologists, which Collingwood
rejects as an empty concept) are neither true nor false, he
qualified himself as a "metaphysical neutralist"--Walsh's
term for a philosopher who limits himself to description
only, refusing to apply criteria which would allow one to
make a judgment on the truth or falsity, reality or unreality,
etc. of the object described.

As merely descriptive and fac-

tually encountered factors operative in the thought of those
who are engaged in any piece of scientific thinking, such
presuppositions may escape the positivistic condemnation of
metaphysical assertions as neither factually verifiable nor
analytically tautologous, but they are also rendered immune
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to any sort of justification--they can merely be reported.
Metaphysics is thus an historical science, as Collingwood's
central thesis of the Essay on Metaphysics maintains; but how
then account for the referability, adequacy, or success of
one set of "con-supponible" presuppositions to another
(CEPC, 134-53; especially, 142-46, 149)?
Similarly, Stephen Toulmin argues that although Collingwood was one of the few pioneer thinkers to come to grips
with the central and still unanswered metaphysical question
about conceptual changes in the history of science (or scientific revolutions, as Kuhn was later to call them), his
"relativism" (roughly the equivalent to Walsh's "neutralism")
prevented him from giving a rational account of why they occur.

Instead Collingwood resorted to a quasi-causal, psycho-

logistic explanation in terms of unconscious mental "strains"
occurring in a constellation or set of presuppositions (Kuhn's
"crisis in normal science") which are "taken up" or resolved
when a new conceptual framework replaces an old one (in Kuhn's
terms, when a new "paradigm science" appears, completing a
conceptual revolution).

Toulmin's dissatisfaction with both

Kuhn and Collingwood adds fuel to Walsh's charge:

if two sets

of presuppositions differ, must there not be some mutual presuppositions with respect to which, or by reference to which,
they are in agreement (CEPC, 201-21, especially 209-13)?
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Finally, Nathan Rotenstreich adds his eloquent voice
to this dissenting chorus with a deft discussion of Collingwood's proposed reform of metaphysics vis-a-vis the tradition
he proposed to reform--Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.
Rotenstreich shows that as often as not when Collingwood used
historical examples of a metaphysician (in Collingwood's reformed sense) who pointed out the presuppositions of science
in one period or another, he (Collingwood) ignored the evaluative activities of these same philosophers, who were not
concerned with reportage only, but with justification and critique as well.

What remains of Collingwood's truncated ver-

sion of metaphysical history is what Rotenstreich calls a
"cultural anthropology of metaphysics," which "does not distinguish between the intention and the intentionality of a
metaphysical system which attempts to be categorical" (CEPC,
179-221; esp. 179-80, 197-99).
From this seeming dead end two escapes are possible:
expansion and revision.
Krausz volume.

Both are represented by essays in the

The first is taken by Errol Harris.

Like Ru-

binoff, Harris is a sympathetic student of Collingwood and of
the great idealists of this and the last centuries, and he
supplements Collingwood's thought by evoking a frankly idealistic context for it.

But unlike Rubinoff, Harris does not he-

sitate to criticize some of Collingwood's positions as unten-
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able. 19

In his essay for the Krausz volume, Harris renews

his argument with Gilbert Ryle over Collingwood's defense of
the ontological argument, first carried out in the pages of

-

Mind in 1935 and 1936, just after Collingwood's Essay on
Philosophical Method was published. 20 Ryle had argued that
c&lingwood's use of Anselm's argument made the common idealistic mistake of thinking that concrete matters of fact (concerning the existence of anything whatever) could be established by the use of

~

priori arguments that can only es-

tablish their conclusions hypothetically.

Harris' response

is to defend the idealist's use of such arguments by showing
the legitimacy of "categorical universal" judgments, "the
concrete universal" of Bosanquet and Bradley, and the Absolute of Hegel (CEPC, 113-33).
Michael Krausz, on the other hand, takes the alternative route.

Collingwood had said in the Essay on Metaphysics

19 cf. Errol E. Harris, "Collingwood on Eternal Problems," Philosophical Quarterly, I, no. 3 (April, 1951), pp.
228-41. Reprinted in his Nature, Mind and Modern Science
(London, 1954), pp. 3-42.
- - -20G. Ryle, "Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological Argument," Mind, XLIV (April, 1935), pp. 137-51; E. E. Harris,
"Mr. Ryle and the Ontological Argument," Mind, XLV (October,
1937), pp. 474-80; G. Ryle, "Back to the Ontological Argument," Mind, XLVI (January, 1937), pp. 53-57. These essays
are printed in John H. Hick and Arthur C. McGill, eds., The
Many-Faced Argument (New York, 1967), pp. 246-74.
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(1) that all questions have presuppositions from which they
logically arise; (2) that to be true or false a proposition
has to be an answer to a question; and (3) that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false because they are not
answers to questions, but stand relative to all questions,
in a body of inquiry, as their presuppositions.

Krausz ar-

gues that Collingwood's formulation of the relation of absolute presuppositions may be interpreted to mean either that
it cannot be the answer to a question in any given systematic
inquiry, or in any systematic inquiry whatever.

In the second

case it is impossible to explain how what is taken as an absolute presupposition at one time can become a relative presupposition (i.e. one that is itself an answer to a question,
and therefore verifiably true or false) at another.

Krausz's

strategy is to argue in favor of the first interpretation,
which involves altering Collingwood's theory of meaning to
conform with more contemporarily acceptable accounts, notably
that of P. F. Strawson, which allow for senses of truth and
falsity not specified by Collingwood (CEPC, 222-40).
It is unnecessary to delve any further into Krausz's
collection of critical essays, 21 since we have at this point
21 There are included in this volume illuminating articles by W. von Leyden, Peter Jones, and Richard Wollheim on
Collingwood's esthetics and philosophy of mind; by Leon J.
Goldstein on the constitution of the historical past (which
deserves special marks for its care in comparing Collingwood's
actual historical praxis, in his writings on Roman Britain,
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a fairly synoptic overview of the range of alternatives available to the reader interested in finding out the extent of
Collingwood's coherence--or incoherence--as a philosopher.
Many of these ideas and issues will arise again in chapters
to come, but before stating our own reasons for rejecting the
approaches of the principal interpreters of Collingwood some
sort of summary of conclusions is in order.

Table I sets

forth observations which seem to follow from our brief survey
of Collingwood's interpreters.
We shall see in Chapter II that the list of issues
which we have found to be the central core of concern to Collingwood's interpreters turns out, interestingly enough, to
be the very set of issues that Collingwood himself presents
in his Autobiography.

And yet not one of the contributors to

this volume of essays seriously considered the Autobiography
as an interpretation valid for the whole of his philosophy.
This is all the more the pity, because it seems that Collingwood is worthy of at least that degree of attention that he
lavished on the unfortunate Albert Memorial during his miliwith the theory of historical imagination in The Idea of History--perhaps the first time an author has approached Collingwood's work on the philosophy of history on his own terms);
by Sherman M. Stanage on "Collingwood's Phenomenology of Education: Person and the Self-Recognition of the Mind" (based
on a few scant remarks by Collingwood on the spearker-hearer
situation and the learning of language, in The Principles of
Art); and by A. J. M. Milne on Collingwood's ethics and political theory (which might serve as an antidote to Walsh's remarks in an earlier essay about Collingwood's lack of appreciation for the social sciences.)
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TABLE 1
THE INTERPRETATIONS OF COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY
1.

2.

The major issues with which Collingwood's interpreters
are concerned are:
a.

his attitudes towards, and arguments about, realism
and idealism;

b.

his formulation of the logic of questions, answers,
and presuppositions, and in general his position on
philosophical methodology;

c.

his remarks about the nature of history and the relationship of history to philosophy, and especially
of history to metaphysics; and

d.

the way or ways inwhich he worked out a reconciliation of all the disparate forms of knowledge (religion, art, science, history, philosophy) within an
overall philosophy of mind.

The major alternatives which interpreters have presented
for dealing with the central paradoxes of Collingwood's
philosophy are as follows:
a.

since Collingwood's philosophy is
stands, it is necessary to divide
into two or more groups, based on
premises on which they are based,
relative merits of one group over

not
his
the
and
the

coherent as it
published works
contradictory
then argue the
other or others;

b.

since Collingwood's philosophy is not coherent as it
stands, it is necessary to propose a revision of a portion of it in order to render the remainder coherent;

c.

since Collingwood's philosophy is coherent as it stands,
its apparent inconsistency can be resolved by assimilating it to a larger and more complete schema--e.g.
historical idealism;

d.

since Collingwood's philosophy is coherent as it stands,
its apparent inconsistency can be resolved by showing
the essential core of truth or coherence that unifies
its diverse aspects.
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tary service in World War I.

For in so much of what he

writes he seems, like the lines he quotes from Wordsworth's
"Leech-Gatherer" to describe this monument,
Like one whom I had met with in a dream;
Or like a man from some far region sent,
To give me human strength, by apt admonishment (A, 29).
It would be apt, therefore, to admonish oneself as an interpreter of Collingwood to ask what relationship there is between what he did and what he had tried to do--the very question he wished to put to Scott, the architect of the Albert
Memorial--and to start by taking seriously what he said he
had tried to do, before rejecting or revising what he did.
4.

On Interpreting Collingwood.

The very issue that is at the center of controversy concerning Collingwood's philosophy recoils upon the method an
interpreter chooses to employ in dealing with that philosophy.
For (1) if history and philosophy are not identical, then in
dealing with Collingwood's philosophy in an historical manner,
the question of its truth or falsity cannot arise:

the his-

torian would merely point to the "facts" of the matter, record any lapses in coherence, and let the matter stand.

And

in dealing with it in a philosophical manner, all the works
of Collingwood suddenly assume equal standing, and it becomes
impossible to see how later positions develop out of earlier
ones, or how one work has priority over another.

One is there-

43

fore stuck again with apparent contradictions in his fundamental assertions.

But (2) if history and

philosophy~

identical, then one cannot deal with Collingwood's philosophy
in a non-evaluative manner:

understanding what he said at

various points in his career would therefore be only a prelude to measuring its implicit promise against its explicit
performance, and evaluating the outcome.

But this alternative

necessitates the evaluation of some texts as central and
others as peripheral, and therefore choosing the "facts" to
which one is to attend.
But if in getting caught up in interpretative controversies we were to sidestep the issue of truth in Collingwood's philosophy, we would be showing that we had not
learned the main lessons he wished to teach us about history:

to think historically is not to merely record facts

and refrain from judgment.

History is essentially a judg-

mental affair, because it involves selective attention to
a chosen set of facts.

This is supremely the case when it

comes to the history of philosophy, where the "facts" to
which the historian selectively attends are meanings and
meaning-complexes.

One must

therefore take a philosopher

for what he said (because this constitutes all the evidence
we have for what he was thinking) but only as a symbol for
for what he meant.

Conflicts in evidence (e.g. contradic-

tion in the texts) may make it difficult or impossible to get
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beyond the symbol to the meaning, but this then is the point
at which the borders between history and philosophy become
precarious.

But since so much of Collingwood's thought re-

sides here, we must not fear to explore these disputed
territories.
To think philosophically about the past, according
to Collingwood, is also to take it as intentional--that is,
as something already deliberated upon and thought about with
us in mind as the intended heirs to a mental estate.

The ques-

tion one ought to ask with respect to Collingwood's philosophy
should then be not what chronological series of literary
events occurred in his lifetime, but rather what order or sequence of thoughts he intended for his readers to follow if
they are to understand his thinking.

Now it is in his Auto-

biography that Collingwood publicly specified for his philosophical heirs what sort of program he wished them to inherit, and in it he tried to make clear how they should proceed to lay claim to this inheritance.

We therefore re-

spectfully decline to accept the limited inheritance offered
to us by Mr. T. M. Knox, and declare our intentions to carry
our suit to a higher court.

In doing so we propose to accept

his Autobiography as Collingwood's only public, legal will.
In arguing our case we shall seriously attempt to live
up to the highest standards of historical scholarship--these
standards being those governing the philosophical interpreta-
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tion of another philosopher's literary remains.

Most of the

canons for such an endeavor are usually given in negative
terms.

Two of them were cited by Collingwood himself in the

Autobiography:

(1) never accept criticism of any author be-

fore satisfying yourself of its relevance; and (2) reconstruct the problem, or never think you understand any statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the
utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he
means it for an answer (A, 74).

To these we add the five interpreter's fallacies stated by Richard Robinson 22 (which we

shall number consecutively to the two Collingwood canons just
cited).

One should avoid committing any or all of the follow-

ing atrocities to a philosophical text:

(3) mosaic interpre-

tation (the habit of laying any amount of weight on an isolated text or single sentence, without determining whether it is
a passing remark or a settled part of your author's thinking);
(4) misinterpretation by abstraction (assuming that because an

author mentions X and X appears to the interpreter to be a
case of Y, that the author also meant, asserted, or was aware
of Y); (6) the fallacy of insinuating the future (assuming
22 Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford,
1953), pp. 1-5. It is interesting that Robinson seems to envision the task of an interpreter in terms which sound like
a direct quotation from Collingwood: "The purpose of an interpreter . . . is to make himself and others rethink the very
thoughts that were thought by someone long ago. Interpretation is not just any sort of commentary, including the revelation of the historical causes and consequences of a given
thought. It is the re-creation of that thought" (Ibid.,
pp. 5-6).
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that the author held doctrines that did not become explicit
until later); and (7) going beyond a thinker's last word
(ascribing to him not merely all the steps he took in a certain direction but the next step too). 23
There may be more rules than this, but these are the
most helpful ones this author has ever encountered, and suffice for the task at hand.

They serve to eliminate every in-

terpretation of Collingwood that has yet been offered.

For

(1) would it not be an error to accept Knox's criticism of
Collingwood's radical conversion to historicism as a lapse
into dogmatism and scepticism due to a cerebrovascular accident, without satisfying ourselves first that it is relevant?
And (2) would it not be a mistake to reconstruct Collingwood's mature

philosophy of mind, as Donagan does, without

understanding what the question was to which it was meant for
an answer?

And was this question not "How can a thinking

person understand his own mind without resorting to the errors
of realism?"

And (3) is it not a mosaic interpretation when

Rubinoff takes the metaphorical remark in Speculum Mentis
about the three ways the "prize of truth" may be awarded, and
then erects on this frail motif the "three ontological levels
of consciousness" on which are mapped all of Collingwood's
23 we also declare ourselves bound by the full set of
grammatical and logical rules necessary for any discourse to
make sense and be coherent. These we omit stating because
they are assumed in any piece of rational inquiry.
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writings, from books to essays to letters and even translations?24

And (4) is it not a case of misinterpretation by

abstraction when Mink rules out Collingwood's views on religion and its philosophy (in the book by that name) on the
grounds that they are not dialectical?

For how does Mink know

that because Collingwood argues that philosophy is at least
dialectical that he would accept the further statement that
that is all it is?

Does he not say it is also analytical,

and is that not what he is engaged in doing in Religion and
Philosophy?

And (5) is it not a case of misinterpretation by

inference to assert, as once again Donagan does, that because
in Speculum Mentis Collingwood connected the doctrine of realism to the mental function of abstraction, and argued that all
abstraction is falsification, and then later in The Principles
of Art argues (if he in fact did so) that all concepts are
abstract, that he therefore "repudiated" his earlier rejection
of realism?

And (6) is it not an insinuation of the future

to argue, as Donagan does, that Collingwood's philosophy of
mind is a specimen of linguistic analysis of the sort carried
out in Ryle's Concept of Mind, and then to assert (on the deception of this analogy with Ryle) that it is fundamentally
anti-Cartesian?

But on the other hand (if we may be per-

24 r do not wish to imply that Rubinoff is the only interpreter to commit this error: Donagan and Mink are equally
guilty of mosaic interpretation--Donagan's four principles of
the philosophy of mind and Mink's tri-partite dialectic of experience, concepts, and mind are also examples of it.
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mitted to invent a new version of (6), is it not an insinuation of the past to justify Collingwood's philosophy of mind,
as Rubinoff does, by appeal to the idealism of Hegel?

And

(7) is it not going beyond an author's last word to argue,
as Rubinoff does, that because Collingwood took several steps
in the direction of a descriptive phenomenology of consciousness in Speculum Mentis, that he therefore would take the next
step too, and endorse a "transcendental phenomenology" of
mind (CRM, 54, 152-53, 311-15)?
And yet historical scholarship, like history itself,
is a developmental process, as Collingwood says, in which
successive terms sum up and go beyond previous terms without
being necessitated by them.

Our own interpretation of Col-

lingwood is itself subject to this description.

Therefore

in what follows we shall see how Collingwood's philosophy,
in senses yet to be specified, displays most of the characteristics that his interpreters have attributed to it--perhaps even some that they did not:
(1)

As Knox points out, Collingwood's most apparent

problem is his "historicism"--his tendency to identify philosophy with history; and beyond this is a deeper, less apparent
problem of establishing a workable relationship between metaphysics (which Collingwood recognized to be at the center of
philosophy) and religious faith.

And as Knox (and later such

authors as Walsh, Toulmin, and Rotenstreich) argue, his final
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position as stated in the Essay on Metaphysics does display
aspects both sceptical and dogmatic.

But unlike Knox, we

find no need to posit a radical reversal in his philosophy,
and by viewing the paradoxical statements of the Essay on
Metaphysics in the light of the overall philosophical orientation provided in his Autobiography, and the development
of his thought in his published writings, this dogmatism and
scepticism are transformed into something more akin to conviction and necessary self-criticism--philosophical virtues
rather than vices.

For there is no need to take the Essay

on Metaphysics as a work all by itself, abstracted from his
other writings.

When restored to its rightful context, its

central paradox is illuminated and refined, and the limits of
its applicability are re-established; metaphysics may be more
than an historical science, but Collingwood's point is that
it is at least that.
(2)

And as Donagan argues, Collingwood's unique

achievement in his later writings is a philosophy of mind that
is carried out by arguments which stress the importance of
expressive, linguistic structures in the life of thought.
But unlike Donagan we find no grounds for arguing that his
final philosophy of mind "repudiates" his earlier antirealistic stance, or even that it was "anti-Cartesian" or
anti-intuitional in denying the thesis that self-consciousness
is possible at all.

The linguistic basis for his conclusions
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was present even in his early writings, and he never varied
in his assault on what he took to be the main tenet of realistic philosophy.

For Collingwood, refuting this central

tenet does not mean maintaining that "all abstraction is
falsification," as Donagan thinks, but rather it involves
showing that the proposition "knowing makes no difference to
the object known" is false.
(3)

And as Mink argues, the central "figure in the

carpet" of Collingwood's philosophy is recognizable in the
methodology first explicitly spelled out in the Essay on
Philosophical Method--a work that is, as Knox first said it
was, a philosophical classic.

We also will agree that the

philosophy of mind that Collingwood worked out in his later
writings exhibits the structure of a scale of forms, a structure first exhibited in Speculum Mentis, which Mink calls
Collingwood's first dialectical book.

However we find no

need to argue, as Mink does, that Collingwood "discovered"
dialectic after writing Religion and Philosophy, nor that
Collingwood had no sympathy or interest in the philosophy of
religion.

On the contrary we will find that Collingwood's

philosophy is profoundly religious, and although he discontinued talking about "absolute knowledge" in his later writings, he modified his view of a philosophical absolute rather
than dropping it altogether (as his discussion of the ontological argument in both the Essay on Philosophical Method
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and the Essay on Metaphysics shows).

And although some of

the functions of a philosophical absolute were taken over
by "absolute presuppositions," it is clear that Collingwood
took as one of the absolute presuppositions of contemporary
science the doctrine of Christianity that God exists.
(4)

And as Rubinoff argues, Collingwood's philosophy

as a whole cannot be understood apart from his overall orientation towards a rapprochement of the alienating forces typical of the contemporary human situation.

The paradigm for

this rapprochement was indeed the relation of philosophy and
history, which the position Collingwood called "realism" was
committed to ignoring.

And the means that Collingwood used

to re-establish continuity between forms of knowledge was by
arguments which are, in some sense of the term, "idealistic,"
relying as they do on premises that are incompatible with the
realistic thesis that "knowing makes no difference to the object known."

However there is no need to call in Hegel's

aufheben--or even Bradley's experiential Absolute--to save
Collingwood's rapprochement project.

If because of irrecon-

cilable contradictions on fundamental issues Collingwood's
philosophy cannot be approached on its own terms, it must be
declared to be to that extent inconsistent and in need of revision, rather than declared to be incomplete and in need of
assimilation to, or absorption by, the philosophy of Hegel.
If we are in debt to Rubinoff for exposing the fallacy of the
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"radical conversion hypothesis," we also declare ourselves
free of his own fallacy, the "radical consistency hypothesis."
The plain fact is that Collingwood did change his mind on several issues, and stated publicly that he had done so--but not
on the fundamental issues discussed in the Autobiography, as
we shall see.
In short, the thesis of our interpretation is that it
is possible to make sense of Collingwood on his own terms, if
we are careful to avoid making the errors of our interpretative predecessors.

Perhaps by so doing we shall avoid the

wrath of the shade of Collingwood, who warned us of a haunting should we fail to take heed to the requirements of philosophical interpretation:
The reader . . . must approach his philosophical author
precisely as if he were a poet, in the sense that he must
seek in his work the expression of an individual experience, something which the writer has actually lived
through, and something which the reader must live through
in his turn by entering into the writer's mind with his
own. To this basic and ultimate task of following or
understanding his author, coming to see what he means by
sharing his experience, the task of criticizing his doctrine, or determining how far it is true and how far
false, is altogether secondary. A good reader, like a
good listener, must be quiet in order to be attentive;
able to refrain from obtruding his own thoughts, the better to apprehend those of the writer; not passive, but
using his activity to follow where he is led, not to find
a path of his own. A writer who does not deserve this
silent, uninterrupting attention does not deserve to be
read at all (EPM, 215).

CHAPTER II
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF
COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY
1.

The Autobiography as Literary Evidence.

In an essay written just two years prior to the publication of his own Autobiography, Collingwood wrote the following account of the requirements for adequate autobiographical composition:
If anyone of us were setting out to compose such an account ((viz. an autobiography - ''a strictly historical account of my own past")), he would be confronted with two
kinds of tasks . . . . The first task is that of recollecting: he must search his memory for a vision of past
experiences, and use various means of stimulating it,
for example by reading letters and books that he once
wrote, revisiting places associated in his mind with certain events, and so forth. When this is done, he has before his mind a spectacle of the relevant parts of his
own past life; he sees a young man undergoing such and
such experiences, and knows that this young man was himself. But now begins the second task. He must not merely
know that this young man was himself, he must try to rediscover that young man's thoughts. And here recollection is a treacherous guide . . . because thought is not
wholly entangled in the flow of experience, so that we
constantly reinterpret our past thoughts and assimilate
them to those we are thinking now. There is only one way
in which this tendency is to be checked. If I want to be
sure that twenty years ago ~ certain thought was-ieaiiy-in ~mind, l must have evidence of it. That evidence
must be a book or letter or the like that I then wrote
. . . . Only by having some such evidence before me, and
interpreting it fairly and squarely, can I prove to myself
that I did think thus. Having done so, I rediscover my
past self, and re-enact these thoughts as my thoughts;
53
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judging now better than I could then, it is to be hoped,
their merits and defects. (IH, 295-96, emphasis mine.)
It would be hard to believe that a trained archeologist and historian, having just written such a clear account
of the criteria for autobiography, an account which expresses
such a hard-headed view of what counts as evidence for such
a literary project, could have forgotten about them completely when it came time two years later to write his own autobiography.

Yet such is the charge of more than one of Col-

lingwood's interpreters--including the man Collingwood named
as his literary executor (cf. IH, x-xi).
Since the charge has been made it must be confronted
in the same spirit of historical objectivity to which Collingwood himself subscribed.

In the second part of his task,

Collingwood wrote, "there is nothing which the autobiographer
does . . . that the historian could not do for another" (IH,
296).

If the autobiographer, in short, performs his task

with the same rigor that is expected of historians, he functions as an historian of a subject matter which merely happens to be the events of his own life.

If in fact Colling-

wood was in good faith with this principle when he wrote his
Autobiography (and he at least claimed that he was--see A,
107 and "Preface"), his own interpretation of his intellectual development (and this is the main concern of the Autobiography) stands as one among other such interpretations,
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each of which must be judged in accordance with the same criteria:

each must be an interpretation of Collingwood's

thought, based on the evidence provided by Collingwood's published writings, critically evaluated.
One serious objection to taking the Autobiography in
this way is that at the time Collingwood wrote it (1938) two
of his major works (An Essay on Metaphysics and The New Leviathan) and several articles had not yet been written.

Con-

sequently a good part of his interpretation of what his philosophy actually achieves remains speculation about what he intended it to achieve, and not what, on the basis of documentary evidence, it already had achieved.

It is because his

work remained incomplete at the time of the writing of his
Autobiography that several of his interpreters have felt justified in rejecting the latter and arguing that his later
works break entirely with the positions he had maintained
prior to his writing of the Autobiography.
But while it is certainly quite appropriate to raise
the question of the de facto adherence of these later works
to the philosophical doctrines of Collingwood's earlier writings, or of the adherence of both of these to the interpretation offered in the Autobiography, it is capriciously arbitrary at best, and maliciously prejudicial at worst, to exclude the latter as a possible interpretation valid for the
whole of Collingwood's philosophy, including the later works.
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That the Autobiography should not be allowed a privileged
position among the interpretations offered of Collingwood's
philosophy is a defensible corollary of the principle cited
by Collingwood above (viz. that correct autobiography is an
application of correct historiography); but that it should be
given no consideration is just as clearly ruled out by the
same principle.
A second objection is that in addition to proposing
an interpretation or an account of the development of his
thought, Collingwood's Autobiography also cites evidence to
support this interpretation, and since some of this evidence
is not publicly available, the interpretation based on this
evidence is also open to question.
Now the evidence in the Autobiography is of three
sorts:

(1) direct statements by Collingwood of positions he

holds, at least at the time of the writing of the Autobiogra-

£by; (2) references to published works that he had completed
some years before, some with and some without qualifying remarks to indicate the extent to which he still agreed or disagreed with what he had written; and (3) references to unpublished manuscripts.

Certainly there is no difficulty with

taking statements from the first group as evidence that as of
1938 Collingwood held the positions that he says he does.
And just as certainly, statements from the second can be
checked for their accuracy by consulting the published works
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to which they refer.

Where such reference is factually mis-

taken, one can only register the lapse and credit Collingwood
only as holding to the position he is discussing (if he gives
textual indication of it) as his own as of 1938.

The third

group requires special comment.
In the Autobiography Collingwood refers to four pieces
of documentary evidence that he gives every indication of having consulted during his composition of the text, but which
are not accessible to other historians.

Two of these docu-

ments--an unpublished book called Truth and Contradiction
which he wrote in 1917, and a book-length essay written in
1920 and jokingly entitled Libellus de Generatione (as if
written by one of the Italian idealists)--were destroyed by
Collingwood after he wrote the Autobiography (A, 42, 99, and
99 n.l).

The other two may still exist:

one is a paper he

wrote around 1918 and read to his colleagues at Oxford, but
apparently never published (A, 44); the other is a 1928 paper
which he calls his "Die manuscript" (because it was written
at a country-house at Le Martouret near Die in France), and
which he may have published under a more descriptive title
(A, 107).

Of these four documents the first two were seen by

at least one other person apiece--the first by "a publisher"
to whom it was sent (and by whom it was refused) (A, 42); and
the second by Guido de Ruggiero, "for whom I typed a copy,
thinking that it might amuse him as an historian of philoso-
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phy" (A, 99).

Whether the latter copy still exists is, to

my knowledge, unknown; but in any event no one has questioned
the fact that the original 1917 and 1920 manuscripts did
exist until Collingwood destroyed them.

The 1918 Oxford pa-

per may be among those unpublished papers still in the possession of Mrs. Kathleen F. Collingwood.

If in fact he did pub-

lish the "Die manuscript" under a different title, it is still
identifiable only in terms of the content he assigns to it,
and is hence not unimpeachable evidence.
Since the remainder of the pieces of literary evidence that Collingwood cites in the Autobiography refer to
books and articles still publicly available, such evidence is
not in question, and one can still test his interpretation by
comparing it with the relevant texts.

The case is not so

clear with respect to the four items mentioned above, and
hence they must be treated as evidence of nothing more than
what Collingwood's views were at the time of his writing of
the Autobiography.

The doctrines that Collingwood claims to

have espoused in these docuQents, insofar as he mentions what
these doctrines are, and insofar as he does not directly repudiate the position stated, must be treated just like the
other direct and contentful statements he makes in the Autobiography--that is, they must be taken as stating doctrines
that he does not assign only to one period or to one document,
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but puts forward as positions that he currently held. 1
1 since the issue is crucial for the interpretation of
Collingwood's philosophy as contained in Autobiography, and
since the issue is made so sensitive by later writers on Collingwood's philosophy, at the risk of tedium I propose the
following propositional version of what I take to be the limits
of autobiographical interpretation:
Supposing in manuscript M1 at time T1 an interpreter
finds author A1 making these statements:

S2:

"I hold P1
"In M at T I held Pz
2
2

S3:

"I still hold Pz

sl:

II

II

II

Then an interpreter is justified in making at least
the following assertions:
Il:Ml is evidence that Al held sl, sz, and s3 at Tl.
Iz:Ml is evidence that Al held pl and Pz at T1 .
He is clearly not justified if he were to say:
I 3 :M 1 is evidence

held P2 at T2 .
He is not justified because I 3 is not constructable on
the basis of s 1 - s 3 of M1 . It is valid on the evidence of M2
only if M2 at T2 contains the assertion, "I hold P 2 ." In
short, s 2 is itself an interpretation requiring M2 for its
justifying evidence. The situation is not changed if the interpreter is the author himself, and the manuscripts are his
own writings.
that~
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2.

The Autobiography as Historical Interpretation.
Prior to the Autobiography Collingwood had published

only four philosophical works:

Religion and Philosophy

(1916), Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophical
Method

(1933), and The Principles of Art (1938).

The latter

two were intended as part of a projected series of philosophical works, about which we will have more to say presently.
Concerning the former two Collingwood has several remarks in
the Autobiography.

Religion and Philosophy had been written

"some years earlier" than 1916 "to tidy up and put behind me
a number of thoughts arising out of my juvenile studies in
theology" (A, 43).

The main effect of these studies, at

least for the development of his later thought, was his recognition of the falsity of the claim that empirical psychology had "already exploded the pretensions and inherited the
possessions of the old pseudo-sciences of logic, ethics, political theory, and so forth," and was hence the science of
human affairs the world was seeking (A, 92).
If this claim never for a moment deceived me, that is a
benefit I owed to my early studies in theology. Like
every one else who studied that subject in those days, I
read William James' Varieties of Religious Experience
and a lot of other books in which religion was treated
from a psychological point of view . . . . I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties . . . because the whole
thing was a fraud. The book professed to throw light on
a certain subject, and threw no light on it whatever.
And that because of the method used. It was not because
the book was a bad example of psychology, but because it
~as a good example of psychology, that it left its subJect completely unilluminated. And in Religion and Phil-
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osophy I attacked, not William James, but any and every
psychological treatment of religion, in a passage of
which the crucial words are "the mind, regarded in this
way, ceases to be mind at all." (A, 93).2
According to the above account, then, Collingwood's first published philosophical work attacked the psychologistic reductions of religion and mind to neuropathology and physiology
respectively, defending them as on the contrary functions of
consciousness, reason, and will (cf. A, 94-95).
His second philosophical work attempted to establish
a position independently of idealism, but repudiating realism
--a position which belonged to no recognizable or ready-made
class.
I became used to it . . . when ((for example)) one of the
"realists" (not an Oxford man), reviewing the first book
in which I tried toindicate my position, dismissed it in
a few lines as "the usual idealistic nonsense." The book
was Speculum Mentis, published in 1924. It was a bad book
in many ways. The position laid down in it was incompletely thought out and unskillfully expressed . . . . But any
one who had been intelligent enough to see what I was
trying to say would have realized . . . that it was neither "usual" nor "idealistic." (A, 56-57).
In a footnote to this passage Collingwood adds that, having
just re-read Speculum Mentis for the first time since it was
published, he found it better than he had remembered.
2The exact words are: "The mind, regarded in this external way, really ceases to be a mind at all. To study a
man's consciousness without studying the thing of which he is
c~nscious is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trifh.ng abstraction." (RP, 42; FR, 77).
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It is a record, not so very obscure in expression, of a
good deal of genuine thinking. If much of it now fails
to satisfy me, that is because I have gone on thinking
since I wrote it, and therefore much of it needs to be
supplemented and qualified. There is not a great deal
that needs to be retracted. (A, 56, n. 1).
Surprisingly enough, this is as much as Collingwood
has to say in his Autobiography about his first two published
philosophical books.

For the remaining evidence that his

ideas developed as he said they did in the period from 1912
to 1932 Collingwood refers the reader to the short articles
he published in philosophical periodicals, "where they were
rendered useless by the fixed determination of the persons who
read such periodicals not to think about history" (A, 116, n.
1).

Two volumes of these essays have appeared since Colling-

wood's death (EPA in 1964 and EPH in 1965).

His first two

books and these essays (several of which are included by Knox
in the concluding portions of The Idea of History are the only
sources presently available for critically reconstructing the
development of Collingwood's philosophy during the period
prior to the appearance of the Autobiography.
What sort of conclusion then can one draw from a careful reading of the Autobiography concerning Collingwood's development as a philosopher?

Every indication in the Autobiog-

raphy leads the reader to conclude that if there was any "development' of his ideas, during which time a possible change of
mind may have occurred, it was in the period from 1912 to 1932
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(A, 23, 28, 116-17), and that after 1932 he was engaged in
preparing his conclusions for publication.
The ideas very briefly summarized in this chapter ((viz.
ch. X--"History as the Self-Knowledge of Mind")) and the
two preceding it were being worked out for nearly twenty
years after I became a teacher of philosophy ((in 1912)).
They were repeatedly written down, corrected, and rewritten . . . . None of these writings has ever been intended for publication, although much of their substance
has been repeatedly given in lecture form; but I am publishing this short summary because the main problems are
now ((i.e. in 1938)) solved, and publishing them in full
is only a question of time and health. (A, 116-17).
Both of these conditions, however, were to prove problematic:
By about 1930 my health was beginning to suffer from longcontinued overwork . . . . By this time I had in my head
a great deal which I believed the public would value; and
the only way of giving it to the public was by writing
books. On this, therefore, I decided to spend my leisure;
and planned a series, to begin with an Essay on Philosophical Method. This I wrote during a long illness in 1932.
It is my best book in matter; in style, I may call it my
only book, for it is the only one I ever had the time to
finish as well as I knew how, instead of leaving it in a
more or less rough state. After settling accounts with my
archeological studies . . . I wrote in 1937 the second
book of my series, The Principles of Art. Before it had
gone through the press I was overtaken by the more serious
illness which gave me both the leisure and the motive to
write this autobiography; whose purpose is to put on record some brief account of the work I have not yet been
able to publish, in case I am not able to publish it in
full. Henceforth I shall spend all my available time in
going on with the series. (A, 117-18).
This passage is crucial for any attempt to reconcile
Collingwood's later philosophy to the interpretation of it offered in the Autobiography.

It will be the purpose of the

later chapters of this dissertation to examine the extent to
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which this program--his "series"--was carried out.
I merely wish to make two observations.

Right now

First, Collingwood

leaves no doubt that he considers the Essay on Philosophical
Method as the key to understanding his mature philosophy.
Even the Autobiography itself, the purpose of which is clearly
stated in the text just quoted, is regarded as an interim report of work in progress.

No other work is singled out for

such high marks, and consequently any account of his mature
philosophy which ignores it must do so in defiance of Collingwood's own clearly stated intentions.
Secondly, Collingwood gives no indication in the Autobiography of any radical change of mind either before or after
he had begun his "series."

He therefore clearly intends his

readers to approach the body of his later writings (i.e.
after 1932) as the fulfillment of a single-minded project, and
the earlier writings as a development leading up to it.

An

interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy would be consistent with the plan of the Autobiography only if it follows
this pattern.
3.

The Autobiographical Interpretation:

Four Themes.

"My life's work hitherto, as seen from my fiftieth
year," wrote Collingwood approximately five years before his
death, "has been in the main an attempt to bring about a
rapprochement between philosophy and history" (A, 77).

The

entire problem concerning Collingwood's mature philosophy is
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contained in this sentence, and especially in the meaning of
the term, rapprochement.

According to Knox and Donagan the

reconciliation which Collingwood outlines in the Autobiography,
and continues in the Essay on Metaphysics, amounts to nothing
short of radical historicism: philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being absorbed into history (IH, x).
According to Mink and Rubinoff no such reduction occurs in
Collingwood's philosophy, since the rapprochement is dialectical in nature, and in a dialectical relation the relata are
not separate or mutually exclusive, but rather "overlap" (a
technical term the meaning of which will be examined in Chapter 9).
In the Autobiography neither of these positions is directly supported.

There is no mention of any serious change

of mind, or of any radical reduction of philosophy to history;
and there is no discussion of dialectic or dialectical relations.

After two introductory chapters ("Bent of a Twig"

and "Spring Frost") recounting his early educational experiences at home and at Rugby (1902-08), there follows two chapters ("Minute Philosophers" and "Inclination of a Sapling")
on Collingwood's encounters with the Oxford Realists, first
as a loyal, but somewhat sceptical student initiate, and
later as a rebelliously independent tutor.

Chapter V ("Ques-

tion and Answer") encompasses the years (1915-18) of his
work in the Admiralty Intelligence Division during World War
I, during which time his daily communings with the grotesque
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Albert Memorial led to the development of his "question and
answer logic" 3 which was to be the foundation of all his later
philosophical and historical work.

Chapter VI ("The Decay of

Realism") records his return to Oxford in 1918 as a complete
opponent of Oxford realism.

The next five chapters ("The

History of Philosophy," "The Need for a Philosophy of History," "The Foundations of the Future," "History as the SelfKnowledge of Mind," and "Roman Britain") deal with the gradual development of his views on historical and philosophical
thinking, listing the principles which became part of his mature philosophy of history, and giving some indication of the
progress of his work on the archeology of Roman Britain.

A

final chapter ("Theory and Practice") records his political
views, especially concerning fascism and socialism, and his
assessment of the rapidly degenerating situation in preWorld War II Europe.
Even from this brief topical survey one can see that
four themes dominate the Autobiography's interpretation of
Collingwood's philosophy.

(1)

Out of a total of twelve chap-

ters, no less than three (III, IV, and VI) deal with Collingwood's reaction to Oxford realism, and the theme recurs
throughout Collingwood's discussion of his own positive con3Hereafter "Question and Answer" will be referred to
by the abbreviation, Q-A: e.g., "question and answer logic"
appears as "Q-A logic."
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tributions to philosophy and history.

In fact, as we shall

see, the Autobiography exhibits a rather surprising consistency when seen from the point of view of this rejection of
realist doctrines.

(2)

Five chapters (VII through XI) are

devoted, as one might expect, to Collingwood's overthrow,
based on his rapprochement between philosophy and history,
of the sceptical conclusions of the Oxford realists.

(3)

The key to this reconciliation is discussed in a crucial
chapter (V) on his "revolutionary" Q-A logic.

(4)

Finally,

the theme of rapprochement is extended, in the final chapter,
but also in remarks scattered throughout the other chapters,
to other, philosophically opposing doctrines:
practice, freedom and obligation, etc.

theory and

These four themes--

the critique of realism, Q-A logic, philosophy and history,
and rapprochement philosophy--are central concepts in the
autobiographical interpretation.
4.

The Critique of Realism.

Collingwood writes that his tutors at Oxford were
members of the "realist" school of philosophers, a school
whose primary function was the destructive criticism of idealism, and which converged towards the "zero line of complete
scepticism" (A, 18-19).
When I began to read philosophy there in 1910, Oxford was
still obsessed by what I will call the school of ((T. H.))
Green . . . . The philosophical tendencies common to this
school were described by its contemporary opponents as

68

Hegelianism. This title was repudiated by the school
itself, and rightly . . . . This movement never in any
sense dominated philosophical thought and teaching at Oxford . . . . \ihen I say that Green's school at this ~ime
obsessed Oxford philosophy, what I mean is that the work
of that school presented itself to most Oxford philosophers as something which had to be destroyed, and in destroying which they would be discharging their first duty
to their subject. The question what positive views they
themselves held was of secondary importance (A, 15, 16,
19) .

At the time of his graduation Collingwood felt that he was
"logically bound to remain a 'realist'" until he had satisfied
himself "either that the positive doctrines of the school were
false, or that its critical methods were unsound" (A, 23) .

In

connection with the relation between methods and doctrine
there appeared to be three alternatives, between which, he
says, he did not decide until after he had begun to teach philosophy at Oxford:

(a)

there was no connection between them

(i.e., both were false); (b)

the positive teachings were mis-

taken but the critical methods sound; or (c) the positive doctrines were correct but the critical methods were invalid.
The fourth alternative--viz. that both the positive doctrines
and the critical methods were valid--was apparently ruled out
by Collingwood on the basis of the negativity of the latter:
their positive teachings were incapable of resisting attack
by their own critical methods (A, 23).
Collingwood's description of this method is given in
acid terms:
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(T)he 'realists'' chief, and in the last resort, it seemed
to me, only method was to analyze the position criticized
into various propositions, and detect contradictions between these . . . (f)ollowing as they did the rules of
propositional logic . . . . (A, 42).
on any given issue a realist would "fish the problem P out of
the hyperuranian lucky-bag, hold it up, and say 'what did Soand-so think about this?'" and only after this would they ask,
"Is he right?" (A, 68-9).

In short, they separated the his-

torical question, "What did X think about P?" from the philosophical question, "Was X right in thinking A about P?" (A,
27, 59).

The presupposition of this procedure was that there

were a set of "eternal problems" in philosophy, to which philosophers gave various answers at various times (A, 60, 69).
The answers given by different philosophers were to a presumably identical set of questions--where "the sameness was the
sameness of a 'universal', and the difference the difference
between two instances of that universal" (A, 62).

Since truth

and falsity were regarded as properties of propositions (A,
34), the "answers" could be compared to one another to see if
they were contradictory or not (A, 40-42).
As for the positive content, Collingwood writes that
this consisted of a single assertion, dogmatically maintained:

" except for ((the)) one nonsensical phrase ((that)) knowledge
making no difference to what is known, 'realism' had no positive doctrines of its own at all but had stolen all that it
had from the school of thought which it was primarily con-
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cerned to discredit" (A, 44-45).

The dogma was propagated in

a number of ways, all of which embody the central assertion in
one way or another.

In its metaphysical form it is the doc-

trine that "the known is independent of, and unaffected by,
the knowing of it" (A, 45).

In epistemology the "Oxford 'real-

ists' talked as if knowing were a simple 'intuiting' or a
simple 'apprehending' of some 'reality"' (A, 25).
What all these "realists" were saying, I thought, was that
the condition of a knowing mind is not indeed a passive
condition, for it is actively engaged in knowing; but a
"simple" condition, one in which there are no complexities or diversities, nothing except just the knowing.
They granted that a man who wanted to know something might
have to work, in ways that might be very complicated, in
order to "put himself in a position" from which it could
be "apprehended"; but once the position had been attained
there was nothing for him to do but "apprehend" it, or
perhaps fail to "apprehend" it. (A, 25-26).
As Collingwood paraphrased the way one member of the movement
stated it, knowing is "the simple 'compresence' of two things,
one of which ((is)) a mind" (A, 25).

In ethics "the great

principle of realism, that nothing is affected by being known"
becomes the principle that "(m)oral philosophy is only the
theory of moral action:

It can't therefore make any difference

to the practice of moral action" (A, 48).

In political theory

the realists denied "the conception of 'common good', the fundamental idea of all social life," by "insisting that all
I

goo d s I were private" (A, 49).
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In Collingwood's estimation the net result of all this
was nothing short of disastrous--for philosophy, for civilization, and for the realist movement itself.

In a gradual and

piecemeal fashion, a process of self-stultification occurred
within the ranks of the Oxford realists.
In this process, by which anything that could be recognized as a philosophical doctrine was stuck up and shot to
pieces by the "realist" criticism, the "realists" little
by little destroyed everything in the way of positive doctrine that they had ever possessed. (A, 49).
But although "the fox was tailless, and knew it," he did not
count it a misfortune:

the realists

were glad to have eradicated from the philosophical schools
that confusion of philosophy with pulpit oratory which was
involved in the bad old theory that moral philosophy is
taught with a view to making the pupils better men. They
were proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from
the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their
hands on their hearts and say it was no use at all; a philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life
of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstruse that
only a whole-time student, and a very clever man at that,
could understand it. They were quite resigned to the contempt of fools and amateurs. If anybody differed from
them on these points, it could only be because his intellect was weak or his motives bad. (A, 51).
Collingwood writes that at the time of the outbreak of
World War I he had not satisfactorily decided which of his three
alternatives concerning Oxford realism was correct (A, 27-28).
As far as he had advanced was to work out the first of his
two rules for sound scholarship which he tried to instill in
his students.

72

I . . . taught my pupils, more by example than by precept, that they must never accept any criticism of anybody's philosophy which they might hear or read without
satisfying themselves by first-hand study that this was
the philosophy he actually expounded; that they must always defer any criticism of their own until they were absolutely sure they understood the text they were criticizing; and that if the postponement was sine die it did not
greatly matter. (A, 27).
"This did not as yet involve any attack" writes Collingwood,
"upon the realists' critical methods" (A, 27).

Using this

rule himself he came to realize that with respect to what the
realist movement primarily was--viz. an attack on "the school
of Green"--they misspent their shot.

The position they as-

saulted was not Hegelianism, nor was it even idealism in the
proper sense (A, 15-16, 19).
But when Collingwood returned to Oxford after the war
he was already convinced that both the critical methods and
the positive doctrines of the realists were in error (his
first alternative) (A, 42, 44), and his "logic of question and
answer," worked out during his wartime reflections on the Albert Memorial, had led to a second pedagogic maxim:

"recon-

struct the problem" or "never think you understand any statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the
utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he
means it for an answer" (A, 74).
In an (unpublished) paper read at Oxford in 1918, Collingwood writes, he assailed the cardinal principle of the
realists:
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I read a paper to my colleagues, trying to convince them
that ((the realists')) central positive doctrine, "knowing makes no difference to what is known", was meaningless. I argued that any one who claimed . . . to be· sure
of this, was in effect claiming to know what he was simultaneously defining as unknown. For if you know that no
difference is made to a thing 8 by the presence or absence of a certain condition c-,-you know what 9 is 1 ike
with c, and also what 6 is like without c, andon comparing the two find no difference. This involves knowing
what ~ is like without £; in the present case, knowing
what you defined as the unknown. (A, 44).
In addition to this "refutation of realism" Collingwood proposed an alternative theory of knowledge based on the centrality
of the questioning, rather than the merely asserting, activity:
The questioning activity, as I called it, was not an activity of achieving compresence with, or apprehension of,
something; it was not preliminary to the act of knowing;
it was one-half (the other half being answering the question) of an act which in its totality was knowing.
(A,
26) •

We will presently consider the "logic of question and answer"
in more detail, but here it is worth noting that Collingwood
proposed his "revolutionary" logic as an alternative to propositional logic:
For a logic of propositions I wanted to substitute what I
called a logic of question and answer. It seemed to me
that truth, if that meant the kind of thing which I was
accustomed to pursue in my ordinary work as a philosopher
or historian--truth in the sense in which a philosophical
theory or an historical narrative is called true, which
seemed to me the proper sense of the word--was something
that belonged not to any single proposition, nor even, as
the coherence-theorists maintained, to a complex of propositions taken together; but to a complex consisting of
questions and answers. (A, 36-37).
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As this passage makes clear, Collingwood's alternative logic
was intended as an instrument for the discovery of philosophical and historical truths--a task for which he felt propositional logic ill-suited.
As a corollary to his Q-A logic, Collingwood denied
the realist's assumption that there are "eternal problems"
in philosophy.

This occurred in two phases (A, 68).

In the

first, Collingwood discovered through his historical research
and in his teaching experience that there is in fact no set
of permanent, eternal questions in philosophy (A, 60-68):
I found (and it required a good deal of hard detailed
work in the history of thought) that most of the conceptions around which revolve the controversies of modern philosophy, conceptions designated by words like
"state", "ought", "matter", "cause", had appeared on the
horizon of human thought at ascertainable times in the
past . . . and that the philosophical controversies of
other ages had revolved around other conceptions, not
indeed unrelated to ours, but not . . . indistinguishable
from them. (A, 68).
Secondly he attacked the problem in principle.

There can be

no absolute distinction between historical and philosophical
questions both because the distinction presupposes the permanence of philosophical problems (which was false on historical grounds), and because in any case of a philosophical
question one and the same passage is used as historical evidence that it was a problem and as philosophical evidence of
~that problem was (A, 69-70).
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Having disposed of the central positive doctrine of
the Oxford realists, as well as their epistemology and logic,
Collingwood went on to reject their moral and political theories.

He writes that since 1919 he lectured almost every year

on moral philosophy, and although his reconciliation-philosophy was still incomplete, the rudiments were present even
then of a solution to the realist separation or distinction
between "facts" and "theories" (A, 148-49).
My first efforts in this direction were attempts to obey
what I felt as my call to resist the moral corruption
propagated by the "realist" dogma that moral philosophy
does no more than study in a purely theoretical spirit
a subject matter which it leaves wholly unaffected by
that investigation. The opposite of this dogma seemed
to me not only a truth, but a truth which, for the sake
of his integrity and efficacy as a moral agent in the
widest sense of that term, ought to be familiar to every
human being: namely, that in his capacity as a moral,
political, or economic agent he lives not in a world of
"hard facts" to which "thoughts" make no difference, but
in a world of "thoughts"; that if you change the moral,
political, and economic "theories" generally accepted by
the society in which he lives, you change the character
of his world; and that if you change his own "theories"
you change his relation to that world; so that in either
case you change the way in which he acts . . . . There
were, I held, no merely moral actions, and no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every
action was moral, political and economic. (A, 147, 149).
Collingwood regarded this as only a "theoretical"
rapprochement, and the conclusion of the Autobiography describes Collingwood's bitter and painful discovery that a
"practical" rapprochement was also necessary.
a unification of what he calls the "three R.

But this meant
G. C. 's"--the

" g 1oves-on" university professor; the family man of practical
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affairs; and the "man of action", a "gloves-off" philosopher
for whom "the difference between thinker and man of action
disappeared," and who used to "stand up and cheer, in a
sleepy voice," whenever he began reading Marx (even though,
he says, he was "never at all convinced either by Marx's metaphysics or by his economics") (A, 150-53).

The closing lines

of the final chapter give the reader a sense of just what a
threat Collingwood regarded the "realists" to be, not only to
philosophy but to civilization as well.

Recalling his remarks

about the realists' reduction of ethics to pure theory, Collingwood links them with the recent rise in England of what
he regarded as a fascist movement:
I am not writing an account of recent political events in
England: I am writing a description of the way in which
those events impinged upon myself and broke up my pose of
a detached professional thinker. I know now that the
minute philosophers of my youth ((viz. the realists)) for
all their profession of a purely scientific detachment
from practical affairs, were the propagandists of a coming Fascism. I know that Fascism means the end of clear
thinking and the triumph of irrationalism. I know that
all my life I have been engaged unawares in a political
struggle, fighting against these things in the dark.
Henceforth I shall fight in the daylight. (A, 167).
The results of our survey of Collingwood's critique
of Oxford realism can be summarized as follows:
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TABLE 2
THE CRITIQUE OF REALISM

1.

Any doctrine which asserts as its basic principle that
the known is independent of, and unaffected by, the knowing of it, is realism (A, 44-45).

2.

Realism's ultimate method is destructive criticism; that
is:

3.

4.

a.

the analysis of a position into various propositions;
and

b.

the use of the rules of propositional logic to detect
contradictions between these propositions (A, 42).

The consequences of realism are:
a.

the separation of the historical question of fact
from the philosophical question of truth, and the metaphysical assumption that the latter are eternal
(A, 59);

b.

an epistemology which defines knowledge as the simple
apprehension of an object (A, 25-26);

c.

a metaphysics which deals with a body of eternal
truths concerning the world's general nature (A, 6567), and which denies the reality of becoming (A, 99);

d.

an ethics which regards itself as merely moral theory,
and hence makes no difference to the practice of
moral action (A, 47-48, 147);

e.

a political theory which denies the conception of a
"common good" and insists that all "goods" are private (A, 49).

The basic principle of realism cannot withstand destructive criticism: it involves the meaningless assertion
(on propositional grounds) that one can know what is simultaneously defined as the unknown. Realism hence cannot live up to its own claims, and fails as a philosophy
(A, 23, 44).
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5.

6.

The method of realism is false as a philosophical method,
because
a.

there is not, and cannot be, a one-one correspondence
between indicative sentences in a language and logical propositions (A, 35); and

b.

meaning, contradiction and agreement, truth and falsity do not belong to propositions by themselves, but
to propositions as answers to questions (A, 33).

The consequences of realism, as well as being disastrous
for civilization, are philosophically erroneous:
a.

philosophical and historical questions are inseparable,
and there are no eternal questions and concepts (A,
68-69);

b.

knowledge is a complex process consisting of questions
and answers, and questioning activity being one half
(the other half being answering the question) of an
act which in its totality is knowing (A, 26);

c.

questions concerning the world's general nature are
based on beliefs or presuppositions made by the physicists of an era, these presuppositions being subject
to change but not to the distinction between truth
and falsity (A, 66);

d.

knowledge of the situation in which one is called
upon to act affects the action of the agent in that
situation (A, 147-48);

e.

actions (which are moral, political and economic at
the same time) based on false knowledge of the situation in which one is called upon to act, do not serve
the good of the nation as a whole but the good of a
class, section, or only oneself (A, 147-49, 155).
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5.

The Logic of Question and Answer.

Collingwood states that the first steps that he took
in his youthful revolt against the doctrine of realism were
methodological:

in place of the "propositional logic" ac-

cepted not only by realists but by idealists as well (A, 52),
Collingwood formulated a "logic of question and answer", philosophically more appropriate and historically more sound (A,
26, 28, 30).

He went so far as to write it up in book-length

form ("during my spare time in 1917"), and offered it, under
the title Truth and Contradiction, to a publisher, but was
refused on the grounds that "the times were hopelessly bad
for a book of that kind" (A, 42).

The book was never pub-

lished, and Collingwood later destroyed the only draft of it
(A, 99, n.l).

The roots of Collingwood's "revolutionary" logic, as
stated in the Autobiography, are complex, and the rules of this
logic shade off imperceptably into his views on history and
metaphysics.

With respect to the former, three areas of his

experience seem to have contributed to the formulation of his
views.

The first was his field experience in archeology--

initially under the tutelage of his father, then, after 1913,
directing his own excavations (A, 23-24, 30).

This experience,

he writes, impressed upon him the importance of the "questioning activity" in knowledge:

in archeological field work "one

found out nothing at all except in answer to a question; and
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not a vague question either, but a definite one" (A, 24).

In

addition to teaching him that the questioning activity was
not preliminary, but rather integral to the activity of knowing, it also taught him that the intuitionistic epistemology
(knowledge reduced to direct acquaintance with an object) and
propositional logic (truth as a property of indicative assertions) espoused by the realists were inadequate (A, 26-27,
30-31).

The second was his pre-war experience as a teacher at
Oxford.

This yielded the first of his two pedagogical rules

for philosophical interpretation:

"never accept critic ism of

any author before satisfying yourself of its relevance"--that
is, one should satisfy oneself by first-hand study that this
was the philosophy the author actually expounded (A, 27, 74).
But (as we have already seen) while this "did not as yet involve any attack upon the 'realists'' critical methods", when
coupled with his archeological experience it converged as a
"flank attack on 'realism' as a philosophy which erred through
neglecting history" (A, 28).
The third source and by far the most important, according to the Autobiography, was Collingwood's daily communings with the Albert Memorial:
A year or two after the outbreak of ((the first world))
war, I was living in London and working with a section of
the Admiralty Intelligence Division in the rooms of the
Royal Geographical Society. Every day I walked across Ken-
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sington Gardens and past the Albert Memorial. The Albert
Memorial began by degrees to obsess me . . . . Everything
about it was visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, crawling, verminous; for a time I could not bear to look at it, and
passed with averted eyes; recovering from this weakness,
I forced myself to look, to face day by day the question:
a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly, so indefensibly
bad, why had Scott done it? . . . . What relation was
there, I began to ask myself, between what he had done and
what he had tried to do? (A, 29).
His reflections on the unfortunate Albert Memorial led Collingwood to formulate the second of his two pedagogical rules:
"reconstruct the problem", or "never think you understand any
statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with
the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he
means it for an answer" (A, 74).

This was a direct generali-

zation arising from the analysis of his aesthetic experience
of the Albert Memorial:

Collingwood forced himself to recon-

struct the problem that Scott had set for himself in designing such an artistic monstrosity:
Had he tried to produce a beautiful thing; a thing, I
meant, which we should have thought beautiful? If so, he
had of course failed. But had he perhaps been trying to
produce something different? If so, he might possibly
have succeeded. If I found the monument merely loathsome, was that perhaps my fault? Was I looking in it for
qualities it did not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it did? (A, 29-30).
In addition to affording Collingwood yet another occasion for
examining the role of questioning in knowledge, his reflections on the Albert Memorial provided him with a clue for solVing the problem about "eternal questions" in philosophy, and
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especially in metaphysics (A, 60).

Applying his second pe-

dagogical maxim to political theory he discovered that "the
history of political theory is not the history of different
answers given to one and the same question, but the history
of a problem more or less constantly changing, whose solution
was changing with it" (A, 62).

Hence the realist assumption

that different philosophies were different attempts to answer
the same question was a "vulgar error, consequent on a kind
of historical myopia which, deceived by superficial resemblances, failed to detect profound differences" (A, 60-61).
Just as the ideal nature of the state exhibits essential differences for philosophers living at different times and in
different societies, so the ideals of personal conduct are
subject to essential changes (A, 61-65).

The question "What

is the ideal state?" and "What sort of behavior is moral?"
are not the same questions when asked by different philosophers, because they have different essential meanings and
different presuppositions.

The clearest application of the

principle was to metaphysics, where Collingwood finally laid
to rest "the philosophers convictions about the eternity of
problems or conceptions" (A, 65):
It became clear to me that metaphysics (as its very name
might show, though people still use the word as if it had
been "paraphysics") is no futile attempt at knowing what
lies beyond the limits of experience, but is primarily at
any given time an attempt to discover what the people of
that time believe about the world's general nature; such
beliefs being the presuppositions of all their "physics",
that is, their inquiries into its detail. Secondarily, it
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is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of other peoples and other times, and to follow
the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another. (A, 65-66).
Hence after discovering the clue during his reflections on
the Albert Memorial and after generalizing the maxim and applying it to the fields of political theory, ethics, and finally metaphysics, Collingwood concluded that ''there was no
recognized branch of philosophy to which the principle did
not apply that its problems, as well as the solutions proposed for them, had their own history" (A, 67).

Except in

the sense used to designate collectively a series of problems
connected by a process of historical change, such that their
continuity, but not their differences, are discernible-except in this inaccurate sense "(t)he conception of 'eternal problems' disappeared entirely" (A, 67-68, n.l).
Based on the generalizations from these three regions
of his experience, Collingwood formulated his revolutionary
Q-A logic, the rules of which (in the autobiographical version) may be tabulated as follows:
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TABLE 3
QUESTION AND ANSWER LOGIC - AUTOBIOGRAPHY
A body of knowledge consists not of propositions but of
these together with the questions they are meant to answer (A, 30).
a.

"Proposition" denotes an assertive act of thought or
what in those acts of thought is asserted (A, 30).

b.

A proposition is always a logical and not merely a
linguistic entity ((i.e. it states what ought to be
the case rather than what merely is the case concerning assertive acts of thought)) (A, 31).

2.

In order to find out what a proposition means the question to which the proposition was meant as an answer must
be known (A, 31).

3.

No two propositions can agree with or be contradictory to
one another unless they are answers to the same question
(A, 33).
a.

The sameness of two questions is the sameness of an
historical process, and the difference between two
questions is the difference between one thing ((the
first question)) which in the course of that process
has turned into something else ((the second question))
(A, 62).

b.

4.

An historical process is a process of becoming such
that if a process P1 turns into a process P 2 , there
remains in P a trace or survival of P 1 (A, 98-99).
2

Truth and falsity belong to a complex consisting of questions and answers such that:
a.

each answer and its question must be relevant to a
complex of questions and answers ((i.e., to a systematic inquiry));

b.

each question within that complex must "arise" ((Collingwood leaves the meaning of "arise" unresolved in
the Autobiography));
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5.

6.

c.

each answer must be the "right" answer to its question (where "right" means "enabling the inquiry to
proceed", and not "true"--the right answer could. be
false);

d.

each answer is to a certain specific question in the
questions and answer complex (A, 37). (cf. A, 31-32-correlativity of Q & A).

Questions not only have answers, they also have presuppositions which are not subject to the distinction between
what is true and what is false (A, 66).
a.

Some presuppositions ((relative presuppositions)) may
be the answer to another question (A, 66).

b.

Some presuppositions are "absolute"--that is, are not
answers to any questions at all (A, 67).

The question "To what question did So-and-so intend this
proposition for an answer?" is an historical question,
and cannot be settled except by historical methods (A,
38-39).
a.

The settlement of an historical question results from
arguing back from the propositional answer to its
question (A, 70).

b.

In arguing back from a propositional answer to its
question, one and the same piece of evidence states
the answer and allows the historian to identify the
question (A, 70).
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Collingwood's informal presentation of this Q-A logic
is interspersed with commentary on it, some of which is worth
mentioning here as a sort of concluding appendix to this section.
It is worth noting, to begin with, that Collingwood's
Q-A logic is formulated in the context of a theory of knowledge, and a theory of knowledge that looks to history as a
paradigm of knowing rather than to mathematics (A, 36-37).
This is the significance of the first statement in the above
table.

The "body of knowledge" or systematic inquiry which he

has in mind is an inquiry in which discoveries are still being
made (at least for the inquirer), and not a closed system witlt
fixed relationships (cf. A, 75).
Secondly, Q-A logic is at once a theory of meaning, of
logical validity (agreement and contradiction), and of truth:
If the meaning of a proposition is relative to the question it answers, its truth must be relative to the same
thing. Meaning, agreement and contradiction, truth and
falsehood, none of these belonged to propositions in
their own right, propositions by themselves; they belonged
only to propositions as the answers to questions: each
proposition answering a question strictly correlative to
itself. (A, 33; cf. A, 37).
Another way of putting the matter would be to say that meaning,
validity, and truth are functions of a Q-A complex which, for
Collingwood, is taken as the primary logical unit.

Items 2,

3, and 4 of the above table take up each of these successive
functions.
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Thirdly, it is over these three functions of the Q-A
complex that Collingwood felt he departed from the doctrines
of propositional logic--the mathematical logic accepted in
part by the idealists, and in total by the realists (A, 3336, 42).

As in his refutation of the cardinal principle of

the realists, Collingwood was careful to formulate "the central doctrine of propositional logic" which he was concerned
to reject:
that there is, or ought to be, or in a well-constructed
and well-used language would be, a one-one correspondence
between propositions and indicative sentences, every indicative sentence expressing a proposition, and a proposition being defined as the unit of thought, or that which
is true or false. (A, 35-36).
This central doctrine would clearly be ruled out of Q-A logic
on the grounds that both meaning and truth are functions of a
Q-A complex, and not of answers or of assertive acts of
thought alone.

Yet it is presupposed by all the various well-

known theories of truth":
One school of thought holds that a proposition is either
true or false simply in itself, trueness or falseness being qualities of propositions. Another school holds that
to call it true or false is to assert a relation of "correspondence" or "non-correspondence" between it and something not a proposition, some "state of things" or "fact".
A third holds that to call it true or false is to assert a
relation between it and other propositions with which it
"coheres" or fails to "cohere". And, since in those days
there were pragmatists, a fourth school should be mentioned, holding . . . that to call a proposition true or
false is to assert the utility or inutility of believing
it. All these theories of truth I denied. (A, 36).
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It is no wonder that, as Collingwood remarks in a later chapter, "(s)o far as my philosophical ideas were concerned, I
was now cut off not only from the 'realist' school . . . but
from every other school of thought in England, I might almost
say in the world" (A, 53).
Fourthly, it is in connection with his application of
Q-A logic to the supposedly "eternal problems" of metaphysics
that the relationship between Q-A complexes and presuppositions makes its appearance (A, 66-67).

So also the example

which Collingwood uses to illustrate that contradiction or
agreement (what we have called "validity") is a function of
the Q-A complex, is the classical metaphysical problem of "the
one and the many":
For example, metaphysicians have been heard to say "the
world is both one and many"; and critics have not been
wanting who were stupid enough to accuse them of contradicting themselves, on the abstractly logical grounds
that "the world is one" and "the world is many" are mutually contradictory propositions . . . . There is no
contradiction between saying that something . . . is one,
and saying that it is many. Contradiction would set in
only if that something were said to be both one x and
many x's . . . . Thus, if a given doctrine D is criticized as self-contradictory because it is divisible into
two parts E and F, where E contradicts F, the criticism
is valid only if the critic has correctly reconstructed
the questions to which E and F were given as answers (A,
40-41).
Fifthly, and finally, the way Collingwood formulates
his Q-A logic presupposes an understanding of "history" as he
uses the term.

This is clear from items 3a and 3b of the
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above table, which specify "sameness of question" in terms of
historical process, and item 6, which makes historical methodology integral to the discovery of "sameness of meaning" in
a Q-A complex.
6.

History and Philosophy.

By the time of the outbreak of World War I, but before his reflections on the Albert Memorial, Collingwood had
not successfully resolved his "threefold question" concerning the critical methods and positive content of Oxford realism, but his archeological research and early philosophical
teaching experience aided him in mounting what he calls a
"flank attack" on the same problem:
Working siumltaneously along these two lines, I could see
them tending to converge in an attack on "realism" as a
Bhilosophy which erred through neglectin~ history. If I
ad thought it possible to forewarn the rrealists" of this
attack, I should have said, "You must pay more attention
to history. Your positive doctrines about knowledge are
incompatible with what happens, according to my own experience, in historical research; and your critical methods are misused on doctrines which in historical fact
were never held by those to whom you ascribe them." (A,
28, emphasis mine).
By 1920, Collingwood writes, he had completely worked
out the idea of a "living past", and was prepared for a frontal assault on the realists' view of the past as consisting
of corpse-like "events".

The realists' neglect of history

was a result of their refusal to admit the reality of becoming.

The overcoming of the error involved in the recognition
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that historical processes survive in the present, and this is
the key concept in deciding how history can be reconciled with
the "wisdom" sought by philosophers.

The past that the his-

torian studies is part of the situation within which he is
called upon to act (A, 114); and the "events" of the past are
processes of becoming which survive as active features of the
present (A, 98-100).
By 1930, according to the Autobiography, Collingwood
had worked out the principles on the basis of which history
as "a science of human affairs" could be constructed (A, 115).
These principles Collingwood connects with his Q-A logic and
with the maxims drawn from his experience as an archeologist
(A, 106-109, 122, 130).

Again, for brevity's sake, we shall

tabulate these principles here in slightly altered order from
their appearance in the Autobiography, but with a notation
that facilitates reconstruction of that order:

91

TABLE 4
THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY
1.

(LG) History is concerned not with events but with processes (A, 99).
a.

Processes are things which do not begin or end ((as
events do)) but turn into one another; if process P 1
turns into P 2 , P 1 goes on in the changed form P 2 , and
P 2 has previously been going on in earlier ((implicit))
form , P1 ( A, 9 8 ) .

b.

((In an historical process)) P 1 leaves traces (evidence) of itself in P 2 , so that an historian living
in P 2 ((a situation)) can discover that what is now
P 2 was once P1 by the interpretation of evidence (A,
98; cf. A, 96).

NOTE: In Table 4, the following abbreviations are
used: LG = Libellus de Generatione (see page 94,
below),
mentioned in Chapter IX of the Autobiography; ARCH-1,-2,-3
=Archeological principles, mentioned in Chapter XI; HIST -1,
-2,-3,-4 = Historical principles mentioned in Chapter X.
Collingwood clearly indicates that the principles employed in
archeology are applicable to all of history (A, 121, 130, 133).
He also states that the idea of a living past, expressed in
terms of historical processes, became his "first principle of
a philosophy of history"; it is therefore listed as such in the
table. "ARCH-2" follows it, because it amplifies "LG", and is
a natural bridge to "HIST-1". "HIST-1,-2,-3 are listed in that
order in Chapter X of the Autobiography. "HIST-4" is not so
numbered by Collingwood, but he indicates that it forms the
conclusion of a train of thought that "was not complete until
about 1930" (A, 115). Finally, it is worth noting that Collingwood states in a footnote that the principles we are calling "HIST-1,-4" were discussed in a paper delivered before the
British Academy after his election to that body in 1934. They
appe~r almost verbatim in The Idea of History in the "epilegomenon called, after the paper, "Human Nature and History" (IH,
205-231; see especially IH, 215).

92

2.

(ARCH-2) There are no mere "events" in history; what is
miscalled an event is really an action, and expresses some
thought (intention, purpose) of its agent; the historian's
purpose is to identify this thought (A, 127-28; cf. A, 130).

3.

(HIST-1)

4.

All history is the history of thought (A, 110).

a.

The thought must be expressed: either in language or
in one of the many other forms of expressive activity (A, 111).

b.

The historian must be able to think over again for
himself the very same thought whose expression he is
trying to interpret (A, 111).

(HIST-2) Historical knowledge is the re-enactment in the
historian's mind of the thought whose history he is studying (A, 112) .
a.

The sameness of the thought is not the sameness of a
universal but the sameness of an historical process
(A, 62).

b.

5.

The difference between the thought of the agent and the
re-enacted thought of the historian is a difference of
context: to the historian it is a past thought living
in the present ("incapsulated", not "free"), while to
the agent it is a present thought (A, 113).

(HIST-3) Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of a
past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts
which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs (A, 114).
a.

An incapsulated thought is a thought which, though
perfectly alive ((not a mere "event", which ends and
begins)), forms no part of the Q-A complex which constitutes the "real" life, the superficial or obvious
present, of the mind in question (A, 113; cf. A, 14041) .

b.

Present and past planes of thought are distinguished
by observing the way in which ((their respective))
problems arise (A, 114).
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c.

6.

Every historical problem ultimately arises out of
"real" life--i.e., out of practical problems (A, 114).

(HIST-4) The science of human affairs (i.e. moral and
political wisdom) is history (A, 99, 115).
a.

Knowledge achieved by historical inquiry is not knowledge of his (the historian's) situation as opposed
to knowledge of himself, it is knowledge of his situation which is at the same time knowledge of himself
(A, 114).

b.

There must be a kind of action which is not determined according to rule, and where the process is directly from knowledge of the situation to an action
appropriate to that situation without passing through
the stage of formulating a rule appropriate to the
situation (A, 103).

c.

History offers insight into the situation in which
one is called upon to act, rather than ready-made
rules for acting in all situations of a given kind
(A, 100-102; cf. A, 114).

7.

(ARCH-1) Success in historical studies depends upon clear
application of Q-A logic to historical problems (A, 121122, 124).

8.

(ARCH-3) No historical problem should be studied without
studying its second-order history, that is, the history
of historical thought about it (A, 132).
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Again, several comments about these principles are
in order.

The first is that what is stated by Collingwood

to be the "first principle" of a philosophy of history, as
of 1920, is expressed by him in two ways, which are not transparently identical in meaning.

The first is "that the past

which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past
which in some sense is still living in the present"; the second is in the form in which it appears above.

The idea of a

living past is described later in terms of the principle of
incapsulation (5. of Table 4), so that its later reiteration
eliminates the need to argue for an identity of meaning in
these two expressions, as well as the necessity to speculate why Collingwood took them to mean the same thing.
Secondly, Collingwood writes that this first principle of history initially appeared in an essay of short
book-length (Libellus de Generatione) which "was primarily
a study of the nature and implications of process or becoming."
Secondarily, it was an attack on "realism", showing how
the non possumus of "realists" towards a theory of history arose from their refusal to admit the reality of becoming, and from their analysis of the true proposition
"P 1 becomes P 2 " into the complex of propositions "P 1 is
P 1 ", "P 1 is not P 2 " "P ends where P2 begins", "P 2 is P 2 ",
1
and "P2 is not P 1 ", all of them either tautologous or
false.
(A, 11).
Hence Collingwood's first principle of history was formulated,
according to the Autobiography, in direct opposition to what
he took to be a realist's position.
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Thirdly, Q-A logic appears as an integral part of his
listing of historical principles:

it appears in his principles

of re-enactment (4), of incapsulation (5), and of successful
historiography (7).
Fourthly, Collingwood states that in connection with
the principle of re-enactment (4), the question of what the
difference is between the thought of an historical agent and
the re-enacted thought in the historian's mind, was the most
difficult of all the questions he encountered in his study of
historical method (A, 112).

The answer that he gives to this

question in the Autobiography and the example which accompanies it are given in terms of his Q-A logic.

According to

the principle of incapsulation (see 5 in Table 4), present
thoughts and past, incapsulated thought are distinguished by
the way in which questions arise in each.

For Admiral Nelson

at the naval battle at Trafalgar the question, "Shall I take
off my decorations?" and its answer, "In honour I won them,
in honour I will die with them," occur in a primary Q-A series that involve the battle and his participation in it on
the decks of the Victory.

But this question does not arise

in a primary Q-A series involving the incapsulated thought
(the historian does not contemplate removing his own decorations in fear of losing his life).
But a question ar~s~ng in ((the historian's)) primary
series may act as a switch into another dimension. I
plunge beneath the surface of my mind, and there live a
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life in which I not merely think about Nelson but am
Nelson, and thus in thinking about Nelson think about
myself. But this secondary life is prevented from overflowing into my primary life by being what I call incapsulated, that is, existing in a context of primary or surface knowledge which keeps it in its place and prevents
it from thus overflowing. Such knowledge, I mean, as
that Trafalgar happened ninety years ago: I am a little
boy in a jersey: this is my father's study carpet, not
the Atlantic, and that the study fendeL, not the coast of
Spain. (A, 113-14).
That primary or surface knowledge, some examples of which Collingwood uses from his juvenile re-enactments of the naval
engagement at Trafalgar, serve to "contradict" the imaginative
experience in which one takes on the role of being Nelson (and
in the process forgets oneself or loses oneself in the imagined object).

It is this "contradiction" which confines

incapsulated thought to a plane different from the context of
present thoughts.
Finally, history as the science of human affairs (6)
corrects the false claim that psychology, a natural science
of mind, is the source of wisdom, especially in matters moral
and political (A, 92, 94, 116, 126).
The nineteenth century, likewise in search of a science
of human affairs, tried to realize it in the shape of a
"psychology" in which the mental was reduced to the psychical, the distinction between truth and falsehood thrown
overboard, and the very idea of a science negated, psychology itself being involved in the resulting bankruptcy.
But the revolution in historical method . . . swept away
these sham sciences and . . . brought into existence a
genuine, actual, visibly and rapidly progressing form of
knowledge which now for the first time was putting man in
a position to obey the oracular precept "know thyself"
. . . . (A, 116).
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But if a "science of human nature" cannot be achieved except
by historical methods, part of the reason is that actions-historical processes--are not always performed in accordance
with rules.

Collingwood points out two occasions in which

agents necessarily act without knowledge of any rule appropriate to the situation:

(1) when a situation requires one

to act and yet does not recognizably belong to any rulegoverned types; and, (2) when the situation is recognized as
of a rule-governed type, but the required act "involves a
certain misfit between yourself and your situation"--presumably because the agent requires more of himself than action according to type or to rule (A, 103-104).
Of these two cases in which it is necessary to act otherwise than according to rule, the first arises out of the
agent's inexperience and ignorance of life . . . . The
second arises only for people of experience and intelligence, and even then occurs only when they take a situation very seriously; so seriously as to reject not only
the claims of . . . desire, and . . . self-interest, but
((also)) . . . right conduct, or action according to the
recognized rules (A, 105).
Such rule-free occasions call for improvised actions appropriate to the recognized realities of the situation; and the
function of historical thinking was to provide "insight" into such situations, the reality of which included the incapsulated past as part of itself (A, 106, 101).
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7.

Rapprochement Philosophy.

We have already seen that Collingwood regarded his
philosophy as "in the main an attempt to bring about a

~

Erochement between philosophy and history"; that he rejected
realism as a "philosophy which erred through neglecting history"; that philosophy and history shared a common methodology by employing Q-A logic; and that historical questions are
not separate from philosophical questions because "all history
is the history of thought".

The final step in the autobio-

graphical account is therefore to elucidate the meaning of
Collingwood's "rapprochement" philosophy.
One aspect of this rapprochement occurred to Collingwood in the course of his philosophical teaching at Oxford:
if philosophers were to deal with the history of their own
subject they ought to do so in a manner that met the contemporary standards of historical thinking (A, 77)--some of which
Collingwood states in the Autobiography, and which we have
summarized in Table 4.
But, in addition to making philosophy more historically respectable, it was necessary to make history more
philosophical:
work.

this Collingwood did in his own historical

As an example of it he cites the chapter on "Art"

which he wrote for the first volume of the Oxford History of
England--a chapter in which he showed how a revival of Celtic
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art forms was possible after two centuries, during which time
only Romanized art was produced.

In solving the problem Col-

lingwood made use of a modified form of his principle of incapsulation:
Incapsulation is not an "occult entity". It was my name
for such facts as this--familiar enough to everybody-that a man who changes his habits, thoughts, etc., retains
in the second phase some residue of the first.
(A, 141).
The principle also operates in habits transmitted from one generation to the next, and without the need of positing any occult entities "like racial temperament or an inheritance of
acquired psychical characteristics" (A, 142):
(T)he transmission by educational means of any moral ideal
which involves the outlawry of an institution or custom,
and the repression of a desire for it, entails the simultaneous transmission of that desire itself. The children of each generation are taught to want what they are
taught they must not have. (A, 143).
This was the means by which a suppressed art-form was preserved over two centuries of time in Romanized Britain:
(T)he less successful the Britons were in Romanizing art,
the more they were likely to cherish the memory of
their own fashions and ensure that these fashions were
never wholly lost to sight by the rising generation. (A,
144).
Collingwood calls on this example as an illustration of the
use of his rapprochement philosophy:
I found it possible to assert a connection between two
facts, both of them notorious, which had not previously
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been thought of as connected. One was the Celtic revival; the other was the badness of Romanizing British
art . . . . (T)he idea which I expressed in the chapter
on "Art" in the Oxford History of England . . . I would
gladly leave as the sole memorial of my Romano-British
studies, and the best example I can give to posterity of
how to solve a much-debated problem in history, not by
discovering fresh evidence, but by reconsidering questions of principle. It may thus serve to illustrate what
I have called the rapprochement between philosophy and
history, as seen from the point of view of history (A,
144-145).

In addition to a reconciliation from the historical
direction, there is presumably a reconciliation from the
point of view of philosophy:
This meant, in the first instance, a special branch of
philosophical inquiry devoted to the special problems
raised by historical thinking. Epistemological problems,
such as one might group together under the question "how
is historical knowledge possible?" Metaphysical problems,
concerned with the nature of the historian's subjectmatter: the elucidation of terms like event, process,
progress, civilization, and so forth.
(A, 77).
We have already observed how Collingwood resolved the first
question (viz. that one can know the past if it is not a "dead"
past, but is rather "living", incapsulated in the present,
and known by critical evaluation of evidence).

In the second

group, Collingwood deals only with the terms "event" and
"process"--the subject matter of the first two principles in
Table 3; the remainder are left unelucidated in the Autobiography.
"But this demand for a new branch of philosophy," adds
Collingwood, "soon developed into the demand for a new kind of
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philosophy" (A, 77), a "Copernican revolution" (A, 79, n.l)
in which historical knowledge is shown to be an element in all
thinking (A, 86-88, 67-68).

Collingwood cites the example of

a scientist who, in framing a theory, makes use of historical
knowledge as to what experiments had been tried and with what
results, and insists that this historical knowledge is an essential element in all scientific thinking (A, 87).

Metaphy-

sics itself is an historical science, insofar as "the question what presuppositions underlie the 'physics' or natural
science of a certain people at a certain time" is a purely
historical question, and the origins of these beliefs about
the world's general nature have come into existence by certain changes out of other such beliefs (A, 66-67).
Finally, a similar analysis occurred in connection
with moral philosophy, which also involved an historical element:
If knowledge as to the facts of one's situation is called
historical knowledge, historical knowledge is necessary
to action . . . . Immediately after the War, therefore, I
began to reconsider in detail all the familiar topics and
problems of moral philosophy . . . . In the first place,
I subjected these topics and problems to what I called an
historical treatment, insisting that every one of them
had its history and was unintelligible without some knowledge of that history. Secondly, I attempted to treat
them in another way, which I called analytic. My notion
was that one and the same action, which as action pure
and simple was a "moral" action, was also a "political"
action relative to a rule, and at the same time an "economic" action as means to an end. (A, 149).
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The reconciliation between theory and practice, like that between history and philosophy, proceeded from two sides.

From

the theoretical side thought and action were shown to be mutually dependent, "thought depending upon what the thinker
learned by experience in action, action depending upon how he
thought of himself and the world" (A, 150).

We have already

seen how the need for a practical rapprochement impressed itself on the "three R. G. C.'s".
Unfortunately this is as much as Collingwood has to
say on the subject of rapprochement philosophy in the Autobiography, and the reader is directed to complete the task of
working out the details for himself (A, 149).

Unlike the dis-

cussion of Q-A logic and the principles of history, there are
no explicit rules for rapprochement.

However, from the above

discussion several generalizations about rapprochement philosophy are possible:
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TABLE 5
RAPPROCHEMENT PHILOSOPHY
1.

The subject matter of rapprochement philosophy are viewpoints presumed to be distinct and opposite (e.g. philosophy and history, theory and practice, etc.). Such an
accepted state of unreconciled opposition between viewpoints is characteristic of the "realist" philosophy (A,
148) .

2.

A reconciliation of opposing viewpoints proceeds from
each viewpoint towards its presumed opposite (e.g. from
philosophy toward history, and from history toward philosophy) (A, 77, 144-45).

3.

What must be shown for minimal reconciliation is that
there is a relation of mutual dependence of each viewpoint on its presumed opposite (A, 150).

4.

A relationship of mutual dependence between opposing
viewpoints is established by subjecting them to both:
a.

an historical treatment, in which they are shown to
satisfy the conditions (or principles) of historical
inquiry (to be related as two phases of a process,
capable of re-enactment, etc.); and

b.

an analytic treatment, in which they are shown to
satisfy the conditions (or principles) of Q-A logic
(they must be answers to the same question, be part
of a Q-A complex, etc.). (A, 148; cf. A, 31, 42).
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It is questionable, given Collingwood's remarks about
rule-free situations and improvisation, whether he would agree
that any such semi-formalization of the methodology of reconciliation is possible.

Improvisation apparently extends even

to the level of methodology:
Obscure provinces, like Roman Britain, always rather appeal to me. Their obscurity is a challenge; you have to
invent new methods for studying them, and then you will
probably find that the cause of their obscurity is some
defect in the methods hitherto used. When these defects
have been removed, it will be possible to revise the generally accepted opinions about other, more familiar, subjects, and to correct the errors with which those opinions
are perhaps infected. In this sense, knowledge advances
by proceeding to "from the known to the unknown", but from
the "unknown" to the "known". (A, 86).
Collingwood extends this remark to include "obscure subjects"
including (at that time in England) historical methodology,
the systematic study of which he hoped would reveal epistemological truths "concealed from the 'realists' by their obviously conventional and second-hand ideas about the methods
of natural science" (A, 86).
It is also possible that Collingwood's failure in the
Autobiography to specify the sorts of conditions under which
questions are said to "arise" is related to his reversal of
the Aristotelian maxim about the direction in which the mind
works in coming to know a subject (for Aristotle it proceeded
from the known to the unknown).

If obscurity is a stimulus

for the invention of new methods which, in turn, reveal errors
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in previous treatments of the subject, then it is hardly possible to predict in advance the questions that will arise:
it presumes prior knowledge of the errors that have been made.
But on these issues Collingwood is enigmatically
silent.

PART II
THE EARLY WRITINGS (1916-1932)

CHAPTER III
REALISM AND IDEALISM
1.

Introduction.

In the Autobiography Collingwood described his weaning from the brand of realism that he had been taught at Oxford, the turning point occurring during his reflections on
the Albert Memorial sometime around 1917.

At one end of this

development is the teaching of Cook Wilson and the other Oxford realists, and at the other is the publication of Speculum Mentis in 1924, which the Autobiography acknowledges was
perceived by at least one reviewer as the "usual idealistic
nonsense.''

In between these two points there is the publica-

tion of his first book, Religion and Philosophy, in 1916, but
actually ''written some years earlier, in order to tidy up and
put behind me a number of thoughts arising out of my juvenile
studies in theology (A, 43).

Prior to the appearance of Spe-

culum Mentis Collingwood published a lecture entitled "Can
the New Idealism Dispense with Mysticism?" and several other
articles dealing with the distinction between science and history and Croce's philosophy.

From these points we should be

able to sketch in the curvature of his thought and compare it
to that described in the Autobiography.
106

107

Along the way we should be able to reconstruct what
Collingwood's understanding was of the realism-idealism .issue,
before it hardened into the form it takes in his later writings--viz. the anti-realism of the Autobiography.

This is a

crucial topic, since the starting point for virtually every
one of Collingwood's publications is a critique of the realistic position of the subject under investigation.

Further-

more his interpreters, as we saw in Chapter I, have used this
issue to discredit the accuracy of the autobiographical account.

Indeed it is difficult to understand how Collingwood

could deny that in the years following the war he thought and
wrote as an advocate of a school of thought widely recognized
under the title "idealism"--as the 1924 article on the "New
Idealism" illustrates.

Yet in the Autobiography Collingwood

writes that Speculum Mentis was neither "usual" nor "idealistic" (A, 57).

We shall have to decide on the basis of his

use of the term whether this is a sheer piece of effrontery
or if it would be like Hegel denying that he was an idealist
--where the term means "subjective idealism" of the sort he
attributed to the Kantian philosophy.
The idealism-realism issue is also a strategic boundary in the interpretation of Collingwood, since (as we also
saw in Chapter I) Rubinoff uses Speculum Mentis as a basic
program for interpreting the entire remainder of Collingwood's
philosophy, and views Collingwood as an unregenerated idealist
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of an Hegelian pedigree, whereas Donagan reconstructs what he
regards as the steps by which Collingwood

worl~d

his way free

from his youthful idealism and forged a philosophy of mind on
linguistic and analytic principles.

And where Rubinoff has to

explain why such terms as "absolute knowledge" and "dialectic" tend to disappear in the later writings, Donagan has to
account for Collingwood's continued and uncompromising antirealism in these same works.

And finally, where Rubinoff has

to account for the reversal from the condemnation of abstraction in Speculum Mentis to the apparent endorsement of it for
all higher thought in The New Leviathan, Donagan, who uses
this as an index of Collingwood's conversion from idealism,
must account for the striking difference between the descriptions of this process of abstraction in the same two works-a point that we will examine more carefully in later chapters.
In all of this discussion we must therefore try to be
as clear as the texts will allow us to be on the senses of the
terms "idealism" and "realism" as Collingwood formulates them.
This will necessitate trying to be clear about certain other
related terms, since what we are trying to do is to flesh out
the bones of the abstract formula for realism from the Autobiography, "Knowing makes no difference to what is known."
What does Collingwood mean by each of the terms, "object,"
"knowing," and "makes a difference"?

As we shall see in this

and subsequent chapters, the sense of the formula shifts with
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the meaning of the terms: where "knowing" means "perception"
the difference knowing makes to the object of perception is
not completely equivalent to the situation in which "knowing"
means "history" and the object is the thought of an historical agent.

And when Collingwood rejects realism with his

autobiographical anti-realistic argument, one must pay careful
attention to the situation in which it is applied in order
not to discard the baby with the bathwater.

When he rejects

the abstractions of realism in Speculum Mentis, for example,
we must ask if there is any acceptable sense of "abstraction"
that is salvable from the condemnation as distinct from the
realism that it is aimed at overcoming.

And similarly when

we find the project of "absolute knowledge" collapsing for
lack of any concrete subject matter at the end of Speculum
Mentis, we have to ask if from the wreckage we can find any
principles on which a more solid structure of thought can be
erected.

(Some of this work will occupy us in the next three

chapters.)
2.

Realism and Idealism in Religion and Philosophy.
If we were to begin where a beginning should really

be made, we would probably never achieve the limited goals we
have set for ourselves.

A proper assessment of Collingwood's

background would require sketching out not only the realistic
doctrines of Cook Wilson and the Oxford realists but also of
the shadowy figure of Bradley, whose thought was still very
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much alive--even if only as the target of realistic critics. 1
From this point one could trace the issues backwards or forwards: backward into the roots of Collingwood's idealism in
Bradley, Green, Hegel, Kant, and Berkeley, and the sources of
the realism he opposed in Mill, Hume, and Locke; and forward
into the fruits of idealism contemporaneous to Collingwood in
the Italian idealists, Croce, Gentile, and de Ruggiero, and
the development of realism with Alexander, Moore, Ayer, and
Russell.

All of this would make fascinating reading and would

be a welcome study and an invaluable background work for the
understanding of Collingwood's philosophy.

Having said that

we shall say little more about these matters, except by way
of occasional footnotes suggesting interesting parallels or
contrasts.

Our task is to understand Collingwood's philosophy

as interpreted by the Autobiography, and limitations in both
space and our own background necessitate leaving these matters
for another time.
The place for us to start is with Collingwood's early
publication, Religion and Philosophy, which we anticipate will
give evidence of Collingwood's early tolerance of realism.

As

expected, this work exhibits an ambivalent attitude toward
realism.

On the one hand Collingwood writes that what he is

saying "contains little if anything which contradicts the prin1c. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (Oxford,
1964), pp. 1-12. Cf. John Passmore, ~Hundred Years-of Philosophy (Baltimore, 1957/1968), pp. 48-71, 240-57).
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ciples of either Realism or Idealism in their more satisfac2
tory forms," and adds that "There is an idealism with w,hich
I feel little sympathy, and there is a so-called realism
which seems to be only distinguishable from that idealism by
its attempt to evade its own conclusions" (RP, 101, n. 1; FR,
3
n. 1). · On the other hand (and even this passage shows a
leaning in this direction), in the same work Collingwood admits that in at least one controversy the position he is defending "would claim the title of idealism" (RP, 94-95).

The

only way for us to understand where Collingwood stands in
this early work is therefore to look a little more closely at
the positions he is analyzing and the arguments he puts forward to confirm or reject them.
Religion and Philosophy is laid out in three parts.
Part I examines the general nature of religion, and attempts
2

In this same footnote he cites with apparent approval
the work of Joachim on The Nature of Truth on the one hand and
Prichard's Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Carritt's Theory of
BeautX on the other as representing the "more satisfactory
torms of the theories he hopes not to be contradicting. In
the Autobiography Collingwood identified Carritt as his realist tutor, and H. A. Prichard as following
Cook Wilson, and
H. H. Joachim as a close personal friend of Bradley and later
of Collingwood (A, 18, 20-22).
3 In-text citations from Religion and Philosophy are
followed by citations from the publication, Faith and Reason,
ed. by L. Rubinoff, because the former is out of print, and
portions of it appear in the latter work. Where no second ci~ation follows the reference to RP, it does not also appear
ln FR.
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to examine the distinction of religion from ritual, conduct,
and fee 1 ing, and to identify it as "creed," i.e. its int;e llectual element.

Furthermore it examines the distinction between

religion and conduct (thought and action), history, science,
and philosophy.

To anticipate later conclusions, we might add

that it is in this part that Collingwood not only engages in
wholesale identification of apparently distinct subject-matters
(religion as creed is identified with history, philosophy, and
even, by implication, science; thought and action are identified; etc.), but also sets up many of the problems against
which he would later struggle in Speculum Mentis.

Part II

takes up the metaphysical issues of proving the existence of
God, the dualism of matter and mind, personal identity, and
evil--these issues all approached in a manner which first analyzes a claim, then its counter-claim, and then attempts to
state on which side the truth appears to reside.

Part III is

more properly theological in tone, dealing in successive chapters with the self-expression of God in Man, in the person of
the Christ; God's redemption of Man; and the problem of Miracles.
As can be seen from this glance at the table of contents, there is a good deal of interesting material in this
very early work, and we must resist the temptation to deal
With all of it (some of it will appear in later chapters--the
issue of the "identities" will appear, for example, in Chapter
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VI on rapprochement).

What we seek to clarify at this point

is how Collingwood stood on the issues of idealism and realism,
and this requires us to limit ourselves primarily to the material presented in Part II, "Religion and Metaphysics."

In

particular we want to find out the way in which Collingwood
understood the independent status of objects of knowledge.
As in most of his subsequent writings, Collingwood
prefaces his positive treatment of the subject with a critique
of false views of the subject matter.

In Part I Collingwood

singles out psychology as characteristic of the way the phenomenon of mind in general, and religious thinking in particular, is improperly approached.

When composing the Autobiogra-

EhY Collingwood recalled this passage with evident approval
(A, 93), and in re-reading it he may have prepared himself
for writing the anti-psychological chapters in the Essay on
Metaphysics, which it strikingly anticipates.

Psychology, Col-

lingwood writes, is distinguished from the philosophical sciences of logic and ethics (which also study the mind) not by
its subject-matter but by its method.
The method peculiar to psychology may perhaps be described
as follows. The psychology of knowing differs from logic
or the philosophical theory of knowledge in that it treats
a judgement--the act of knowing something--as an event in
the mind, a historical fact. It does not go on to determine the relation of this mental event to the "something"
known, the reality beyond the act which the mind, in that
act, apprehends. Such a further investigation would be
metaphysical in character and is therefore avoided by psychology. Now this formula can be universalized, and thus
gives us the definition of the psychological method. Take
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the mental activity as a self-contained fact; refuse, so
far as that is possible, to treat of its metaphysical aspect, its relation with real things other than itself; and
you have psychology. Thus in scientific thought as studied by logic we have a judgement in which the mind knows
reality: psychology, treating the judgement as a mere
event, omits its reference to reality, that is to say,
does not raise the question whether it is true. (RP, 40;
FR, 7 5-76).

In a footnote Collingwood adds that the same omission or abstraction is made by formal logic, which he takes to be a psychological rather than a philosophical science (RP, 40, n. 2;
FR, 76, n. 2).

Here we have in germ a strategy which comes to fruition in Collingwood's later philosophy of history as areinterpretation of the act-object distinction, i.e. the distinction between an act of consciousness and the object of
such an act, where the former is regarded by realists as an
event in the subjective or psychological life of a conscious
agent (cf. IH, 282-301).

Our present interest is in the "me-

taphysical" aspect of the "reality beyond the act" which the
mind apprehends.

Throughout this chapter and those which fol-

low, where Collingwood's anti-realism is being evaluated we
will use this independent reality of the object as an index
to measure the degree of his anti-realism, bearing in mind
that in each case ·we must try to assess the meaning of the
terms involved.

It is, after all, the object's independence

from the act of knowledge which is at the center not only of
Collingwood's autobiographical realist formula, but also of
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the historical issue as Collingwood inherited it.

4

The passage about psychology which we have just quoted is taken from a chapter on religion and history, in which
Collingwood is trying to demonstrate that religious creed is
not devoid of reference to historical factuality.

The attack

on psychology is carried out because the psychology of religion, while pretending to deal with the phenomenon of religious consciousness, fails to do so precisely because it ignores this factual reference:

a mind regarded in an external

way, i.e. without reference to its object, "really ceases to
be a mind at all," and the knowledge gained by studying it in
this way "is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trifling abstraction" (RP, 42; FR, 77).

In a later passage he

comments that empirical psychology treats mind exactly as if
it were matter (RP, 76).

But when it comes to describing the

4 cf. Bertrand Russell, "Logical Atomism," in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London, 1924),
I, p. 360: "For some years I was a disciple of Mr. Bradley,
but about 1898 I changed my views, largely as a result of arguments with G. E. Moore. I could no longer believe that knowing makes any difference to what is known." A more technical
version of the formula was given by Russell some years earlier
in "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," Mind, n.s.
XIII (1904), p. 204: "every presentation and every belief must
have an object other than itself, and, except in certain cases
where mental existents happen to be concerned, extramental; .
. . and . . . the object of a thought, even when this object
does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon
its being an object of thought." R. M. Chisholm in his "Editor's Introduction" to Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (New York, 1960), p. 3, n. 1, quotes Russell as saying
that he had been led to accept these theses by Mr. G. E. Moore,
and that "Except Frege, I know of no writer on the theory of
knowledge who comes as near to this position as Meinong."
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nature of history in contrast to this Collingwood endorses
what appears to be a blatantly realistic definition:
History must be regarded not as a mechanical process, nor
yet as a gradual accumulation of truths, but simply as objectivity; as the real fact of which we are conscious. -History is that which actually exists; fact, as something
independent of my own or your knowledge of it. In this
sense there would be no philosophy without it; for no form
of consciousness can exist without an object. (RP, 49;
FR, 83).
At this point in his development Collingwood had not yet come
to a full realization of what he would later call the ideality
of history, and as the subsequent discussion illustrates, history is not yet confined to deeds of men.

In Chapter V we

shall see how this primitive idea of history became refined
in the essays written between 1920 and 1930.
But what of this concept of a fact as "something independent of my own or your knowledge of it"?

Where we might be

tempted to soften its realistic impact by qualifying it as distinct from an object (the factuality of anything is its givenness, its aspect of independence, which says nothing about the
facticity of objects, or about their independent existence or
reality), it is better to let it serve as a statement forming
the limit of Collingwood's early attitude toward realism.

We

shall never again encounter him affirming anything like it-unless it is as a premise which he was setting out to demolish.
The problem of the reality of objects makes its appearance in
a later chapter in the discussion of what he calls the "plain
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man's metaphysic:"
Popular metaphysic distinguishes two categories of reality,
mind and matter. Mind is a reality whose qualities are
thought, will, and so forth; it is not extended over space
or divisible into parts. Matter, on the other hand, occupies space, and is homogenously subdivisible into smaller
parts; it has no consciousness of itself as mind does
. . Mind is active . . . matter is passive . . . . We have
thus three hypotheses before us. Either the world is entirely material, or it is entirely spiritual, or it is a
compound of the two . . . . (M)aterialism will admit the
existence of thought, but will try to explain it as a kind
of mechanism; the opposite theory (which for the sake of
convenience I shall call idealism) will admit the existence
of mechanism, but will try to describe it in such a way
that its operation is seen to be a form of spiritual activity. (RP, 72-73).
In a footnote Collingwood adds that the sense of the term "idealism" which is opposed to materialism "must be carefully distinguished from Idealism as a theory of knowledge.

The former,

concerned with the antithesis between mind and matter, has no
connexion whatever with the latter, which concerns the quite
different antithesis of subject and object, and is opposed not
to Materialism but to Realism" (RP, 73, n. 1).
Here a preliminary distinction has been drawn between
metaphysical and epistemological idealism, and although one
might question whether they truly have "no connexion whatever"
withone another, 5 such an equivocation on the term might allow
5we shall try to avoid being drawn into a protracted
historical discussion of what the various meanings of the term
"idealism" have been--since the title encompasses everything
from Platonic archetypalism to Husserlian essentialism, and
along the way from one end of this spectrum to the other, cuts
across both Kantian and Hegelian territory. Nevertheless to
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Collingwood to deny being an idealist (in the metaphysical
sense) without being committed thereby to a denial that he
was an idealist in the epistemological sense.

More impor-

tantly, Collingwood does not view the realism-idealism controversy in a metaphysical sense--as it might be viewed by
someone who takes realism to be a statement about independent existence of objects, in which case it is saying something about reality rather than something about our knowledge of it.

For Collingwood realism is not a metaphysical

issue but an epistemological one, i.e. one which says something not about reality but about our knowledge of it.
After some argumentation criticizing rigid adherence
to the materialistic hypothesis (partly based on the impossibility of importing mind-characteristics into a purely mechanistic description of the world, and partly based on the
failure of mechanists to defend the principle of causality),
Collingwood pays the mechanistic devil his due.

Materialism

satisfies the scientist's demand for uniformity, regularity,
and generality--all of which are satisfied by a materialistic philosophy (RP, 91).

But that is not all.

Another merit of materialism is its insistence on fact, on
reality as something beyond the power of the individual
~ay that the metaphysical and epistemological forms of ideallsm have nothing whatsoever to do with one another ignores
the fact that Berkeley's idealism arises from a critique of
the concept of matter from a practitioner of epistemological
empiricism.
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mind to create or alter. Matter is supremely objective.
And when it is said that mind is the only reality, the
suggestion at once arises that the world is less solid,
less satisfying, less "real" than we believed . . . ·.
Materialism . . . is right as against those theories which
make the world an illusion or a dream of my own individual
mind; but while it is right to insist on objectivity, it
goes too far in describing the objective world not only as
something different from, and incapable of being created
or destroyed by, my own mind, but as something different
and aloof from mind in general. (RP, 92-93).
We shall find Collingwood making this point in various forms
repeatedly throughout his philosophical writings, but usually
not in defense of materialism.

Whatever mind may make of the

world, it is not simply the creation of one's own imagination
--a view that Collingwood called "subjective idealism" (RP,
120) 6 and one which he tended to associate with solipsism.
6 This is the title Hegel applied to the Kantian critical philosophy. Hegel faulted Kant for stopping short with
the analysis of experience at that point at which objects of
experience are shown to be mere appearances (phenomena),
whereas the view that Hegel advocates is absolute idealism,
which holds that objects of experience are not only mere phenomena for us but in their own nature, since their existence
is founded not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea.
Cf. The Logic of Hegel, tr. from The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences by William Wallace (Oxford, 1873), pp. 9394. Kant himself refuted a form of idealism which he called
"material idealism"--the theory which declares the existence
of objects in space outside us to be merely doubtful and indemonstrable (the problematic idealism of Descartes) or to be
false and impossible (the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley)--Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by N. Kemp Smith
(New York, 1961), B 274, p:-244. Collingwood's use of the
term is closer to Kant's "material idealism" than to Hegel's
"subjective idealism."
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The outcome of the discussion of the matter vs. mind
controversy is that "we cannot conceive matter without a.scribing to it some qualities of mind, nor mind without ascribing
to it some qualities of matter" (RP, 93-94)--in short, the
"mixed" hypothesis.

But even here there is a definite tilt

towards idealism.
To ask whether mind is a form of matter or matter a form
of mind is largely a question of words. The important
thing is that we should be able to bring the two into relation at all; that we should hold such a conception of
matter as does not prevent us from admitting truth, morality, and life as a whole to be real facts, and that we
should hold such a conception of mind as does not reduce
the world to an illusion and experience to a dream. The
first of these errors is that of crude materialism, and
the second that of an equally crude idealism. The view
for which we are contending would claim the title of idealism rather than materialism, but only because the current conception of mind seems a more adequate description
of the world than the current conception of matter. We
are laying stress on the fact that the world is the place
of freedom and consciousness, not of blind determinism;
and at present this can best be convey;d by saying that
mind is the one reality. (RP, 94-95).
A similar fate awaits the immanence-transcendence
question in a later chapter.

God must be regarded as both im-

manent and transcendent: immanent because all human knowledge
and goodness

are the very indwelling of his spirit in the

7collingwood closes the chapter with the suggestion
that he does not wish to exclude a "higher materialism" which
would "regard matter as nothing else than mind itself in its
concrete existence, and mind as the life and operation of matter"--but this must wait for physics to develop to the point
where it can adopt a principle which would regard all matter
as in its degree a form of life (RP, 95).
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mind of man; and transcendent because God has attained these
things whether or not man attains them, his being not depending upon the success of human endeavor (RP, 119).

But when

he asks if God exists only as a "spirit in our hearts" or if
he is also a real person "with a life of his own, whether we
know him or not," he confesses that this is not an easy philosophical problem to solve.
The difficulty of answering this question is bound up with
a well-known philosophical puzzle, the puzzle of how to
prove the existence of anything except as present to the
mind. If it is true that things cease to exist when we
are not thinking of them, . . . then it follows by the
same argument that God is immanent only, and exists nowhere
but in the mind of men. But we cannot really believe that
these things are so . . . . The arguments for pure immanence are at bottom identical with the philosophical creed
of subjective idealism, and with that creed they stand or
fall.
(RP, 119-20; FR, 188-89).
If God is not entirely an immanent idea, what objective status does the concept have?
be proven?

Can the existence of God

Collingwood argues that the traditional proofs for

the existence of God are not so much impossible as premature:
what is required is to first define what one means by "God,"
which involves finding some definite content to the concept-the task of theology.

"No one can prove that God exists, if

no definite significance is attached to the words" (RP, 64). 8
8collingwood does not deny that the existence of God
can be proven--he merely postpones it until after an adequate
concept of God has been developed. But after he spends the
remainder of Religion and Philosophy expending considerable
effort to develop just such a concept, he does not conclude
his study with any such proof. Nor does one appear in any of
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The only course open to the sceptic who doubts the existence
of God is to discover what he actually thinks, and then to
find out if that idea was justified or not (RP, 69).
This is an extension of a principle which Collingwood
lays down as fundamental to all thought, and which is an early
statement of the principle of intentionality, the modification of which we will be watching closely in succeeding chapters.

In its

earlie~formulation

it is expressed as follows:

The mind is specifically that which knows the object . .
The mind seems to be not so much that which thinks
as the thinking itself; it is not an active thing so much
as an activity. Its esse is cogitare . . . . All consciousness is the consciousness of something definite,
the thought of this thing or of that thing; there is no
thought in general but only particular thoughts about particular things. The esse of mind is not cogitare simply,
but de hac re cogitare. (RP, 100; FR, 172).
When two minds think the same thought it is never exactly the
same in terms of emphasis or applications peculiar to the individual; but that does not mean that such a difference destroys the identity of the truth, or its ability to be the
same truth thought by two different minds (RP, 106; FR, 177).
his writings. What one finds instead is a favorable discussion of the ontological argument in the Essay on Philosophical
Method (EPM, 124-26), and a very idiomatic use of the argument
in the Essay on Metaphysics (EM, 185-90), which declares that
the statement-rrGod exists" is not a verifiably true or false
proposition, but an absolute presupposition, and therefore
that the ontological proof is only a way for Christians like
St. Anselm to say what in fact they believe. If Religion and
Philosophy is Collingwood's theology, his philosophy of religion remains unpublished. (Cf. RP, 16; FR, 53-54).

123
In Chapter VI we shall take up the issue of Collingwood's use
of the term "identity" as he uses it in Religion and Philoso9
QhY and Speculum Mentis.
On the strength of the passages we have been examining
we can say that in this early publication Collingwood already
shows a leaning toward an epistemological form of idealism,
but at the same time he rejects both a "metaphysical" or subjective idealism which would assert that objects of knowledge
are simple creations or imaginings of subjective consciousness.
With respect to realism he displays a certain tolerance--as in
the notion of "fact" as something independent of any knowledge
of it, and in the distinction between an act of consciousness
and its object (although he says nothing about the esse of the
object to correspond to the esse of consciousness).

Similarly

9our purpose in this chapter is to examine Collingwood's early views on realism and idealism, and it is only
secondary to this that we have become involved in the issues
of the philosophy of religion. But we do not mean to leave
the reader dangling on the issues we have just raised--some
of which we will meet again repeatedly in different chapters.
The conception of God that Collingwood develops in Religion
and Philosophy is basically that of the Christian God--centering on the Incarnation as the means by which the creator God
overcomes his transcendence. The unity of man and God occurs
through a "concrete union . . . attained in and by the identification of the self in all its aspects with the perfect
mind of God" (RP, 150; FR, 254). This is achieved in the person of the Christ, who "has absolute experience of the nature
of God and lives in absolute free obedience to his will" (RP,
~66; FR, 267).
Insofar as any man achieves a similar concrete
ldentity of will with the mind of God he achieves union with
God (RP, 160, 167; FR, 262, 268). Whether such a person as
the Christ actually existed is an historical issue that Collingwood declines to consider (RP, 151; FR, 254).
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he shows a tolerance for the positive aspects of materialism
as a philosophy which, with proper modifications, is able to
satisfy the scientific demand for uniformity and generality.
We have not yet found any form of the anti-realism argument
as outlined in the Autobiography, nor any linkage of realism
and abstraction.

The situation, in short, is pretty much what

we would expect it to be on the grounds of the autobiographical interpretation.
3.

Idealism, the Absolute, and the Metaphysic of Knowledge.
In a short piece published after a symposium in 1923

(the year before Speculum Mentis), Collingwood responded to a
paper by Evelyn Underhill on the "new idealism"--by which she
meant the philosophy of Croce and Gentile (FYC, 85).

Under-

hill charged the Italian idealists with failing to provide
room for mysticism in their account of the forms of experience, and Collingwood (who had just finished translating Guido
de Ruggiero's Modern Philosophy 10 ) undertook a defense of Gen10 collingwood translated three of Croce's works and
two books by Croce's disciple, Guido de Ruggiero--see Johnston, FYC, 66. Johnston's book also has a sketchy chapter on
Collingwood's relation to Croce and the Italian idealists,
whose influence on Collingwood Johnston aptly summarizes under
the rubric formulated by Collingwood himself, that "to borrow
is to interpret" (FYC, 89). "Collingwood asks us to focus not
on what was borrowed, but on what led the borrower to select
what he did . . . . It was the multiplicity of his interests
and his command of many fields of learning which made Collingwood 'capable of borrowing' from Croce, Gentile, and Vico. It
was his almost unique intellectual versatility which 'laid
(Collingwood) open to their influence''' (FYC, 88-89).
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tile's religious philosophy against her attack.

The interest

for us of this brief and tactful article is in the distiDCtions that Collingwood draws concerning idealism, which if
they do not directly reflect his commitment to the school of
thought he is discussing, at least indicates to us his understanding of it.
Collingwood corrects Miss Underhill's misconception
that the new idealism "dispenses with mysticism" in the sense
that it ignores an intuitive or immediate consciousness of the
supreme reality as one, eternal, and spiritual.

On the con-

trary, both Croce and Gentile identify mysticism with religion (FR, 270). 11 Gentile in particular does not deny the
existence of an absolute object of thought such as that which
mystics contemplate--something that is one, eternal, and unchanging; nor is Gentile's philosophy exhausted by calling it
a philosophy of change like that of

Bergso~

reality is an absolute flux (FR, 273).

for whom absolute

This misconception is

taken over from Bosanquet, whose view Collingwood corrects as
follows:
11 collingwood recognizes that Croce did not represent
religion as one of the "necessary forms of the spirit" in his
systematic philosophy (FR, 270), but adds that it provides the
hint of a new attitude towards religion that "in Gentile blossoms into a complete new attitude to religion" (FR, 271-72).
Johnston adds that Croce "accords religion scant place," and
that in this "he differs significantly from Collingwood, who
all his life regarded religion as a necessary, even indispensable component of culture" (FYC, 70).

126
reality, for Gentile, is history. Now history is not,
as Miss Underhill assumes, a synonym for change. Change
is . . . a realistic concept, history an idealistic. That
which changes is a mere object, which need not know that
it is changing, and indeed which no one need know to be
changing. The philosophy of change is a "metaphysics of
being," that is, a philosophy which tries to describe the
world as a thing in itself without raising the question
how it comes to be known. And there can be little doubt
that the philosophy of change makes the world unknowable.
That which has a history, on the other hand, is a mind,
for matter may change but it cannot be said to have a history . . . . Hence Gentile's philosophy is a "metaphysic
of knowledge," that is to say, a philosophy which never
loses sight of the question "how do we come to know what
we know?" (FR, 274).
In the light of what we shall find Collingwood saying in Speculum Mentis in this and the next three chapters, it can hardly be doubted that Collingwood would describe his own philosophy as a "metaphysic of knowledge."
But is that idealism?

By 1923 it is clear that Col-

lingwood had recognized the essential ideality of history, and
had already moved away from a conception of history as simply
"factuality."

In Chapter V we shall observe the staging of

this development; at this point we are interested in the way
in which Collingwood describes idealism.

In the essay under

consideration Collingwood finds in Gentile an expression of
the common ground of all idealism (FR, 277), the double aspect
of mind as both active and passive, expressed by Gentile as
the identity of act and fact:
(C)hange in a mind must be change for that mind, a change
of which that mind is conscious; and to be conscious of it,
the mind must somehow be raised above it. How is this apparent contradiction to be realized? How is the mind to
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be at once in change and out of change? Only if the mind
originates change in itself. For then, as the source and
ground of change, it will not be subject to change; while
on the other hand, as undergoing change through its ·own
free act, it will exhibit change. This double aspect of
the mind as active and passive is the very heart of Gentile's philosophy. It is his favorite distinction of act
and fact.
(FR, 275).
But if the identity of act and fact is the equivalent of Croce's principle of immanence, what room is there for a principle of transcendence?

Gentile assigns the name of religion or

mysticism to the losing of the mind in its object--the transcendent element of all human life.

The synthesis of the im-

manent element of life (which Gentile calls art) with the
transcendent is philosophy, which seeks the absolute, defined
(citing Hegel for support) as "that which has reconciled its
own opposite to itself, and therefore no longer stands in opposition to it" (FR, 276).

Collingwood therefore states that

in pursuing the absolute, Gentile's philosophy ''is as convinced
of the necessity of transcendence as Miss Underhill herself . .
. . That reconciliation of the opposing principles of immanence and transcendence which both regard as possible, necessary, and indeed actual, she calls mysticism, and ((Gentile))
calls it philosophy" ( FR, 2 76- 77).

It is, he adds, in basic
'

agreement with Hegel's Absolute Spirit and the post-Kantian
tradition in philosophy (FR, 277).

For this tradition, mysti-

cism is a thing which cannot be dispensed with--not as something intuitional or wholly immediate, but as something assimilated by the labor of the life of the mind (FR, 278-79).

128
The necessity of mystical experience lies in the principle that we discover new truths neither by the inference of the logic-books nor by the intuition of Aristotle,
but by an act of mind which reaches out beyond the g1ven,
grasps the new thought as it were in the dark, and only
after that consolidates its new conquest by building up
to it a bridge of reasoned proof. (FR, 281).
In this discussion of Gentile we find Collingwood defending a form of absolute idealism, and defending it against
attack not from the point of view of someone who finds it
problematic in the sense of failing to show how the object is
unaffected by the knowing of it (epistemological realism), but
from the point of view of someone who charges it with failing
to provide sufficient grounds for mystical religious experience.

In the next section we shall find Collingwood widening

this discussion to include all forms of experience, and deepening his commitment to absolute idealism at the same time that
he begins to lay the foundation for moving beyond it.
4.

Absolute Idealism and the Forms of Experience.
In 1916, when Religion and Philosophy was published,

we found Collingwood stating that the argument he was advocating did not conflict with either realism or idealism in their
more satisfactory forms.

By 1924 not only had his point of

view shifted in the direction of absolute idealism, but his
earlier tolerance had completely vanished.

In Speculum Mentis

Collingwood was prepared to take a stronger stand against realism and all its ramifications, and it was this work that
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earned him the reputation of being an "idealist."

It is a 1 a-

bel that he explicitly rejected, but in much the same sense
that he had rejected it in Religion and Philosophy:
Idealism . . . is the doctrine th~t the world is made, so
to speak, of mind; and is regarded as the opposite of materialism or the doctrine that the world is made of matter.
Both of these theories begin by abstracting the object of
knowledge from the subject, and both go on by inquiring
into the nature of the object in this abstraction, regarded as a thing in itself. Both agree in committing the fundamental error of separating the metaphysical inquiry as
to what the world is in itself from the psychological inquiry as to how we come to know it. Idealism in this
sense leaves unreconciled the opposition between subject
and object, and therefore sets the object outside the subject; . . . it tries to bridge the gap by ascribing to the
object some kind of consubstantiality with the subject,
turning it into another mind, a society of minds (spiritual pluralism) or an infinite mind (theism). With anything which deserves the name of idealism in this sense we
have nothing to do except reject it. (SM, 266-67).
What is being rejected is the "metaphysical idealism" that he
had contrasted with materialism in Religion and Philosophy.
But what of the "epistemological idealism" that is
contrasted with realism over the issue of whether knowledge
makes a difference to the object known?

Speculum Mentis

widens our horizon beyond the object of religious knowledge;
it is an analysis of successive "forms of experience," each
of which competes with all the others for the "prize of truth"
--that is, the successful fulfillment of its claim to be
true knowledge (SM, 42).

Each form of experience is a con-

scious attitude with respect to the known, an activity which
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has both cognitive and practical aspects (SM, 39, 42, 44).
In short, each is knowledge claiming to be wisdom.
Five such forms of experience are examined--art, religion, science, history, and philosophy--although the list is
not exhaustive of all possible forms (SM, 41, 57, 280).

As

concrete activities engaging the whole self, each form of experience regards the others as illegitimate contenders for the
prize of truth, "rival ways of conceiving the whole"--the
"whole" being that conception of reality which will allow the
mind to live the unified life that it sees and needs in order
to be totally satisfied (SM, 36-37, 47-48).

Consequently the

forms of experience cannot be regarded as mere species of a
genus, each taking a portion of the prize:

"each denies the

others; and because they are not species they have not that
indifference with respect to one another which characterizes
abstract logical classifications" (SM, 55).

Each is to be ex-

amined on its own merits or in accordance with its own claims,
in order to discover whether its claim is consistent with its
actual performance.
Our map ((of knowledge)) . . . is to be a statement of the
essential nature or structure of each successive form of
experience, based on actual knowledge of that form from
within, and concentrated upon the search for inconsistencies, rifts which when we come to put a strain on the fabric will widen and deepen and ultimately destroy it. (SM,
46).
When such inconsistencies appear it is the task of a higher-
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order form of experience to repair the damage by constructing
"from without" a self-conscious justification of the pri)llary,
inconsistent form (SM, 250, 252-55).
Since we will be engaging in an explicit discussion of
the form of experience called science in Chapter IV, of history
in Chapter V, and of the overall argument of Speculum Mentis
in Chapter VI, rather than attempting a detailed analysis of
the contents at this point we shall first present Collingwood's
own summary of the five forms of experience in the Outlines of
~

Philosophy of Art which appeared the following year (re-

printed in EPA, 45-154), and then focus on those sections of
Speculum Mentis which particularly reveal Collingwood's views
on idealism and realism.
After stating at some length a general theory of art,
Collingwood locates art within the context of the life of the
spirit, which he characterizes as follows:
The life of the spirit is an indivisible whole within
which are necessary and permanent distinctions: permanent
in the sense that the spirit in its own activity perpetually affirms them, and necessary in the sense that the attempt not to affirm them would merely result in affirming
them over again. Fundamentally, the spirit is awareness
or consciousness, which implies a prima facie distinction between the conscious spirit and the world of which
it is conscious; but since this awareness is itself an
act, a self-modification on the part of the spirit, the
passivity of pure awareness rests upon the creativity of
action, and the life of the spirit is a whole within which
consciousness and action, awareness of the world and modification of the world are correlative elements. The unity
of these two elements is feeling, where that of which we
are aware is our own states, and these states are identi-
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cal with the feeling of them: they are at once states of
consciousness and objects of consciousness.(EPA, 137-38).
coming upon this

pa~sage

after reading Collingwood's defense

of "the new idealism" it is hardly possible to ignore Collingwood's commitment to an idealism at least similar to that of
the Italian philosophers, Croce and Gentile.

For certainly

the view expressed herE: represents the unity of "act and fact"
or the duality of spirit or consciousness as both active and
passive--a view that Collingwood had called the common ground
of all idealism.

Furthermore it appears that this distinction

is at least post-Kantian, and probably Hegelian:

the con-

sciousness-object distinction is described as occurring within
spirit ("a self-modification on the part of spirit") rather
than forming the limit of spirit beyond which lies an unintelligible thing-in-itself.
Furthermore Collingwood imbues this structure with an
internal dynamism which propels it through the stages of the
"forms of experience":
Hence a rhythm in which awareness and activity concentrate
themselves into the unity of feeling, and feeling again
articulates itself into awareness and activity, is fundamental in all aspects of spiritual life. But life is not
a mere rotation of three psychological categories in a
rhythmical montony. This triple rhythm is present in all
life, but it is never twice alike; its whole character is
altered by the specific difference of the experience in
which it is embodied. These differences emerge in the
course of a process which on its theoretical side may be
called the spirit's attempt to know itself, on its practical side the spirit's attempt to create itself. To know
itself means also knowing its world, and to create itself
means creating its world; its world in the former case
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means the world of which it is aware, in the latter case
the world in which it can live. (EPA, 138).
It is clear that when Collingwood refers to "objects" or "the
world" he means primarily objects of consciousness--what he
had called, in Religion and Philosophy, de hac re cogitare.
It refers to the objective correlate of acts of consciousness,
and when the term "object" is used henceforth without further
qualification this is the sense we shall have in mind.

If we

mean to refer to a "thing" we shall call it a "physical object" or an object having extramental reference.
The first stage in the life of spirit is the life of
art or the pure act of imagination--i.e. "the act of consciousness which presents to itself an object of whose relation to
other objects it takes no cognizance" (EPA, 139).

It is im-

portant to bear in mind that by imagination Collingwood does
not mean a faculty which creates objects which appear to be
presented in perception; in an earlier section of this essay
Collingwood makes this point more clearly than he ever did in
his subsequent writings:
In art there are always a subject and an object, a contemplator and something contemplated. But the subject's
activity, the object's nature, and the character of the
relation between them have certain peculiarities which
distinguish the case of art from other cases. What the
subject does is to imagine: the object is an imaginary
object, and the relation between them is that the individual or empirical act of imagining creates the object.
In knowledge, on the other hand, the object is real; and
the relation between them is that the empirical act of
knowing presupposes the object and does not create it.
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This may be said without prejudice to the idealistic view
that there is an absolute or transcendent sense in which
knowing creates its object; for no idealist is so i~nocent
as to confuse knowledge with imagination and to suppose
that what we generally call knowing is simply imagining.
(EPA, 52).
The caveat against the "idealist" here is clearly against the
''subjective idealist."

Furthermore by "the empirical act of

knowing" Collingwood clearly means perception.

We shall find

that throughout Collingwood's writings he never intimates that
in perception consciousness creates an object ex nihilo: and
this is the abhorent sense of "idealist" that he rejected
throughout his published works.
If the essence of artistic consciousness or aesthetic
experience is its monadism, i.e. its contemplation of an object without relating it to other objects, its practical aspect appears in play--the immersing of ourselves in an activity without any question as to the relation of this activity and anything else.

"Just as art does not explain itself

by stating reasons, so play does not explain itself by stating reasons; and immediacy means the absence of reasons" (EPA,
139-40).

But neither simple imagination nor simple play can

remain in this immediacy as a complete and self-contained form
of consciousness:
It is only within a consciousness which distinguishes
truth from falsehood that we can find in actual existence
that consciousness which does not distinguish them . . . .
The question "what am I?" can therefore no longer be answered in terms of imagination; I am not merely an imagin-
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er but a thinker. The question "what is my world?" must
be answered by saying that it is a world not merely of
fancies but of realities. But if I who think am als.o the
I who imagine, it would seem natural to superimpose the
act of thinking on the act of imagining in such a way that
the real is merely one division of the imaginary. The
only world whose existence we have learned to recognize is
the world of our own imaginations; and when the distinction between reality and unreality forces itself upon us
. . . we impose this distinction upon the world of imaginations, and regard certain imaginations as true and others
as false. To do this is to break with the life of art;
for . . . now we are asserting one imaginary object as
real, and denying another as unreal; and to do this is to
embark upon the life of religion. (EPA, 140-41).
I have quoted this passage at some length because it
is our first contact with a transition between forms of consciousness, and is expressed without much of the complicating
circumlocutions of Speculum Mentis.

In fact it is exemplary

in its simplicity, and gives us a clear sense of how Collingwood envisioned distinctions occurring within the unified life
of the spirit:

when a distinction like that between reality

and unreality "forces" itself upon us, it is imposed on the
unity of the form of consciousness which thereafter regards
its objects under this oppositional distinction.

In religion

this takes the form of mythological or metaphorical expression,
insofar as religion "says one thing and means another" by using imagery to convey a truth.

Nevertheless religion marks

an advance in the life of spirit:
(I)n religion that indifference to the distinction between real and unreal, which is the essence of art, is
abolished. Religion is essentially a quest after truth
and explicitly conscious of itself as such a quest. But
the truth which it can and does discover is a truth which
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is always hidden from view in a reliquary of symbolism:
we see the imagery, but we do not see the truth; we are
only conscious that the truth is there, and its pres~nce
converts the beauty of the imagery into holiness. But
inasmuch as this holiness is a property of a mere symbol,
religion always contains an element of idolatry and superstition. (EPA, 141).12
Religion, like art, cannot survive the disruptive force
of the tension between metaphorical and literal language.

When

it attempts to overcome its own superstitious tendencies it is
forced to distinguish thought from its own imagery, aud in the
process "the symbol loses its holiness and becomes merely significant" (EPA, 142).

With the distinction between metaphori-

cal and literal expression the life of explicit or selfconscious thought is reached.

While art forgets the presence

of thought and concentrates on the pure imagery of language,
and where religious thought was immediately identified with the
language expressing it,

scientific consciousness separates

thought from language and intellect from imagination.
Here thought is regarded as an activity self-contained and
self-sufficient, and its object as a self-contained and
self-sufficient intelligible world, reached through, but
lying behind, the sensible world. The aim of science is
to apprehend this purely intelligible world as a thing in
itself, an object which is what it is independently of all
thinking . . . . The world of thought is the universal,
the timeless and spaceless, the absolutely necessary,
whereas the world of sense is the contingent, the changing
12 Remarks like this make it difficult to assess Collingwood's true estimate of religion, which here seems to have
slipped somewhat under the high position he accords it in Religion and Philosophy. In Chapter VI we shall review Collingwood's
remarks about religious consciousness and try to judge the extent to which his view of religion is reductive.
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and moving appearance which somehow
bolizes it. (EPA, 142).

indicates or sym-

The distinction is the separation of reality from appearance,
the necessary from the contingent, which ultimately poses problems for scientific consciousness.

Science cannot bridge the

gap between the abstract universal and the particular, the necessary and the contingent, reality and appearance. 13
The overcoming of this opposition is the achievement
of the form of experience known as history.
Appearance and reality, imagination and thought, have been
merely distinguished and not related: they must somehow be
brought together again and shown to be equally necessary,
each to the other. This need is satisfied by the historical consciousness, whose object is the individual; no
longer an abstract universal divorced from its own equally
abstract particulars, but a universal that particularizes
itself, a particular constituted by its own universality.
For history, the truth is no longer an abstract necessity
which nowhere actually exists; it is concrete and actual,
it is real in every sense of the word, while the truth of
science is a reality which is in one sense utterly unreal,
and ideal never realized, a law which has no instances.
(EPA, 143).
13 collingwood's view of science in these early writings is primarily based on the classical Greek notions of science, perhaps modified by Renaissance advances, but hardly
based on first-hand knowledge of work in the physical and biological sciences of his day. It is therefore s~at understandable why this form of experience is least articulated and
not altogether satisfactory. Having stated the requirement
for other forms of experience that the philosopher of it must
be one who not only observes the experience of others but has
engaged in the activity for himself (EPA, 153), Collingwood
was in a weak position to describe the nature of scientific experience. Nevertheless we shall try always to evaluate what he
says about it as a reflection of his own understanding of it rather than what natural science is in itself or in the contemporary understanding of it. What he.does understand by it is
sometimes quite remarkable, as we shall see in Chapter IV.
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But history too has its fatal flaw.

The historian presumes a

world of fact which is already there for him to discover., and
for which the historian is a mere spectator.

The fact is a

thing in itself, "a thing whose existence and nature are supposed to be wholly independent of the thinker" (EPA, 143).
This constitutes the separation of subject and object--a relic
of the abstractness of science remaining in history. 14
This abstractness is only overcome in philosophy. The object of philosophy is nothing short of reality, a reality
which includes both the fact of which the historian is
aware and his awareness of that fact. The philosopher
. . . is not, like the historian, outside his own picture; he sees himself as part of the historical process
which he studies, and therefore part of his problem is to
understand how that historical process has thrown up in
its development an organ--namely himself--which is at once
a part of it and the spectator of it. With this clue in
his hand . . . he is able to reinterpret that process itself, and to see in every phase of it a nisus towards
self-consciousness. And in realizing that history is the
emergence of the spirit's consciousness of itself he is
actually achieving that consciousness . . . . His knowledge is therefore explicitly action; he is creating himself by knowing himself, and so creating for himself an
intelligible world, the world of the spirit in general.
(EPA, 143-44).
Since we are treading on the margins of territories that we
prefer to leave for later chapters, we shall leave off this
discussion of the forms of experience with the conception of
philosophy just given.

In Chapter VI we shall be in a better

14As Collingwood's idea of history developed he struggled against this very criticism, and his development of the
concept of "re-enactment" is an attempt to overcome the difficulty completely. The extent to which this constitutes an adequate rapprochement between history and philosophy will be
evaluated in Chapter IX.
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position to evaluate Collingwood's project for a philosophy
of "absolute knowledge."
But we have several particular ideas from Speculum
Mentis to attend to, and to these we must now turn.
5. Speculum Mentis and the Emergence of Explicit Anti-Realism.
In the last section when we discussed the way in which
the five forms of experience competed, as rival ways of conceiving the whole, for the prize of truth, we noted that when
a particular form of experience exhibits inconsistencies it becomes the task of a higher form of experience to resolve the
disparity.

That form of experience is philosophy, whose main

task is to attain self-consciousness and therefore to overcome
all the contradictions that arise due to the subject-object
dichotomy.

In Speculum Mentis this process gives rise to the

construction of what Collingwood calls "dogmatic philosophy"-i.e. a form of consciousness which is conscious of itself, but
imposes on itself the limits of a particular form of experience--art, religion, etc.--which it undertakes to justify as
the only true form of experience.

But these are errors that

the mind makes about itself, and since the esse of mind is de
hac re cogitare, it follows that when the mind takes itself
as its object, an error about that object is an error that it
makes about itself--an error that is immediately reflected in
the mind's activities under the erroneous conception of it-
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self: "the mind, having formed a false conception of itself,
tries to live up to that conception.

But the falseness Df

the conception just means that it cannot be 'lived up to"'
( SM, 2 50) .
Art, religion, science, and history are thus philosophical errors, and owe their characteristics, and the characteristics attributed by them to their ostensible objects, to the initial error on which each is based . .
. . Each grasps "one aspect of the truth," as we say,
forgetting that truth is a whole whose aspects cannot be
thus separated: each is true, even while it is false . .
. . Error is always present in truth, but negatively present, that is to say, it is present as that which is denied
. . . . This interdependence of truth and error, error
containing truth positively and truth containing error
negatively, is not only a fact easily verified in empirical observation . . . but is a corollary of the fact that
all knowledge is self-knowledge, and every error an error
about the knowing mind. Hence an abstraction which separates subject and object also separates truth and error
(good and evil, and so on), and . . . is a logical consequence of realism, for if there were a world of real objects completely other than the mind, absolute errors
could no doubt be made concerning them. (SM, 250-52).
Here for the first time we encounter Collingwood attributing to realism all the errors that the mind makes about
itself.

But if we are to become aware of the genesis of this

generalization, we must return to the conception of "fact"
with which we began our investigation of realism in the section on Religion and Philosophy.

Where in that earlier work

Collingwood appeared to be content with leaving uncriticized
the concept of

historical "fact" as "something independent

of my own or your knowledge of it," this immunity is no longer
respected.

The philosopher knows what the historian does not
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know, "that his own knowledge of facts is organic to the facts
themselves, that his mind is these facts knowing themselves
and these facts are his mind knowing itself" (SM, 295; cf. SM,
287).

Modern realism arises from the discovery of the concept

of fact, which soon develops into the "historical form of dogmatism" (SM, 281):
Historical dogmatism is the assertion of fact as ultimately real, and fact means not only the facts of "history"
but the facts of perception. Such a dogmatism may take a
considerable number of forms ((several of which Collingwood lists: monism and pluralism, intuitionism and intellectualism, materialism and spiritualism, etc.)) . . . .
That which unites all these divergent views is their common assertion of the ·positivity of the object, that is,
their denial that the object is conditioned or affected
by becoming known to any thinking mind or to what, with
a question-begging epithet, is sometimes called finite
mind: its finiteness being just this indifference to it
on the part of its object. Such a realistic account of
the object, as positive fact indifferent to its being
known, is at first sight compatible with any theory as to
what the ultimate nature of this object may be; and so we
get all manner of realisms . . . all equally capable of
being held in combination with the fundamental thesis
of realism, which is distinguished from them as "theory
of knowledge" from "metaphysics." (SM, 282-83).
Here we find a clear statement of what the Autobiography called the central doctrine of realism.

This formulation never changed substantially in Collingwood's writings. 15

15 cf. EPA, 182-83 (1925); EPH, 99-100 (1933); EPM,
161-62, 169-70 (1933); IH, v, 142 (1936). The term "realism"
does not appear in some of the later writings because the movement ceased to maintain its positions under that title. But
Collingwood's arguments were directed against the same positions as they were now maintained under the titles of positivism and empiricism: cf. PA, 130-31, 149-51 (1938); EM, 34-35,
37-38, 337-38 (1940); NL, 5.2, 5.31-5.32, 5.39 (1942).
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Just as in the Autobiography it is presented primarily as a
negative thesis: the negative formula that knowledge can make
no difference to its object.

But the realist is caught in a

positive antithesis to which he is equally committed--a coincidentia oppositorum which could not help but embarrass a subscriber to formal logic.

If reality consists of a collection

of objects independent of the mind which knows them, then a
pluralistic realism is affirmed--a universe in which objects
and minds both occur.

But on the other hand the historian

presumes that all facts fall into place in a single all-embracing system of fact, and this system is the absolute, the ultimate reality--a monistic realism which conflicts with its latent pluralism precisely over the status of the thinker.

Col-

lingwood phrases the dilemma as follows:
For either the thinker himself falls inside the absolute
whole or he does not. If he does then differences in his
thought about it make a difference to it, and the more
concretely real--that is, organized and interconnected in
all its parts--it is, the more fundamental these differences will be and the more completely the positivity of
fact is lost. If he does not, then the monistic doctrine
is surrendered and we return to pluralism. (SM, 283-84).
While this is an issue that appears to arise only from within
the perspective of the form of experience called philosophy,
Collingwood emphasizes that it is a problem that arises from
within the historical standpoint itself.

The fundamental

principle of history, the concreteness of the object, makes
it impossible for it to define its object in such a way that
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it leaves out the subject, i.e. the historian, and "compels
us to recognize an object to which the subject is

organ~c,

in the sense that the subject's consciousness of it makes a
real difference to it as a whole and to all its parts," so
that "(b)eing known, whether truly known or erroneously known,
must make a difference to the object" (SM, 244).
Just as the formulation of the central doctrine of
realism corresponds to the statement of it in the Autobiogra-

EQy, so one also finds in Speculum Mentis a rejection of the
principle in an argument employing the same strategy.

However

the argument introduces a complication in the form of the
principle of abstraction, an issue to which we shall return
after having a look at the argument.
(A)ny object considered in abstraction from a mind which
knows it is neither material nor mental, but an illusion,
a false abstraction. Thus we do not say that the objective world in itself is mental. If we are asked what it
is apart from a mind that knows it, we shall answer that
it is not "apart from" such a mind; it is "with" it in
the sense of being known by it. If we are asked what it
would be apart from such a mind, we shall answer that the
very question implies the suggestio falsi that we can describe that which by definition is unknown. (SM, 267-68;
cf. SM, 241).
Notice that the nerve of this argument is the absurdity that
results from suggesting that we can describe (and hence know)
what has been defined as something that is unknown, i.e. the
world as it is "apart from" the mind which knows it.

This is

slightly different wording from the Autobiography, but essen-
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tially the same argument as the one that he claims to have
given at Oxford in a paper which refuted the central negative
tenet of realism (A, 44).

It is also noteworthy that although

the phrase "in abstraction from" is employed in connection
with this refutation of realism, its use in the argument is
confined to the meaning, "apart from," as is indicated by the
fact that Collingwood replaces the phrase with this expression
without any change in the resulting sense of the argument.
But since Alan Donagan has made the issue of abstraction central to his interpretation of Collingwood's development (see Chapter I), we should take careful note of this meaning of the term in Speculum Mentis, so that when we encounter
it again in its altered meaning in Chapter VIII we shall have
some basis for comparison.

Furthermore it plays such a prom-

inent role in Speculum Mentis and its connection with realism
is so strong that it would be hard to ignore it.

Collingwood

himself ties the concepts of realism and abstraction together:
Such was . . . and to some extent still is, the belief of
eminent realists, who sum up their own position in the
negative formula that knowledge can make no difference to
its object. On the other hand, it is not possible to assert so much as this without asserting more, namely the
principle of abstract thought; for what is explicitly asserted is the complete separateness of subject and object,
their independence of one another: and this implies that
there are facts in existence which are thus completely independent. It is therefore correct to maintain that realism commits its author to the principle of pluralism;
and pluralism only means the scientific abstraction of the
universal from its particulars. This path, therefore,
leads from historical dogmatism back to scientific dogmatism. (SM, 283).
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It is this double implication that causes the basic inconsistency within realism itself, and is responsible for the dual
role that realism is assigned in Speculum Mentis.

On the one

hand realism is identified with the particular form of dogmatism which he calls "historical"--history being taken as "the
assertion of concrete fact," and realism as the assertion of
this fact as ultimately real (SM, 281-87, 201-11).

On the

other hand realism is identified with all forms of dogmatism,
insofar as realism is the willful resistance to any doubt
that subject and object are in all cases separate from one another, such an act of will being the essence of the dogmatic
attitude (SM, 259).

Realism thus appears to be identified

with both the principle of abstraction (where abstraction
means separation of subject and object), and the principle of
concrete factuality.

Collingwood himself recognizes this dual

role, and charges the realists themselves with it:
In spite of the simplicity of these difficulties, they
have not as yet been fairly faced by a single realist
with whose work the present writer is acquainted . . . .
The fact is that modern realism is essentially inconsistent. It is a halt, or rather a confused running to and
fro, between two principles, the abstract concept and the
concrete fact (SM, 284-85).
Speculum Mentis thus emerges as a philosophical work
which not only rejects realism but does so in large part on
the grounds of its principle of abstraction.

It is the latter

principle which is responsible for all the errors that consciousness makes about itself.

"There is not only one dogma-
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tism; there are as many types of dogmatism as there are types
of abstraction" (SM, 268). 16 "Every error is a lapse from
concreteness into abstraction, and all abstraction is dogmatism" (SM, 288).

"(T)he abstraction which separates subject

and object also separates truth and error (good and evil, and
so on) . .

Such a melodramatic view of life is a logical

consequence of realism (SM, 252; cf. SM, 259).

"Abstract know-

ledge is the same as error . . . . But all error contains an
element of truth and the error appears as the externality of
the object, its otherness with respect to the mind" (SM, 313).
Furthermore realism and abstractionism are also held
responsible for most of the pernicious consequences of realism
that Collingwood listed in the Autobiography:

an ethics which

separates knowledge from conduct (SM, 169-72); an epistemology
which defines knowledge in terms of intuition (SM, 188-94; cf. SM,
255, 262, 283, and 293); a metaphysics which deals with hypostatized or abstract universals concerning "nature or the objective world'' (SM, 271-81, especially 273 and 277; cf. SM,
158-63); and political theory which, in the guise of utilitarianism, pits the subjective will of the individual (as de16 How many types is that? Clearly more than Collingwood enumerates in Speculum Mentis, since the abstraction that
he embraced in later years is not one of those considered
among the abstractive processes of the four sub-philosophical
forms of experience. See Chapter VIII, below. We leave it
to the reader to judge if that form of abstraction also qualifies as a dogmatism.
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sire) against the objective will of society (as law), so that
"in such a society one regards every one else as a means to
his own ends"--a society in which, in other words, all goods
are regarded as private (SM, 169-76, 221-31).
Nor is this anti-realism peculiar to Speculum Mentis
alone; many of these themes appear in different guises in articles which he published during this period, and some of them
are brought out even more forcefully in later publications.
It is also instructive to pay attention to the synonyms that
Collingwood uses for realism.

Thus what is called the "plain

man's metaphysic" in Religion and Philosophy, and "realism"
in Speculum Mentis, is called "the plain man's realism" defined as "to think of the object as a 'thing in itself,' a
thing existing in and by itself" in a paper of 1928 on "The
Limits of Historical Knowledge" (EPH, 99).

In a 1921 paper

on "Croce's Philosophy of History," Collingwood criticizes
Croce for his "vacillation between naturalism, for which some
statements are just true and other just false, and idealism,
for which truth and falsehood are inextricably united in every
judgement" (EPH, 12)--the former representing the Croce who
is "the realist, dualist, empiricist, or naturalist, who delights in formal distinctions and habitually works in dualistic or transcendent terms"(EPH, 8).

In passages such as these

it is clear that Collingwood tends to use interchangeably
terms like realism, naturalism, dualism, and empiricism.
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This synonymous use of terms is further exemplified
in a 1923 paper on "Sensation and Thought" in which Collingwood attacked what he called "the empiricist fallacy" of divorcing sensuous appearance from objective reality, or assuming "that a distinction could be made between what a thing
17
looks like and what it is" --a distinction which is taken as
"the infallible mark of dogmatism (and consequently of realism) in all its varieties in Speculum Mentis (SM, 255; cf. SM,
77).

Here we have empiricism and naturalism described in

terms identical with the epistemological doctrine of realism.
In a 1925 paper on "Economics as a Philosophical Science" Collingwood reinforces this identification of realism and empiricism by defining "empirical thought" as "that which conceives
its object as substance or thing," as opposed to philosophical
thought, which conceives its object as activity. 18 The distinction is virtually repeated in "Political Action," a paper
delivered before the Aristotelian Society in 1928. 19
6.

Conclusion.

To say that "realism" as described in Speculum Mentis
is a protean monstrosity would hardly be an exaggeration, and
17 p rocee d 1ngs
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18 International Journal of Ethics, XXXVI (1925), p. 162.
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one cannot help but wonder why any person of sound mind and
civilized demeanor would ever willingly describe himself· as a
realist.

Are we dealing with something which has any histori-

cally evidenced counterpart, or is Collingwood presenting us
with caricature as a foil for his protagonist, absolute idealism?

While we can certainly say that at this point that

the autobiographical interpretation on the issue of realism
20
. .
is we 11 supporte d b y t h e ev1. d ence we h ave b een exam1n1ng,
we are left with a number of troubling problems which we shall
have to monitor closely in the chapters which follow.
20 Two themes from his discussion of realism in the
Autobiograthy have not been discussed at this point: the noneternity o philosophical problems and the falsity of realistic logic with its claim to one-one correspondence of propositions with indicative sentences. We shall be examining Collingwood's views on logic in the next chapter. Concerning the
eternity of problems, the closest one comes to a statement of
his position at this time is in a 1927 paper on "The Theory
of Historical Cycles" (EPH, 76-89), which argues that in one
sense it is true to say the the problem of politics is always
the same, but in an equally important sense it is always different. The abstract goal of providing for the needs and betterment of a society remains the same, but in each case this
involves solving different concrete problems (EPH, 85-87).
The reader of the quotations of the last few pages would not
have much difficulty in constructing an argument to overcome
this difficulty: the problems that philosophers are concerned
with are eternal--the same questions from generation to generation--only insofar as they are initially taken as abstracted
from the historical situations in which they arise. The refusal to see these questions and their historical context as
related is a willful dogmatism, and a species of the more fun~amental error of separating subject (the philosopher) and obJ:ct (the problems he considers). From an abstract point of
~lew, then, there are eternal questions and concepts--and such
1~ the point of view of the realist; from a concrete point of
V1ew, there are not--and such is the view point of the philosopher as historian.
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The first of these is the issue we just raised. If
there are distinctions which Collingwood is willing to make
within the ranks of those who have been called idealists,
so that when Collingwood denies that Speculum Mentis is idealistic he can remain in good faith with his readers by assuming that they understand him to mean that he was not a subjective idealist, are there no such equivalent distinctions to
be found among the ranks of the realists?

While Collingwood

tells his readers that there are as many forms of error as
there are forms of realism, he fails to tell the reader what
those forms might be.

We shall find in succeeding chapters

that this issue remains unresolved, and that the "realists"
remain not only a shadowy group of figures warming themselves
by the bare fire of their negative thesis, but also that the
position being rejected becomes progressively more indistinct
as his polemic against it increases in its fury.
What is clear from this polemic is that in discussing
realism Collingwood himself always employs an abstract sense
of "knowing" and "object" because he was dealing with the problem from what he considered to be the realist's own perspective, i.e. one which takes the perception of a physical, extra-mental object as paradigmatic for all forms of knowing. 21
21 Passmore writes that "British philosophy, preoccupied with the theory of perception, tends to classify philosophical theories by their attitude to the perception of material things: 'realism,' for it, is the view that material things
exist even when they are not being perceived, and 'idealism'
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This means that by "realism" Collingwood had in mind the epistemological viewpoint which looks to empiricism as its natural
point of departure.

That there might be non-empiricist real-

ists Collingwood never appears to have

considere~

as is clear

from the fact that even in his criticism of a realist he admired--Samuel Alexander--his main objection is to the fact
that he adopts an acquaintance theory of knowledge (EM, 17678).

His strategy is therefore to attack any sensation-bound

theory of knowledge which neglects the active role of thought
in perception, and to do so by emphasizing the contextual and
interpretative aspects of the perceptual process.

In Chapter

VII we shall find Collingwood arguing against a different opponent--G. E. Moore--and adopting a similar strategy, but one
which argues that the expression "sense datum" is intrinsically absurd.

But in both earlier and later writings, his point

of departure is the abstract statement of the realists that
"knowing makes no difference to the object known," where
"knowing" means perception, and "object known" means object
of perception.
Secondly, what about the connection between realism
and abstraction?

Obviously an empiricist epistemology must

account for the existence of universal concepts and many do
is, most commonly, the view that they exist only as objects
of perception." Op. cit., p. 49, note.
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so by providing a theory which describes universals as arising by a process of abstraction from particular sensible instances.

In Speculum Mentis Collingwood does not enter into

a criticism of any such abstractive process, nor is it the
basis for attack on "abstraction" as the root error of realism
and all forms of dogmatism.

Speculum Mentis, adopting the

stance of absolute idealism, assumes that absolute truth resides only in the whole, and "abstraction" is whatever divides
this whole into atomic parts.

Just as Collingwood did not

seem to consider the possibility of a non-empiricist realism,
in Speculum Mentis he did not appear to consider a non-abstractive realism.

But we found him in at least one passage argu-

ing against realism in a way which does not entail any commitment to the principle of abstraction (SM, 267-68), at least
not in all senses of the term.

In Chapter VIII we shall find

Collingwood proposing a peculiar description of abstraction
that does not involve "separating" what is abstracted from its
abstracting context, and at that point we shall have to assess
whether such a process can be maintained within an anti-realistic framework.

The statements "all abstraction is falsifi-

cation" and "abstraction is necessary for all true judgements"
may not be contradictory when the appropriate interpreting
qualifiers are added--"simple abstraction" in the first assertion being semantically discernible from concrete or "real
abstraction" in the second.

But more of this in Chapter VIII.

153

Thirdly, we wish to point to a hidden presupposition
in these early discussions of realism and idealism, but pne
which Collingwood stated early on in his career, and never
abandoned.

In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood had already

decided that there was no such thing as a fixed human nature.
This appears to be a corollary of his principle that the esse
of mind is de hac re cogitare.

"The question to be asked

about mind," writes Collingwood in 1916, "is not what it is,
but what it does; a question which thelogic of things and
qualities does not deal" (RP, 165; FR, 266)--and herein lies
an enormous part of the program for the remainder of his philosophy.

Not only does it entail placing Collingwood on a col-

lision course with empirical psychology, which until the end
of his life he criticized for treating mind as if it were a
thing, and acts of thought as if they were events not significantly different from those of the physical world; but it required him to formulate a logic alternative to that of "things
and qualities" in order to have an instrument for dealing with
what mind does without doing violence to it in the process.
In the next chapter we shall look at Collingwood's early attempts to satisfy this requirement.

We can anticipate that,

just as he found in the philosophy of absolute idealism a kindred spirit for his anti-realistic leanings, so he would also
find in their logic an alternative to the formal logic he presumed to be the tool of the realist philosophers.

r

CHAPTER IV
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, LOGIC AND DIALECTIC
1.

Introduction.

In the Autobiography Collingwood states that his Q-A
logic was not explicitly formulated until he was obliged to
confront the Albert Memorial on a daily basis during World
War I;

but by 1917 it was, since he states that it was at

that time that he wrote a book called Truth and Contradiction,
which was refused by a publisher.

After writing the Autobiog-

raphy Collingwood deliberately destroyed it (A, 29-30, 42,
99 n. 1).

In Chapter I we noted that Knox found it incred-

ible that Collingwood could have worked out his theory of absolute presuppositions (which the Autobiography describes as
part of Q-A logic) prior to writing the Essay on Philosophical
Method in 1932 (IH, x-xi).

Since the Autobiography is not

clear on what exactly is included in the version of Q-A logic
presented in Truth and Contradiction, we have questioned Knox's
judgment on this issue.

In this chapter we must try to find

whatever evidence we can in the writings prior to 1932 of the
role of questions and their presuppositions in the logical
functions of mental acts, and on the basis of this evidence to
decide if Collingwood's autobiographical interpretation can be
154
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upheld on this point, or if he was deliberately trying to deceive his readers (as one might suspect from his destruction
of the manuscript of Truth and Contradiction, which could be
interpreted as an attempt to cover his own tracks).
At this level of inquiry our task is plain:

we are to

take up the early publications, including books, essays, and
published lectures, and examine them for statements concerning questions, answers, and presuppositions.

Unfortunately

this task is already complicated by the overlay of issues from
the previous chapter--especially the problems which arise due
to his early commitment to absolute idealism.

For while Col-

lingwood disclaimed originality in rejecting propositional logic and the

propositional, correspondence, coherence, and prag-

matic theories of truth (A, 36), he appears to claim credit
for recognizing that truth is a property of the Q-A complex
and not of propositions as such (A, 38).

Furthermore he

clearly wants his readers to believe that the alternative to
formal logic was his own Q-A logic, and that Q-A logic allowed
him to answer his 1914 question about whether the realists'
methods were sound:

the answer was that they were not, be-

cause "the 'realists'' chief and only method was to analyse
the position criticized into various propositions, and detect
contradictions between these," following as they did the rules
of propositional logic (A, 42).
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But if Collingwood could have been so historically
careless as to have forgotten, as other students of Oxford
realism have not, that it was Cook Wilson himself who was
highly critical of propositional logic, and who insisted that
what the actual subject or predicate of a statement was depended on what question the statement is answering, 1 could he
also have been mistaken about other details concerning his
"discovery" of Q-A logic?

What is particularly puzzling is

Collingwood's failure inthe Autobiography to mention anything
at all about dialectical logic, and it is this oversight--or
was it deliberate neglect?--that is brought into focus by the
issues raised in the previous chapter.

While it is true that

in Religion and Philosophy Collingwood employs a method of argument that relies more on what he claimed in the AutobiograE£y to be that of the realists (i.e. analysis into contradic-

tory propositions), Speculum Mentis is beyond any reasonable
shadow of a doubt built upon the dialectical logic familiar to
1 "A point of particular importance . . . is CookWilson's criticism of the subject-predicate logic. First of
all, he sharply distinguishes between the grammatical subject
and the logical subject, which the traditional logic is content . . . to identify . . . . Everything depends upon what
question ((a)) statement is answering . . . . (S)tress and
context are ignored by the traditional logic; thus there arises what Cook Wilson regards as the absurd presumption that
the noun which is nominative to the principal verb in a statement is bound to indicate the logical subject" (John Passmore,
~Hundred Years of Philosophy (Baltimore, 1957/1968), p. 244).
Passmore also notes that Cook Wilson criticized Bradley's dialectical method for asking "unreal" questions, i.e. questions
which cannot intelligibly arise (op. cit., p. 246).
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post-Kantian idealist philosophers.

If Collingwood was an

anti-realist primarily because he became an absolute idealist,
then it is understandable that he would also be opposed to a
logic of atomic propositions, each externally related to an
equally atomic and distinct state of affairs in the physical
world, and that he would offer in its place a dialectical logic of developmental processes more in keeping with the active
role of thought in reconciling oppositions.

But this is not

the genesis of his thought as he outlined it in the Autobiography, where the turn away from realism is described without
any mention of absolute idealism or dialectical logic.

In

fact it is astonishing to find that there is no mention of any
of the Italian idealists in the Autobiography other than one
brief reference to Guido de Ruggiero as the recipient of a
copy of his manuscript, Libellus de Generatione, which outlined the logic of historical process (A, 99).

His descrip-

tion of this process is also the closest that Collingwood
comes in the Autobiography to discussing dialectical logic
(the term is not used).

In fact in reading the Autobiography

one is inclined to believe that while Collingwood read widely
in his youth, in his maturity he was philosophically influenced only by indigenous British philosophers.
We already know this not to be the case.

But if we

are to understand the Autobiography as an act of self-interpretation, our concern is less with such oversights as these--

r
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2
whatever their reason might be --than with the extent to which
the account he gives can make sense of his published writings,
and it is to these that we now turn without further prologue.
2. Abstract and Concrete Universals.
As one might expect, there is no mention of the questioning activity in Religion and Philosophy, nor of the Q-A
complex as the unity of knowledge.

But there are scattered

remarks about logic, the universal, abstraction, and scientifie thinking which provide us a few clues about the way in
which he conceived these subjects prior to his turn to absolute idealism.

In the first chapter Collingwood tries to an-

alyze what would be meant by a philosophy of religion, and in
the process outlines what a "philosophy of" anything means:
The philosophy of any subject means careful reflexion upon
that subject; thus we have the philosophy of art, of con2

one such reason could very well be the political and
military polarizations which were occurring at this time in
Europe. In May of 1936 Italian forces entered the Abyssinian
capital of Addis Ababa, and in July of 1936 the Spanish Civil
War began. The Preface to Collingwood's Autobiography is
dated 2 October 1938. In May of 1939 Germany and Italy signed
the "Pact of Steel." From June through August of 1939, Collingwood sailed to Greece and Italy as First Mate of the
schooner yacht, Fleur de Lys. In The First Mate's Log he
writes with outrage and contempt of an incident with an Italian fascist harbor patrol in Messina (FML, 170-74), and at the
end of his account of the voyage he describes the discovery by
the crew, mostly from Oxford, of the German-Russian alliance
and the Nazi invasion of Poland. In such circumstances it is
understandable why Collingwood might not wish to make an issue
of expressing his indebtedness to German and Italian idealism.
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duct, of science and so on. To do a thing, and to understand what one is doing and how one does it, seem to be
different things; . . . to conduct an argument is science,
to reflect upon it is logic . . . . But the theory of
knowledge or logic does not consider differences of the
object, but only processes of the subject; and therefore
there is no distinction between the philosophy of religion
(as theory of religious knowledge) and the theory of knowledge in general. If there is a general philosophy of
knowing, it includes religious knowledge as well as all
other kinds; no separate philosophy is required. (RP,
15; FR, 53) .

As Collingwood's thought developed, nearly every statement in
this passage is modified to the point of contradiction, with
the exception of the definition of logic as a "theory of knowledge."3

By the time he came to write Speculum Mentis he had

already abandoned the idea of a "general philosophy of knowing"--as if knowledge were a genus and cases of it were partieular species; and in the same work he denies that a theory of
knowledge does not consider differences of the object, but
only "processes of the subject."

In fact even in Religion

3 In his chapter on Cook Wilson and Oxford philosophy,
Passmore writes: "Cook Wilson's main theme is logic, but logic conceived in the Oxford manner, as a philosophical investigation into thought rather than as the construction of a calculus. The Boole-Schrtlder logic, indeed, Cook Wilson condemned as 'merely trivial,' in comparison with 'the serious
business of logic proper'--inquiry into 'the forms of thought'"
(op. cit., p. 240). It must be recalled that Collingwood
learned his logic from Cook Wilson, and never seems to have
accepted any other view than that the true task of logic is
to understand the "forms of thought"--cf. Chapter VIII, below.
As Donagan rightly notes, Collingwood completely failed to appreciate the revolution in logic occurring during his lifetime.
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and Philosophy Collingwood could not consistently maintain
-that
logic considers only processes of the subject, since in
this work we have already found him attacking psychology for
treating a judgment (the act of knowing something) as an
event in the mind without going on to determine the relation
of this mental event to the reality beyond the act which is
being apprehended (RP, 40; FR, 75-76).
A more promising and enduring starting point is with
his remarks about the universal-particular distinction.

In

analyzing the relationship of philosophy and history (as part
of his efforts to relate religion and history), Collingwood
examines the attempt to distinguish history and philosophy on
the grounds that they deal respectively with the particular
and the universal:
History, it is sometimes said, is knowledge of the particular, philosophy knowledge of the universal. But the
particular is no mere particular; it is a particular of
this or that universal; and the universal never can exist
at all except in the form of this or that particular.
"The universal" and "the particular" considered as separate concrete things are fictions; and to equate the distinction of philosophy and history with such a fictitious
distinction is to admit at once that it is untenable.
(RP, 49-50; FR, 83).
Later Collingwood settles in much the same way the suggestion
that the Incarnation can be interpreted by means of the same
distinction--God as the universal and man as the particular.
To regard the universal as if it were something separate and
concrete is the result of a logic gone awry.
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(T)he universal itself, which as a matter of fact exists
only in various particulars, is sometimes falsely conceived as if it were itself another particular; and-thus
arises the notion of an archetype or ideal specimen of a
class to which every less perfect member is an approximation. These ((are)) two tendencies of false logic, the
tendency to elevate one particular into the standard and
only real instance of a universal, and the tendency to
hypostasise the universal into a perfect and ideal particular . . . . (RP, 163).
What Collingwood suggests as an alternative to the
separate universal of false logic is what he calls a concrete
identity in Religion and Philosophy and the concrete universal in Speculum Mentis.

We shall deal with the latter in the

next section, but it will be helpful to have a provisional
idea of what he means by these terms.

Evidently a universal

refers to a unity of some sort, and especially a unity which
is capable of being shared by two minds thinking about the
same thing--such is the minimal sense of "universal" at least
since the time of Socrates and Plato.

When Collingwood asks

how it is possible for two minds to think the same thought,
he begins by assuming the factual existence of communication
and knowledge (RP, 98, 109; FR, 170, 180) and, like Kant, asks
how this is possible.

Since all consciousness is the con-

sciousness of something definite, it follows that if one is
thinking of anything at all it must be a thought of something
concrete; Collingwood goes so far as to say that "One simply
cannot make general statements without any thought of their
instances'' (RP, 46; FR, 81).

Two minds share the same thought

when that thought is a concrete identity, i.e. one which has
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the characteristics of a whole in each of whose parts the
whole is entirely present (RP, 88-89; cf. RP, 108, 112; FR,
179, 182).

Collingwood contrasts this concrete unity (mani-

fested in personal identity) with the abstract unity--i.e.
what a thing is in itself as opposed to what it is in relation to its context or the whole of which it is a part;

he

argues that the character or self of a thing, what it is, cannot be distinguished from its relations, which consist in a
quality of the thing itself (RP, 110-12; FR, 181-82).
Without going further into this discussion (we shall
take it up again in more detail in Chapter VI on rapprochement
identity), we can see already a drift in the direction of
idealism of the sort we discussed in Chapter III.

It is also

transparent that Collingwood is making use of distinctions
that were known to anyone familiar with the logic of Bradley. 4
The contrast is between the abstract and concrete universals,
and while it is somewhat vague and imbedded in discussion of
other topics in Religion and Philosophy, it is explicit and
prominent in Speculum Mentis.

But so is, we must add, the

role of questioning in knowledge.
In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood seems anxious
to take seriously the realists'

princi~le

"that the mind is

4 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (Oxford, 1883),
Vol. I, p. 188; cf. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality
~Value (London, 1927), pp. 35-39.
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one thing and the object another," although he immediately
adds that "we cannot rest content with the statement" (RP,
99; FR, 172).

The theory of knowledge contained in this

early work seems to be an attempt at a compromise between correspondence and coherence theories of truth with the hope expressed that it would offend neither realists nor idealists.
On the one hand mental acts (judgments) are defined and determined by their reference to objects (RP, 99-102; FR, 17173); on the other hand the "object" toward which mental acts
are directed turns out to be an identity-in-difference (a concrete universal) whose "inner structure" is entirely constituted by the necessary relations it has as part of a whole
(RP, 108-14; FR, 179-84).
But by 1924 Collingwood was less willing to grant any
ground to the realist at all.

In Speculum Mentis knowledge

in its irreducible and simplest state is an activity of questioning and answering, and the attempt to identify knowledge
as anything less than this is sharply dismissed:

A crude empir1c1sm imagines that knowledge is composed
wholly of assertion: that to know and to assert are identical . . . . Knowledge as a past fact, as something dead
and done with--knowledge by the time it gets into encyclopedias and textbooks--does consist of assertion . . . .
But those who look upon it as an affair of discovery and
exploration have never fallen into that error. People
who are acquainted with knowledge at first hand have always known that assertions are only answers to questions.
( SM, 77).
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Here we have a declaration that sounds like it could be a
direct quote from the Autobiography.

But as we have already

seen, there is a great deal else in Speculum Mentis that does
not.

One noteworthy difference is that there seems to be a

strong inclination to accept coherence rather than P-Q-A cornplexes as a touchstone of truth:

Collingwood makes it clear

from the start that the various claimants to the title of
truth--his five "forms of experience"--are to be tested on
their ultimate self-consistency, that is, the coherence they
exhibit in attempting to live up to their own claims (SM, 4445).

The "self-consistency" that Collingwood has in mind,

however, is not merely freedom from propositional contradiction:
Now the characteristic mark by which a form of experience
is shown to be satisfactory is simply that it is possible
. . . . Any scheme ((i.e. form of experience)) which is
in itself contradictory or nonsensical cannot redeem
((its)) promises, because it cannot be put into execution; but if there is any scheme of life which is inherently consistent and therefore, ideally speaking, practicable, we may safely assume that this is the scheme to
adopt. Self-consistency, then, is our test.5 (SM, 44;
cf. SM, 250).
Collingwood immediately adds that any criterion of truth resting on a presumed correspondence either with human nature or
5cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford,
1893), p. 120: "Is there an absolute criterion? . . . Ulti~ate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here
1s an absolute criterion.
And it is proved absolute by the
fact that, either in endeavoring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity."
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with the facts about the world is a mistake, because both of
these are inherently doubtful:

what human nature is and. what

the facts about the world are, are both open to legitimate
questioning (SM, 45).

So it is apparent that if the usual

form of "coherence" is not exactly what Collingwood has in
mind as a criterion of truth, "correspondence" of consciousness and object is no longer acceptable.

Nor did he appear

to entertain it seriously again for the remainder of his published career.
Speculum Mentis also in part corrects, in part develops his earlier views on logic.

As in Religion and Philosophy,

what Collingwood is seeking is a philosophical logic, by which
he apparently meant something like Kant's transcendental logic, i.e. a logic which does not regard mental acts considered
in abstraction from their reference to objects.

It must

therefore be not the formal logic of the "abstract universal"
(the unity, identity, or sameness of a concept which is indifferent to the variation or inter-relation of its own instances), but the dialectical logic of the "concrete universal" (an identity-in-difference, or a unity to which difference is essential) (SM, 162-63).

Collingwood's strategy in

both of these early works is to argue that the very attitude
of consciousness that regards all concepts or universals as
abstract also prevents the latter from being identified in any
meaningful way with their objects or instances--in a word,
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from referring.

In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood lim-

ited himself to the case of religious consciousness, and calls
such an abstract attitude with respect to religious objects
"psychology" (RP, 40; FR, 75-76) (although he does also speak
of "abstract history"--this being the "mere verbal description
of events without any attempt at understanding them," and abstract philosophy as "the dry criticism of formal rules of
thinking without any attempt at grasping their application"-RP, 51; FR, 85).

In Speculum Mentis such an attitude towards

objects of knowledge is taken to be characteristic of science
as such (SM, 158-63).

In both cases the reification of the

abstract universal, that is, making it an object of thought
"separate" from its instantiations, is taken as characteristic of the "realistic" point of view (SM, 189, 252, 282-85).
But in Speculum Mentis objects of knowledge are not described
as "real things" or "facts" independent of anyone's knowing
of them, but rather are taken as the objective correlates of
acts of knowledge (SM, 11, 159, 287, 293-95, 310).

And as a

consequence the tendency to regard logic merely as a psychological science (a tendency opposed by such diverse thinkers
as Bradley and Frege) is overcome to some extent, and logic
is allowed to have its own innings--that is, to present its
case as a justification of science as an autonomous discipline.
But since it is in Speculum Mentis that both Q-A logic
and formal logic (as the justification of science) make their
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appearance, it is necessary here to assess their relationship
in order to see if Collingwood's view in the Autobiography,
which presents the former as an alternative to the latter, is
reflected in his second major work.

As we shall see, the link-

ing concept between the two is bound up with the activity of
"supposal" or hypothesis formation, which remains somewhat ambiguous--as one might expect, since at this stage his reconciliation philosophy was still incompletely worked out.
3.

Science and Supposal.

The form of experience which regards its objects only
as particulars of a universal, as members of a class, or as
instances of a law, Collingwood calls "science" (SM, 158-63).
Whether the abstract concept makes its appearance as a Platonic form, a medieval universal, or a Renaissance law of nature, the characteristic viewpoint of scientific consciousness is that it distinguishes between universals and particulars, and assumes that the former can be abstracted by thought
--i.e., separated or isolated and studied apart from its instances (SM, 159-60, 180).

Such an attitude is variously de-

scribed by Collingwood as the abstractness of the scientific
concept (SM, 162), the principle of the transcendence of the
universal to the particular (SM, 179), or the relation of difference without identity (SM, 243).

In any event it asserts

the reality of the abstract concept as indifferent to its exemplifications or to the mutual relations its instances have
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other than as members of a class (SM, 162-63).

Furthermore

the abstract universal of science is contrasted with the concrete universal of history:
Classification is the key-note of the scientific spirit;
but classification is nothing but the abstractness of the
scientific concept. For a class as such is a collection
of individuals without any mutual cohesion or organization
except their common membership of the class. They have no
reference to each other, but only to the universal; and
each one refers to the universal in precisely the same
way as every other. As soon as they refer to the universal in different ways, or, what is the same thing, as
soon as they develop a system of mutual relations between
themselves, they cease to be a mere class and become an
organized and articulated system; and the universal ceases
to be an abstract universal (class-concept) and becomes a
concrete universal, or one to which the differences between its particulars are relevant. (SM, 162-63).
The point at which science cannot maintain its object as an
abstract universal, and is forced to assert the reality of the
concrete universal is, therefore, the point at which science
ceases to survive as an autonomous form of experience and becomes dependent on another form of consciousness, viz. history
(SM, 180, 186-87; cf. 193).
That point occurs when scientific consciousness attempts to deal with "facts," or to refer to objects and events
given in sensuous appearance.

In its most elementary and

primitive form science is constructed in accordance with an
! priori or deductive ideal:

it is the attempt to work out

the implications of the concept of a class as such, known independently of all experience (SM, 164).

Since the relations
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of an indeterminate plurality of abstract units (the members
of a class) to a determining unity (the class itself) is precisely what constitutes the numerical series, mathematics is
the one and only.§! priori science.

Mathematics "is simply

the theory of order, where order means classificatory order,
structure in its most abstract possible form" (SM, 165). Pure
mathematics deals with classes (e.g. numerical sets) whose
members are themselves classes (numbers) (SM, 169).

But if

it claims to be objectively true, mathematics turns out to be
an illusion: it is "the truth about nothing," since it is "the
description of the structure of a null class"(SM, 185). 6
The attempt to import some sensuous content into
these empty class-concepts gives rise to the second phase of
science: science on the empirical or inductive model--an ordered knowledge of "facts" (SM, 177; cf. 168).

But the in-

ductive method (observation and experiment) does not supersede .§! priori deduction; on the contrary, induction itself
presumes a principle variously described as the uniformity of
nature, the law of universal causation, etc. which induction
is unable to establish by its own methods, and which rests on
the principle of uniformity itself (SM, 178-79).

If it is

6 This seems to be a variant of Russell's paradox--the
class of all classes both is and is not a member of itself.
For Collingwood's further use of this paradox, see SM 169, 189,
and 192. Collingwood does not, however, seem to apply it to
mathematics itself, but only to mathematics insofar as it
claims to be objectively true.
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not to presume the very principle that it seeks to prove, empirical science is forced to alter its conception of its own
object, and this leads to the third phase of science: science
as supposal.

7

Science asserts, not the actual truth, but what would be
true if something ((else)) were true which is laid down
as an hypothesis. It asserts, never that S is P, but that
if there were an S it would be P. Its procedure therefore
consists, first, in making an assumption, secondly in deducing consequences of that assumption. Throughout this
process it never makes an assertion, in the sense of a
categorical judgement, at all. Its judgements are hypothetical from the beginning to end. (SM, 183).8
Such a process is utterly gratuitous: without a basis in previous assertions, Collingwood insists, no hypothesis can be
framed at all, much less relevant or illuminating hypotheses
(SM, 79).

Supposal without a framework of assertion is arbi-

trary and meaningless; but supposal within a framework of assertion is something more than merely hypothetical.

Its ob-

7collingwood, true to a long standing tradition in
British philosophy, does not provide his reader with anything
but scant clues about the historical representatives of these
movements. The third phase has taken place "almost within
living memory" in the latter part of the 19th century, and is
represented by the "critical movement" and "scientific pragmatism" (SM, 180-82). There is no hint in Speculum Mentis
that any movement in science follows this one.
8 collingwood casts the hypothetical assertion in
subject-predicate form but it is clear that it applies equally
to propositional functions: the procedure of "making assumptions" and then "deducing the consequences of these assumptions" is appropriate for propositions, since what is assumed
is a proposition, not merely the subject of an assertion.
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ject is not only something possible (viz. the alternatives envisaged in the hypothesis) but something actual, and this is
beyond the reach of mere supposal (SM, 187-88, 191, 199). Unless science is to remain a tissue of hypotheses, and fact is
therefore permanently to elude the grasp of science, it must
have a categorical basis in actual assertions.

( SM, 185).

On this objective ambiguity founders the autonomy of
science.

If the objects of science are pure concepts (mathe-

maticals, universals), they are true of nothing actual at all;
but if science intends its laws to apply to real objects it
cannot deal with the latter by means of purely abstract concepts; and finally, if science says that its object is neither
a null class nor something strictly speaking actual, but only
something possible, it renders its conclusions abritrary.

The

issue cannot be settled from within scientific consciousness
alone, and the attempt to settle it from without gives rise
to "scientific philosophy"--that form of dogmatism which, in
the guise of formal logic and metaphysics, presents itself
as a justification of the scientific attitude (SM, 271).
Since the deduction of consequences from hypothetical
assertions is governed by the rules of formal logic, the latter is taken (by the critical and pragmatic defenders of the
third, and presumably still current phase of science) as the
justification of the methodology of science.

But mathematical

or formal logic constructs its deductions in a categorical
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fashion:

its statements are demonstrably true of every pos-

sible object--true, that is, categorically.

Insofar as.formal

logic is the categorical basis for the (hypothetical) mathematical formulation of scientific assertions, mathematical
truths themselves are taken as "true without qualification of
the entire world, actual and possible" (SM, 184-85).

Unfor-

tunately this conflicts with the conclusion that mathematics
had reached about itself as the "theory of order"--viz. that
it is the description of the structure of a null class, the
truth about nothing.

Formal logic of itself is not able,

therefore, to extricate third-phase science from its difficulties:

laws that are categorically true of every possible

object are true of everything in general, but of nothing in
particular.

Formal logic may be able to distinguish valid

from invalid inferences, but without metaphysics as its necessary correlate, such a vindication of the principles on which
scientific thinking is founded may only be true for thought
alone, and not for thought that is directed to an object (SM,
272-73).
(W)e must demonstrate that what we have hitherto called
logic or the theory of ((scientific)) thought is really
metaphysics or the theory of reality, and that what we
have called the laws of thought are the laws of being.
But this is precisely what we cannot do. Metaphysics is
impossible ((on scientific grounds)); for its task is to
vindicate the objective validity of the ways in which we
think, and if there are any flaws in our methods of
thought, these will affect our metaphysical theory of reality and introduce into it the very mistakes which by
its help we had hoped to eradicate. Hence the theory of
being as distinct from thinking (metaphysics) will only be
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the theory of thinking as distinct from being (logic) expressed in different terminology, but subject to the same
fatal weakness, namely that just as logic can never.analyze real thinking--thinking that, going on in the logician's mind, always lies behind ((i.e. beyond)) his analysis--so metaphysics can never analyze real being, being as
it is in itself untainted by thought. (SM, 273-74).
In short, scientific consciousness is left permanently and irreparably without justification because its principle of abstraction renders its objects (individuals, particular matters
of fact) utterly beyond the reach of its principles (laws, necessary principles of order) (SM, 185-86, 277).
What science is left with as a justification of its
own viewpoint is a psychology of abstract consciousness which
fails for the very reasons that Collingwood had advanced in
Religion and Philosophy--viz. since it fails to take into account the truth or falsity of the thought it examines ab extra, as an event, it cannot justify itself as anything more
than another mental event alongside the first (rather than an
explanation of the thought it claims to be observing) (SM,
274-77).

Psychology (or, more properly, psychologism) marks

the point at which scientific consciousness fails to achieve
wisdom or self-conscious self-justification, just as history
marks the point at which science fails to achieve concrete
knowledge of fact--the difference being that history provides
the justification of the scientific attitude that psychology
cannot (SM, 186, 193).

But of this we shall have more to say

in the immediately following chapter.
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It is important to realize (both for an understanding of the argument in Speculum Mentis and for an assessment
of the relationship of Q-A and formal logic) that when a form
of experience is show to fail in its claim to be the whole
truth about its object, it is exposed as an error, but it is
not thereby utterly discredited and completely rejected.
Since it is an error that consciousness makes about itself,
that error is overcome only when it is criticized and shown
to rely on something other than itself for its validity (SM,
244-45, 255, 288-91, 296-97).

Consequently when scientific

consciousness "collapses" it does not collapse into nothing,
but leaves behind "solid assets" in the form of a pure science
of mathematics and an empirical-hypothetical science of nature,
with mathematical logic and metaphysics as their partial justification, and the psychology of concrete mind as their absolute justification (SM, 271-72, 277-78, 280, 317; cf. "ST",
73-75).

One of the "solid assets" for Collingwood's philoso-

phy is the status of questions and answers in this context.
And since the purpose of this excursion through one
portion of Collingwood's "phenomenology of error" 9 was to as9c£. SM, 289; Collingwood rejects this title as a description of what he is doing, but in at least one sense of
the term "phenomenology"--as a description of how states of
consciousness appear or manifest themselves--it is still a
correct description of what he is doing in Speculum Mentis.
Collingwood rejects the term because he claims not only to be
merely describing, but also stating the truth about the forms
of experience he is describing.
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sess the relationship between Q-A logic and formal logic, it
is time to make good our previous assertion that the connecting link is an ambiguous notion of hypothesis or supposal.
The entertainment of an hypothesis is, according to Speculum
Mentis, equivalent to the asking of a question:
Science is explicitly supposal. But supposal itself . . .
is identical with questioning, which is the cutting edge
of the mind, an activity not self-contained or independent,
but implying behind it a body of information or assertion
. . . . But it is the facts that are true; the scientific
simplification of them into instances of laws, abstract
particulars of abstract concepts, is not true but arbitrary, useful no doubt, but useful precisely because it
is not asserted as true but merely entertained in the form
of a question. (SM, 186).
But the entertainment of an hypothesis in the form of a question turns out to be a complex mental function, since hypothesis formation is identified not only with questioning but
also with "intuition":
The paradox of science may be expressed by calling it intuitive thought. Intuition is the questioning, immediate
side of experience: thought is the asserting, explanatory
side. Science is explicit to itself as thought, but it
turns out on inquiry to be identical with the questioning
activity; that is, it realizes the contradiction of a type
of thought which is not thought precisely because it is
thought's opposite, intuition. (SM, 188).
Collingwood is quick to add that the division of experience
into intuition and thought is an abstract fiction, and represents only a distinction between two sides of the indivisible
whole of experience--"an immediate, intuitive, or questioning

176
side" and a "mediating, reflective, logical or assertive
side," the former being called sensation and the latter,
thought (SM, 95, 188; cf. "ST", 57-58).

But the willful en-

forcement of this distinction by scientific consciousness is
another manifestation of its self-contradictory or paradoxical nature:
It is this falling-back upon intuition that constitutes
the irrationality, the arbitrariness of all science. The
assumptions made by science cannot be justified under
criticism; their only justification is the frankly irrational fiat of the scientist's will. The concept is for
him an abstraction, that is to say hypostasized into a
thing, reified; hence it cannot be explained by thought,
it can only be intuited, and this intuitive attitude
towards a concept is what is meant by assumption in science. (SH, 189).
It is at this point that the ambiguity of hypothesis
or assumption becomes apparent--a ghost that not only remains
unexercised in the body of science, but which survives to
haunt Collingwood's Q-A logic.

If assertion is the minimum

activity claiming truth or falsity (SM, 59-60), then (with respect to assertion) hypothesizing, questioning, and intuition
have one and the function: each is a suspension of the activity of asserting (SM, 78-79, 186, 188-89).

But there are im-

portant differences which such an identification overlooks,
and which are crucial not only for formal logic but for a Q-A
logic which seeks to replace it.
(1) Questions are not merely non-assertions, they are
proto-assertions--non-assertions about to become assertions.
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It may be true that "supposal and questioning are at bottom
the same thing" (insofar as asking a question, like framing
an hypothesis, means contemplating the non-existent in the
form of several alternatives, only one of which may be existent), but "true questioning is a suspension ((of assertion))
which looks forward to a renewal of this asserting activity,
in the shape of an answer" (SM, 78-79).

"Hypothesis" as Col-

lingwood uses the term in Speculum Mentis vacillates between
these two senses--i.e. proto-assertion and non-assertion-and it is not until the Essay on Metaphysics that the distinction is clearly made between questions, assertions, suppositions, and presuppositions (EM, 21-33).
(2) In Speculum Mentis meaningful questions do have a
hi-directionality, looking both forward to an answer and backward to other assertions (SM, 79), but there is no clear recognition that the assertions which ground questions may be
non-factual but yet meaningful--i.e. function as what he was
later to call "presuppositions."

Instead Collingwood leaves

the reader to decide whether the categorical assertions, which
are logically prior to hypotheticals (SM, 183: cf. "ST", 64),
are necessarily or only factually true.

Thus, for example,

within two pages he speaks about the mind "categorically asserting a concrete fact" (when it sets about framing hypothe-
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ses), 10 and about mathematical logic being "categorically true
of every possible object" (SM, 184-85).

These are the factual

and the inferentially necessary senses, respectively, of the
term.

It is not until the Essay on Philosophical Method that

Collingwood would try again to say what he means by a "categorical assertion" (EPH, 117-36).
(3) Underlying both of these ambiguities is a basic
equivocation on the use of the phrase, "mental activity,"
which leaves mental dispositions (conscious attitudes involved
in raising questions, framing hypotheses, asserting a proposition, etc.) undistinguished from logical functions (formal
properties of interrogative sentences, hypothetical assertions,
. 1 propos1t1ons,
. .
categor1ca
etc. ) ll

Th 1s
. 1 ea d s to certa1n
. puz-

1 0 cf. EPH, 45-46 (1924):

" ( S) cientific thinking is an
abstract thinking, historical thinking a concrete thinking.
In other words, because the object of science is not a fact
but an abstract type or form, the judgement of science is al1
ways hypothetical:
if A, then B, 1 where it is not asserted
that A exists in the world of fact . . . . Whereas the object
of history is the fact in all its actuality, and therefore the
historical judgement is categorical . . . . The ideal of history, then, is to be a single categorical judgement, articulated into an infinity of coherent categorical judgements, as~erting the reality and expounding the nature of an infinite
1ndividual world of fact articulated into an infinity of individual facts.
11

The closest Collingwood comes in Speculum Mentis to
recognizing the difference is at SM, 79, where he speaks about
the "empty form of questioning," questions which ask nothing,
m~re "marks of interrogation."
But he is not here explicitly
d~stinguishing between mental dispositions and logical functlons, but rather two sorts of mental activities, one with
and one without a background of factual assertion.
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zling and unresolved contradictions which mask rather than illustrate Collingwood's thought in Speculum Mentis, and provide
obstacles to the success of his Q-A logic.

(a) On the one

hand questioning is identified with explanation and intellection.

The characteristic mark of the former processes is

their "immediacy" (i.e. their spontaneous actuality, their
positivity, or in general their lack of dependence on something other than themselves) (SM, 95, 188).
thus immediate, and answers mediate.

Questions are

(b) On the other hand

questions are identified with the logical function of assertion cast in the hypothetical mode, while answers are identified with the corresponding categorical function (SM, 183,
186).

In this sense questions are mediate (their truth de-

pends on something further being asserted), and answers are
immediate (they actually assert something positive--something
true or false).

It is not until Collingwood wrote the chap-

ter on language in the Principles of Art that logical and psychological functions are distinguished (PA, 225-69).
Collingwood does not seem to be alarmed at these conclusions in Speculum Mentis, since he presumes that such arguments demonstrate that questions and answers are not independent abstractions, but are both mental activities, and therefore have the characteristic marks of all mental activity--
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12
viz. mediacy and immediacy (cf. SM, 80).

But when Colling-

wood calls the distinction between question and answer an
"ideal distinction," and adds that "the process of knowledge
is . . . not so much an alternation of question and answer as
a perpetual restatement of the question, which is identical
with a perpetual revision of the answer," the ensuing "iden12

Cf. SM, 188-89, where parallel arguments concerning
mental and logical functions are put forward to illustrate the
irrationality of the abstract distinctions made by science:
(a) "Intuition and thought are not two separate activities
which are somehow united in the body of human experience. Experience is an individual whole in which two sides can always
be distinguished: an immediate, intuitive or questioning side,
which is hypostatized in abstract psychology into the faculty
of sensation, and a mediating, reflective, logical side, which
is called thought. Thought is the one, sensation the many.
What characterizes the intuitive or sensuous side of experience
is just its manyness or perpetual difference from itself, flux,
novelty, or creation. What characterizes the logical or reflective side is its self-identity, permanence, unity. Now we
have already seen that science consists in the separation of
these two distinct elements, and the attribution of reality to
thought while denying it to sensation. But division as such
is the characteristic of sensation as opposed to thought:
thought unifies what sensation divides. Therefore any given
thing which is made the field of an unreconciled division is
thereby placed under the head of sensation, for the characteristic unity of thought has been denied to it. If experience
as a whole is now divided into two separate parts, thought and
sense, it becomes by this very definition wholly sensuous, and
each part of it is a sensuous, not an intelligible, object."
(SM, 188-89). (b) "This argument is more familiar, though
more superficial, when stated in terms of logic. The universal has its very life and being in its particulars, of whose
multiplicity it is the unity. If now it is disentangled from
those particulars and set apart by itself, it becomes not
their universal but another particular object, thus losing pre~isely its intelligibility (universality) and becoming an obJect of mere intuition, a thing that we no longer think but
only imagine. It is this falling-back upon intuition that constitutes the irrationality, the arbitrariness of all science."
( SM, 18 9) .
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tity" which "contains all diversity within itself" (SM, 80)
appears dangerously similar to that absolute night in which
all cows are black.

The result, in short, is as unfortunate

for his Q-A logic as it is for formal logic: if truth and
falsity are functions of the Q-A complex and there is no adequate way to distinguish within that complex what counts for
a question and what counts for an answer, then it seems there
may be no adequate criteria for distinguishing between truth
and falsehood either.

It is not until the early chapters of

the Essay on Metaphysics that he attempted to disentangle Q-A
complexes and truth criteria (EM, 21-48).
4.

Conclusion:

Three Logics.

From the evidence that we have just examined it does
not appear that there is any systematic "question-and-answer
logic" as such mentioned in any of Collingwood's writings
through 1924, and a glance at the articles from this date until 1932 does not yield any significant indication that would
change this judgement.

Thus we find Collingwood writing in

"The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" (1925) that
the way in which a problem arises for an historian must convey some hint of the direction in which evidence for its solution is to be sought, and that in doing so he argues to and
from this evidence, so that there is in the last analysis no
distinction between his sources and his conclusions (EPH, 5253).

While this gives the observant reader of the Autobiog-
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~phy

some confirmation of the use of Collingwood's Q-A prin-

ciple that in arguing back from a propositional answer (the
conclusion) to its question the same piece of evidence states
the answer and allows the historian to identify the question,
it does not explicitly suggest that this was a conscious application of a systematic Q-A logic.

And again Collingwood

writes in "The Philosophy of History" (1930) that
a question must be asked with some reasonable expectation
of being able to answer it, and to answer it by ((genuine))
thinking; otherwise it leads nowhere, it is at best idle
"wondering" . . . . We express this by saying that a question does or does not "arise." To say that a question
arises is to say that it has a logical connexion with our
previous thoughts, that we have a reason for asking it and
are not moved by mere capricious curiosity. (EPH, 137).
We see at work another of the principles of Q-A logic cited in
the Autobiography, but without any explicit mention of presuppositions and their logical efficacy in causing such questions
to arise.

In fact the omission of any explicit discussion of

presuppositions or presupposing in these early writings renders suspicious the autobiographical suggestion that he had
formulated Q-A logic as such (including the theory of presupposition) in the years between 1916 and 1918 when he returned
to Oxford.

And once again we must add that this suggestion

is rendered even more suspicious by his failure to mention anything about dialectical logic and his early absolute idealism.
But perhaps we are allowing ourselves to be misled by
Collingwood's use of that vague and sometimes all-inclusive
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word, "logic," as well as by his tendency in the Autobiography
to offer Q-A logic as an actual replacement or substitute for
formal logic.

In Chapter VIII we shall take a hard look at

this claim and try to settle the issue of whether and to what
extent Collingwood's Q-A logic is "logic" in this sense at all.
For now we can only make several tentative statements based on
the evidence provided in the writings we have been examining.
We note, first of all, that we have three labels to attend to,
if not three logics:

formal logic (F-logic), dialectical log-

ic (D-logic), and Q-A logic.

Collingwood's conception of log-

ic tends to view it in epistemological terms, but he does allow that logic in general is concerned with the justification
of some form of knowledge.

If it is to be a truly philosophi-

cal logic, it must justify not only the conclusions reached by
a body of knowledge, but the way in which it reaches these
conclusions.

The way in which conclusions are reached is by

a systematic question-and-answer process, the success or failure of which is not measured by any external criteria, although in empirical science, at least, the conclusions arrived
at can be shown to be free of contradiction by formal logic.
But a body of knowledge must not only be free from contradiction; it must also be able to demonstrate that in its process
of development the methods that it employs for the discovery
and verification of these assertions do not conflict with the
ideals which this knowledge sets for itself.
of dialectical logic.

This is the role

It would therefore appear that Q-A, F-,
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and D-logics are ordered in a developing series such that Q-A
and F-logics are opposed and complementary phases by which
knowledge comes to be (Q-A logic), and retains itself in being by resisting criticism (F-logic), but are both preliminary to the dialectical measurement of explicit performance
against implicit promise (D-logic).

We hasten to add that

this suggestion of the relationship between the three logics
that appear in Collingwood's writings was never made explicit
by him, and is our own reconstruction of their apparent relationship at this point in our investigation.
Before passing on to the next step of our survey of
the early works, we must make
logic.

some final comments about D-

At least one of Collingwood's interpreters, whose

views this author greatly respects, has stated that Religion
and Philosophy is Collingwood's only non-dialectical book, and
that his moment of kairos came between his first and second
books, because Speculum Mentis is a dialectical essay where
its predecessor is not (Mink, MHD, 20, 242).

To this we can

only comment that if Collingwood discovered dialectic, it
could not have come as much of a surprise.

For on his own

principles philosophy does not bring us to know things of
which we are simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which we already knew in some way (EPM, 161).
Dialectic could therefore only be something of which he was
already aware, so that when it became explicit it was only a
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refinement of a reflection on an experience with which he was
already familiar.

We therefore cannot accept any

inter~reta

tion of Collingwood which presumes that there was any such
"event" in the intellectual development of his philosophy,
and especially when no such event is acknowledged in the Autobiography.
But the evidence of Collingwood's writings forces us
to admit that not only does the explicit use of dialectical
concepts, judgments, and inferences show an order of development, but also the use of the term dialectic has a peek-a-boo
career in Collingwood's published writings.

So far as this

development is concerned, Religion and Philosophy presents us
with the spectacle of an analytic of concepts and principles,
but does display a propensity for expressing first one side of
an issue and then the opposing viewpoint, and only does so in
order to resolve the issue by showing how the two opposing
viewpoints can be reconciled.

Furthermore the discussion of

"concrete identity" (which evolves quite naturally into that
of

the concrete universal of Speculum Mentis) is prominent in

Religion and Philosophy, and is opposed to the abstract universal of "false logic."

In Speculum Mentis the concrete univer-

sal emerges as an "identity-in-difference" whose characteristics are those of a scale of forms, but one which lacks the
unity of both differences of kind and differences of degree
that Collingwood later specified for such a scale in the Essay
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~Philosophical

Method (SM, 208; EPM, 54-57).

13

Therefore

from Religion and Philosophy to Speculum Mentis to the Essay
~

Philosophical Method there is a continuous development of

the idea of defining something not by subsumption under a universal and abstract class, but by showing how its meaning ineludes others which are related by opposition and distinction,
embodying differences of both degree and kind, and where the
variable is identified with the generic essence.
But on the other hand the term dialectic appears and
disappears in Collingwood's writings, sometimes in a most
confusing manner.

While the term is not mentioned in Religion

and Philosophy, it is over-used in Speculum Mentis, mentioned
with modesty in the Essay on Philosophical Method (e.g. EPM,
12, 210), disappears altogether in the Autobiography and the
14
Essay on Metaphysics
but re-appears in more classical cos13 The reader must be patient with the use of such jargon at this stage of our investigation--the terms will be explained in future chapters. But it is well to bear in mind
that (1) where Religion and Philosophy argues that where two
terms are "not differentn-they are therefore identical, and
(2) Speculum Mentis argues that two terms in a dialectical
series are related to one another in kind only, and not in degree, (3) it is only after the Essay on Philosophical Method
that terms in a scale of forms are declared to differ both in
degree and in kind from one another. Therefore if Religion
~ Philosophy is a non-dialectical book, so is Speculum
Mentis--i.e. on the standards of dialectic set in the Essay
on Philosophical Method.
14There is only one reference to dialectic in the
Essay on Metaphysics, and that is in connection with Hegel's
use of it, which is not treated in a flattering manner (EM,
318).
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tume in The New Leviathan.

15

Nor can one simply relate the

sudden prominent usage of the term in Speculum Mentis either
with his recognition of its systematic implications (since
such a description is present in Religion and Philosophy in
the analysis of "concrete identity") or with the properly
philosophical use of the implicit-explicit distinction (since
this is not a distinction reserved for philosophical dialectic:

at SM, 93 it is applied to psycho-analysis in the Freud-

ian sense--the interpretation of dreams is not the bringing
into consciousness of that which was unconscious, but the
bringing into explicitness that which was implicit).
A more promising direction for uncovering Collingwood's
mature understanding of the term is in the posthumous publication, The Idea of History.

In a chapter on Hegel in Part I,

Collingwood takes up Croce's criticism of Hegel's philosophy
15
At NL, 24.63-24.68 Collingwood writes of dialectical
thinking, defined as "the readiness to give up something which
at a certain time you settled on as true." As an example Collingwood cites Plato's discovery that the way to find one's
way about in a Heraclitean world is to think dialectically--a
Heraclitean world being one in which change from X to not-X or
vice versa is constantly occurring. At NL, 27.82 Collingwood
writes of the dialectical spirit as the spirit of agreement
and compromise in the ensuing discussion--see NL, 24.61, 27.9).
And at NL, 24.57-24.61 Collingwood writes of dialectical disc~ssion, where one's aim is to show that both disagreeing partles in an argument are correct. NL, 24.57 contrasts dialectical and eristic discussion, and declares that all logic is
concerned with discussions. In all these usages Collingwood
seems to have in mind a sense of the term derived from classical Greece, i.e. the sense which emphasizes the manner of conducting a debate involving disagreeing parties.
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of history which appeared to Croce to be a "gigantic blunder
produced by confusing two quite different things: namel"y opposition and distinction." Then he continues:
Concepts, Croce says, are related by opposition: good and
bad, true and false, freedom and necessity, and so forth;
and the theory of their relation, he admits, has been well
expounded by Hegel in his theory of dialectic, which describes the way in which any concept stands in a necessary relation to its own opposite, generating it at first
and then negating it, so that the way in which the concept
lives is by creating and overcoming oppositions. But the
individual things which are the instances of concepts are
never related to each other by way of opposition, only by
way of distinction: consequently the relations between
them are not dialectical, and in history, which is the
history of individual actions and persons and civilizations, there is consequently no dialectic . . . . (IH,
118-19).
It is interesting to note, before turning to Collingwood's
comments on this Crocean criticism, that in The New Leviathan
Collingwood remarks that logic applies to propositions only
because it applies in the first instance to concepts (NL, 7.33,
7.39, 11.35).

Following this line of thought one might con-

clude that D-logic applies primarily to concepts, and F-logic
to propositions.

But extrapolating this analogy is not very

promising, since Q-A logic is not obviously inferential, where
F-logic is, and so is D-logic.

Nonetheless there is some

point in the observation that the center of gravity, so to
speak, of D-logic is concepts, which emphasizes the semantic
unity of terms, and has as its central concern the meaning of
terms, whereas F-logic takes as its minimal unit the proposition that can be the bearer not only of meaning but of truth
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or falsity.

However in the passage that we are presently

considering Collingwood is pursuing a different line of.
thought:
Plausible though Croce's view is, it does not really get
to the heart of the problem. It implies that in talking
of history we should never use words like opposition or
antagonism, and synthesis or reconciliation: . . . we
ought only to say that they are different: we ought not
to speak of an opposition, but only a difference, between
Whigs and Tories, or Catholics and Protestants. Now it is
true that we do not need to use terms like opposition (let
me call them dialectical terms), when we are talking only
of the outward events of history; but when we are talking
only of the inv1ard thoughts which underlie these events
it seems to me that we cannot avoid them. (IH, 119).
To pursue his argument from the Idea of History any further
would get us into the subject of the next chapter, where we
shall have a chance to observe how his concept of history developed in the early writings.

For now we wish to call atten-

tion to the usage of opposition as a "dialectical" term, and
synthesis as a term of reconciliation.
As we proceed with our investigation of Collingwood's
logical views it will be well to bear in mind that "dialectic"
may represent a number of different meanings in his writings,
so that we might recognize, for example, that as the methodical program we have called D-logic it stands in a relation
With F-logic and Q-A logic so as to appear to form a scale of
forms, from another point of view any such scale can itself be
defined as "dialectical."

And again, while the analysis of a

concept into opposing principles may be called a dialectical
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relationship and the synthesis of this opposition may be
called a rapprochement (so that analysis, dialectic, and reconciliation may be interpreted as three phases of complete
philosophical thought), from a more inclusive sense of the
term (e.g. the one so frequently used in Speculum Mentis)
all rapprochement is dialectical.

It may well be that Colling-

wood omitted explicit reference to dialectic and dialectical
logic in the Autobiography because the term is capable of
such a multitude of meanings that it was virtually useless for
painting the kinds of sharp contrasts that he wanted to elicit for the purpose of highlighting what he regarded as central to his philosophical development.
But while we may charge Collingwood's Autobiography
with an error of omission, and even with being somewhat misleading in that it suggests to the reader that his early Q-A
logic already made explicit the role of presuppositions, it
is at least accurate to the extent that the early writings do
show evidence of a stress on the role of questioning in the
process of knowledge.

We can also say that nothing we have

found would give any indication that had he had such a complete Q-A logic he would have done anything but embrace it
wholeheartedly at this point in his development, since its
spirit is present from Speculum Mentis onwards, and many of
its principles are explicitly stated in the early writings.

CHAPTER V
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
1.

Introduction.

There can be little doubt that Collingwood felt that
his greatest contribution to philosophy would be his reconciliation of philosophy and history.

The Autobiography describes

in some detail how the two activities between which he divided
the majority of his time, his actual work in Roman-British history and his philosophical lecturing and writing, gradually
converged, and how this synthesis not only was in large measure
responsible for breaking with the epistemology of his realist
tutors at Oxford, but also was the foundation for the development of his rapprochement philosophy.

If we are to understand

how and why he recognized this relationship to be axial not
only for his development but for interpreting his entire philosophical outlook, we must take a careful look at how this
philosophy of history took shape in his early writings.

And

since the Autobiography specifies that this development can be
found in his essays of the twenties (A, 107, 116-17), it is
this group of articles that we must spend most of our time on
in this chapter.
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But what is it that needs reconciling?

If "the phil-

osophy of" something merely means, as Religion and Philosophy
asserts, the careful reflection upon that subject (RP, 15; FR,
53), what is problematic about a philosophy of history?

In

the Autobiography the opposition is approached from the direction of the realism-idealism controversy: realists assumed the
existence of permanent philosophical problems which could be
analyzed independently of their historical setting, so that
the historical question of what someone thought about one of
these "eternal problems•• was distinct from the philosophical
question of whether or not he was right (A, 59-68).

In addi-

tion to this mistake, the realists assumed that all knowledge
was a simple apprehending or intuiting of some unaffected reality, which failed to recognize the essential role of interpretation of evidence in the case of historical knowledge (A,
25-26, 39-40).

But from the other side, in the practice of

his historical studies Collingwood found that those historians
he most respected knew and cared little about philosophy (A,
83), so that the need for a reconciliation from this direction
was simply the absence of any serious philosophical reflection
on the subject-matter of history.

Not only did realist phil-

osophers neglect history as a form of knowledge not assimilable
to their sense-bound epistemology, but historians neglected
philosophy and therefore failed to pay sufficient attention to
the foundations of their own science (A, 85-90).
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When we turn to the early writings we find out that
it was not merely neglect that is involved in the distantiating of philosophy and history, but a basic difference in
orientation of each that must be overcome.

As we shall see

in the next two sections, Collingwood's earliest attempts at
the philosophy of history tend to assume that philosophy is
the realm of the universal and history the

realm of the par-

ticular, and the resolution of the conflict that arises when
it is assumed that truth resides either with the universal or
the particular is by rooting both in a "concrete identity" or
"concrete universal"--an individual which is both universal
and particular at once.

While the idea of an individual his-

torical event as something which is both universal in meaning
and concrete in objective reference is an idea which as a long
and continuous development in Collingwood's philosophy of history, the focus of it shifted gradually away from the object
of history and towards the thinking role of the historian,
and it is this development that Collingwood is anxious to indicate in his Autobiography.
It is also quite a natural course of thought from the
point of absolute idealism, as we saw in Chapter III; for if
the

c~n

ground of all idealism is the role of the mind as

both active and passive (FR, 275, 277), then to view the historian as a merely passive receptacle for the transmission of
fact as ''something independent of my own or your knowledge of
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it" is on a collision course with the philosophical view of
knowledge as active, and ultimately with the philosophical demand for self-knowledge.

Just as Gentile distinguished be-

tween the realistic concept of change in material objects and
the idealistic concept of the history of mind, and argued that
reality is history (FR, 274), so Collingwood would distinguish
between physical events and re-enacted historical acts, and
argue that mind is what it does, and what it does is to make
history.

The path to self-knowledge then is through history,

for it is history which narrates what it is that man has done.
But the reconciliation of philosophy and history develops as Collingwood's concept of rapprochement became more complete.
2.

The Identity of History and Philosophy.

In the earliest form that Collingwood's reconciliation
between history and philosophy takes, the two are simply equated:

philosophy and history are the same thing.

In Religion

and Philosophy the identity between philosophy (like that between religion and philosophy, and between religion and morality) is established in two ways: first by criticizing the
Views which hold them to be separate, and then by showing that
they are mutually dependent on one another.

In the case of

history its abstract separation from philosophy has been held

by those who maintain either that historical facts are independ-
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ent of the philosophical constructions or interpretations that
are placed on them (historical positivism), or by arguing that
the past as such is unknowable because it depends on inferences
based on fallible data (historical scepticism).

Neither of

these anti-historical arguments can withstand criticism.

His-

torical positivism fails because the distinction between historical interpretation and historical fact cannot be maintained:

historical interpretation is just historical fact fur-

ther specified.

If one "construction" that is put on fact dif-

fers from another, it is not merely two "ideas" superimposed
on one fact:

one was an historical fact and the other a his-

torical error (RP, 46; FR, 80).

Similarly, anti-historical

scepticism fails because it is not just historical data used
in inference that is fallible; the same can be said of all
data.

"If inference as such is to be distrusted, the evidence

that leads us to distrust it is discredited with the rest" as
another misreporting of a well-attested fact.

(RP, 44; FR,

79).
But not only do arguments for positivism and scepticism
fail to dislodge historical thought, but we cannot do without
either philosophical or historical thought, since they coimply one another:
In the first place, it appears that history cannot exist
without philosophy. There is no such thing as an entirely
non-philosophical history. History cannot proceed without
philosophical presuppositions of a highly complex character. It deals with evidence, and therefore makes episte-
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mological assumptions as the value of evidence; it describes the actions of historical characters in terms
whose meaning is fixed by ethical thought; it has continually to determine what events are possible and what
are not possible, and this can only be done in virtue of
some general metaphysical conclusions.
(RP, 46-47; FR,
81).
We shall see in Chapter VII that at least one of these "metaphysical conclusions" (actually a presupposition) mentioned
here is taken by Collingwood from Bradley's The Presuppositions of Critical History, which Collingwood would later
acutely criticize (IH, 238-39).

It is interesting to note

that this is the first reference to "presuppositions" which we
have encountered in Collingwood's writings, and it occurs in
the context of an argument that identifies philosophy and history.

The argument continues by showing tha philosophy needs

or presupposes history:
It is equally certain that philosophy is impossible without history; for any theory must be a theory of facts, and
if there were no facts there would be no occasion for
theory . . . . History must be regarded not as a mechanical
process, nor yet as a gradual accumulation of truths, but
simply as objectivity; as the real fact of which we are
conscious. History is that which actually exists; fact,
as something independent of my own or your knowledge of it.
In this sense there would be no philosophy without it; for
no form of consciousness can exist without an object. (RP,
47-49; FR, 81-83).
Collingwood draws the conclusion that the relation of history
to philosophy is that neither can exist without the other, or
as he says, "each presupposes the other" (RP, 49; FR, 83).
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Each is knowledge; and if they are different, they must
be the knowledge of different objects. How can we distinguish these objects? History, it is sometimes said,
is knowledge of the particular, philosophy knowledge of
the universal. But the particular is no mere particular;
it is a particular of this or that universal; and the universal never can exist at all except in the form of this
or that particular . . . . History, like philosophy, is
the knowledge of the one real world; it is historical,
that is, subject to the limitation of time . . . . It is
philosophical, that is, all-embracing, universal, for the
same reason; because historical fact is the only thing
that exists and includes the whole universe. History a
parte objecti--the reality which historical research seeks
to know--is nothing else than the totality of existence;
and this is also the object of philosophy. History ~
parte subjecti--the activity of the historian--is investigation of all that has happened and is happening; and
this is philosophy too . . . . (T)he philosophical presuppositions of history are not something different from
the history itself; they are philosophical truths which
the historian finds historically exemplified. History
and philosophy are therefore the same things. (RP, 49-51;
FR, 83-85) .

As can be seen from this argument, Collingwood had not
at this point penetrated very deeply into the nature of historical thought.

As he refined the concept he would narrow the

object of history from "the knowledge of the one real world"
or "the totality of existence" to res gestae--deeds of men,
done in the past.

And even in Speculum l•Ientis he showed dis-

satisfaction with such wholesale identities as he proposed
in Religion and Philosophy.

Since it is not a settled part of

his mature outlook, we shall not engage in criticism of the
argument here (although we shall do so in examining the concept of rapprochement identity in Chapter VI).

But while one

may quarrel with the argument here, the spirit of reconciliation is certainly present here, its only flaw being that the
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resulting rapprochement between history and philosophy is less
a marriage than a fusion.

While he continued to use the strat-

egy of "co-implication and therefore identity" in arguing for
the reconciliation of any two forms of consciousness, he became more careful (a) to specify the differences between them
as well, (b) to distinguish what any form of consciousness is
1
implicitly from what it is explicitly; and (c) to locate them
not as co-ordinate species of the genus, "knowledge," but rather as successors on a scale of forms.
3.

The Concrete Universal as Absolute Object.

This is evident in Speculum Mentis, where philosophy
and history are described as having aims insofar as they both
essentially assert concrete reality and deny simple abstraction.

Therefore "the identification of philosophy with his-

tory is far less violent and misleading than its identification with science, religion, or art."

But it is immediately

added that "all such identifications are barren abstractions,"
since to "assert the identity without the difference or the
difference without the identity is to turn one's back on reality and amuse oneself with paradoxes" (SM, 246).

The dif-

ferentiating feature of philosophy as opposed to history, as
1 cf. SM, 108, n. 1, where Collingwood acknowledges
t~at in Religion and Philosophy he had overlooked the distinct~on between implicit and explicit--roughly, the distinction
between its "promise" or what it indirectly implies (implicit)
and its "performance" or what a form of consciousness directly
asserts (explicit).

•
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presented in Speculum Mentis, is that in philosophy subject
and object are identified, whereas for historical thinking
concrete fact is always assumed to be something independent
of the knowing activity of the historian (SM, 241-43, 249).
That is why Collingwood calls modern realism, in which the object is presumed to be unaffected by the knowing of it, the
historical form of dogmatism.
Now these appear to be paradoxical assertions if taken
in conjunction with what Collingwood says about the reconciliation of philosophy and history in the Autobiography.

(a) If

it is philosophy, and not history, that is the form of consciousness in which subject and object are identified, then
how can history be the "self-knowledge of mind" that Collingwood intended it to be?

And (b) if the form of dogmatism pe-

culiar to the historian is realism, then how can realism be
"a philosophy which erred through neglecting history"?

We al-

ready know part of the answer to the second question from Chapter III:

what makes history dogmatic is its unquestioning ac-

ceptance of the concept of fact as something independent of
anyone's knowledge of it, which is the fundamental concept underlying realism.

Since there are as many forms of realism as

there are of dogmatism, historical realism follows scientific,
religious, and artistic realism.

What makes historical realism

an error is its assumption that this is the whole story, and
what is neglected is the higher concept of history in which
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fact and the knowledge of fact are reconciled in self-consciousness--i.e. the philosophical concept of history . . But
this leads us back to the first question, and ultimately to
the development of the concept of history in Collingwood's
early writings.

The first stage in this development we have

just reviewed in Religion and Philosophy.

The second is in

Speculum Mentis, which we will consider in this section.

The

third is in the essays on history that appear in the decade of
the twenties, which we will examine in the immediately following section.
The recognition that the form of experience known as
history

is an improvement on abstract science is an achieve-

ment of the Renaissance, and is solidified in the experimental
method of Renaissance scientists.

"Experiment means the re-

cognition of fact, and experimental science means the assertion of fact, even if only mutilated fact, as the true presup2
position of scientific thought" (SM, 201-202).
The first to
recognize this explicitly, says Collingwood, was Descartes:
2The reader would be correct to assume that by the
"assertion of fact" at this point Collingwood means something
more than the utterance of a statement that something or other
is a fact or is the case. In Speculum Mentis to assert a fact
means to assert it as true, which is more than merely observing it. To be asserted as scientifically true it must be capable of withstanding Baconian cross-examination, which means
subjecting a fact to the sort of treatment an hypothesis gets
in the laboratory. Cf. SM, 53.
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All science, said Descartes, rests upon the one indubitable certainty that I think and that therefore I exist.
Now the thought and existence of which Descartes spoke
were not abstractions--anything thinking anything, or anything somehow getting itself thought about . . . . Descartes meant what he said; and what he said was that the
concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present
awareness, was the root of science. He was only going one
step beyond Bacon, for whom the root of science was natural fact: Descartes, more profoundly, saw that before
natural fact can be of any use to the scientist he must
observe it, and that the fact of his observing it is the
fact that really matters. Science presupposes history and
can never go behind history: that is the discovery of
which Descartes' formula is the deepest and most fruitful
expression. (SM, 202).
If it is surprising to find Descartes' cogito translated as
"the fact of my actual present awareness," and given credit
for expressing the discovery that "science presupposes history,"3 it is nonetheless revealing of Collingwood's early
view of the matter:

the recognition of the historical element

of science is the first stage of both a revolution in science
(the development of the experimental method) and the beginning
of a revised awareness of history (SM, 202-203).
It also brings into focus an early association of history as a form of knowledge and perception as a level of mental
activity.

The early annalists or historical compilers were not

aware of their reliance on perception, but as the concept of
3As we shall see, this is not the last of Collingwood's creative interpretations of Descartes and the history
of philosophy: cf. EPM, 10-25, 124-26, 155-60; EM, 185-90. In
~ Idea of History Descartes is treated as an historical
sceptic, and Vice's anti-Cartesianism is hailed as the real
beginning of scientific historiography (IH, 59-70).
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history developed the role of perception, as opposed to sensation, became more explicit.
Sensation is the false or abstract account of perception.
In perception we are immediately aware of our object,
which is a concrete and therefore historical fact: perception and history are thus identical. But the immediacy
of perception does not exclude mediation, it is not abstract immediacy (sensation) but implicitly contains an
element of mediation (thought) . . . . Perception is explicitly immediate, but it always contains within itself
mediation (thought, "interpretation of sense-data," "inference from the immediately given," or whatever one likes
to call it) and is therefore never abstract immediacy . .
. . History is thus, as a specific form of experience,
identical with perception. (SM, 204-205).
Just as perception requires an element of memory insofar as an
object of perception is grasped not all at once or immediately
but serially, or as a "synthesis" or reconstruction, so also
the annalist or writer or memoirs is someone whose reminiscences rely on memory--one's own or that of a "source"--for its
narrative sequence.

But such a reliance on memory must, to

retain even the rudiments of reliability, distinguish between
memory and pure imaginative fantasy, and this requires the exercise of a selective criterion (SM, 213-14).

The earliest

forms of historiography were dominated by various mixtures of
the true criterion of history with ideals drawn from other
forms of experience, so that in historians like Herodotus and
Thucydides factual coherence was mixed with aesthetic or dramatic effect (SM, 214-16).

It is only in the eighteenth cen-

tury that the concept of fact becomes explicit and such errors
were overcome to reach "historians' history" (SM, 216).
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But it is at this point that fact is elevated to the
level of the absolute:
There is thus no feature of experience, no attitude of
mind towards its object, which is alien to history. Art
rests on the ignoring of reality: religion, on the ignoring of thought: science, on the ignoring of fact; but with
the recognition of fact everything is recognized that is
in any sense real. The fact, as historically determined,
is the absolute object. The mark of the absolute object
is individuality, for individuality is concreteness. The
object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this
is concretely articulated into parts each of which is
again individual, and so to infinity . . . . The object,
as a system of fact so organized, is objective throughout,
for every part is a true microcosm, and is truly infinite.
(SM, 218-19).
It is to this extent that history achieves what art, religion,
and science could not.

For where esthetic consciousness ex-

presses itself in a monadic work of art, but while each such
work is its own cosmos, it is only so by ignoring not only
other works of art but the everyday world in which the artist
lives and works (SM, 84, 219).

Religious consciousness locates

its individuality in God, "the monad of monads, a cosmos whose
structure is that of the absolute object"--but whose individuality stands over against that of the world "whose very nature
is to be outside him," and therefore leaves the absolute individuality of God unattained (SM, 219).

Scientific conscious-

ness replaces the concept of God with the concept of law, but
with the consequence that "(w)hat is individual and organized
as a system of individuals is not the world but only the concept" which keeps law separated from true individuals to the
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extent that any such individual is only a particular instance
of the law.

The failure of each of these forms of experience

is redeemed by the success of history, which reaches the idea
of an object "beyond which there is nothing and within which
every part truly represents the whole."
This absolute whole is the concrete universal; for concrete universality is individuality, the individual being
simply the unity of the universal and the particular. The
absolute individual is universal in that it is what it is
throughout, and every part of it is as individual as itself. On the other hand it is no mere abstraction, the abstract quality of individualness, but an individual which
includes all others . . . . The principle of its structure
is not classification, the abstract concept, but the concrete concept, which is relevance, or implication . .
(T)he concrete universal is the daily bread of every historian, and the logic of history is the logic of the concrete universal. (SM, 221).
It is doubtful whether every historian would recognize
that his "daily bread" consisted of "the concrete universal"
in the sense of being the "system of systems, the world of
worlds"--including the later Collingwood himself, as we shall
see in Chapter IX:
~

while the historian brings to his study an

priori concept of the past, as well as presuppositions about

the coherence of the past, he feels himself under no obligation
to consider the whole of it as an absolute object consisting
of an infinity of facts (IH, 240-45, 303).

In fact it is un-

der the burden of such a goal that history collapses by the
"inner dialectic" of its own version of the monism-pluralism
dilemma.

If history exists, its object is an unknowable in-

205
finite whole; and if its parts are atoms, then history disappears and science takes its place, with its own unresolved
problems of universality and particularity (SM, 234).

In

either case, the absolute object remains unachieved.
Thus history is the crown and the reductio ad absurdam
of all knowledge considered as knowledge of-an objective
reality independent of the knowing mind. Here for the
first time we place before ourselves an object which satisfies the mind; an object individual, concrete, infinite,
no arbitrary abstraction or unreal fiction, but reality
itself in its completeness . . . . The progressive alienation of the mind from its object is in history complete.
The world is triumphantly unified as object, only to find
itself separated from the mind by a gulf which no thought
can traverse. (SM, 238).
We shall resume this discussion in the next chapter,
where we shall be concerned with the rapprochement identity of
absolute knowledge as it is presented in Speculum Mentis, but
at this point we must make several observations about the concept of history herein presented.

The reader has no doubt

wondered why it is necessary for history to postulate itself
as an absolute object at all, for if it were not for this the
final "reductio ad absurdam" would not occur at all.

It ap-

pears that the chapter on history is only a stage along the
way to establishing the demands of absolute knowledge--i.e.
the demand for an object that will fully satisfy the mind.
What mind?

The mind of an absolute idealist, one concludes--

for there is only token effort to take into account the actual
praxis of historians in Speculum Mentis,

other than the occa-

sional remarks about Herodotus and Thucydides, Mommsen and
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Gibbon.

What we are confronted with instead is what amounts

to a very abstract view of the subject matter, one which tends
to assimilate historical thinking to perception and memory,
and the historical object to the world of fact--all of it.
Little consciousness is exhibited of the uniqueness of human
acts in the range of facts, of the need for cross-examination
of facts by the historian's critical intelligence, or the
legitimate role of the historian's pressuppositions in this
process.
We are therefore a long way from the view of history
presented in the Autobiography--but this itself is consistent
with the autobiographical interpretation, since Collingwood
states that in these years the rapprochement between history
and philosophy was incomplete, and was subject to a long and
painstaking development.

The evidence for this development

is contained in the essays written between 1920 and 1930, and
to these we must now turn.
4.

The Ideality of History as a Scale of Forms.
There is no clearer index to Collingwood's views on

the philosophy of history than that which can be obtained by
careful attention to these essays from the decade of the twenties.

In them one finds a gradual shift away from a defini-

tion of history solely in terms of the realism-idealism controversy and toward a clear recognition of the multi-layered

207
senses of the term.

Between these two ends of the scale we

shall find not only most of the "principles of history"·mentioned in the Autobiography making their appearance, but we
shall also see parallel discussions of both the static logic
of historical assertions (for example concerning "categorical
judgements" and "the concrete universal") and the dynamics of
history in terms of processes and dialectical development.
A.--In "Croce's Philosophy of History" (1921) and "Can
the New Idealism Dispense with Mysticism?'' (1923) Collingwood
writes, as we have already seen, as a sympathetic critic of
Italian and German idealism, and in the process of his discussion of this philosophy he formulates (and explicitly approves)
the notions of a "living past," history as dealing with
thought, and the basic process of "re-thinking" past thoughts
(EPH, 6-10; FR, 274-75).
History goes on in the mind of the historian: he thinks it,
he enacts it within himself: he identifies himself with the
history he is studying and actually lives it as he thinks
it, whence Croce's paradox that "all history is contemporary history." . . . History is thought, annals the corpse
of thought. But has thought a corpse? and if so, what is
it like? . . . Croce's general "philosophy of the spirit"
supplies him with a ready-made answer.
Nothing exists
but the spirit; but the spirit has two sides or parts,
thought and will . . . . Thought is the synthesis of subject and object, and its characteristic is truth; will is
the creation of an object by the subject, and its characteristic is utility . . . . Annals are not thought but
willed; they are constructed--"drawn up"--by the historian
for his own ends. (EPH, 6-7).
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In this 1921 essay Collingwood goes on to criticize Croce for
mixing idealism with naturalism (which, we recall, is a-synonym for realism), and he calls on Croce to purge his philosophy of its naturalistic elements in order to "reach the point
of absolute idealism" which the essay appears to assume to be
a step forward (EPH, 22).

While Collingwood is critical of

Croce for reducing philosophy to the methodological moment of
history, and for absorbing philosophy into history (EPH, 20-21),
the idea of a living history of thought remains untouched.

It

comes fairly close to the "first principle" of history as Collingwood formulated it in the Autobiography (A, 110).
In the 1923 essay Collingwood presents in even stronger terms the contrast between the idealistic and the naturalistic view of history.

We already quoted the passage in which

Collingwood contrasts Croce and Gentile on the issue of the
"metaphysic of being" which presents a philosophy of the realistic concept of change, and a "metaphysic of knowledge" which
presents a philosophy of idealistic concept of history (FR,
274).

Although Collingwood does not explicitly state the ex-

tent to which he would subscribe to either Croce's position or
Gentile's, these passages do show an awareness of a distinction between process in general and historical processes. When
taken in conjunction with his charges against Croce, it is not
unreasonable to infer that Collingwood leaned toward a view on
the ideality of history not significantly different (at this
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point) from that of Gentile.

By 1923, Collingwood appeared

to have accepted the basic ideality of history, i.e. that
thought is essential to it.

Later Collingwood will drop the

idealism-realism emphasis, while retaining the distinction
between natural change and historical processes.
B.--In "Are History and Science Different Kinds of
Knowledge?" 0922) and "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy
of History" (1924), Collingwood examines the epistemological
claims of history vis-a-vis other forms of knowledge.

These

two essays represent a position intermediate between that of
Religion and Philosophy (in which various forms of knowledge
are identified insofar as they are directed toward the same
intentional object) and that of Speculum Mentis (in which forms
of knowledge are distinguished on the basis of the manner in
which they grasp their intentional objects--as successive approximations to the truth).
In the 1922 essay Collingwood denies that there are
any epistemological grounds for a distinction between history
and science: "when both are regarded as actual inquiries the
difference of method and logic wholly disappears" (EPH, 33).
It is not the case that the scientist deals with the universal and the historian

with the particular exclusively, nor

that it is the function of the scientist to generalize and of
the historian to particularize; both deal with the world of
individual fact, and both activities involve the interpreta-
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tion of individual facts in terms of general concepts (EPH,
26-27).
Interpretation is not the employment of a previously constructed tool (concept) upon a separately-given material
(fact): neither the concept nor the fact is "possessed"
(thought and observed respectively) except in the presence
of the other. To possess or think a concept is to interpret a fact in terms of it: to possess or observe a
fact is to interpret it in terms of a concept. Science
is this interpretation . . . . The object which the scientist cognizes is not "a universal," but always a particular fact, a fact which but for the existence of his
generalizing activity would be blank meaningless sense
data. His activity as a scientist may be described alternatively as the understanding of sense-data by concepts,
or the realizing of concepts in sensation, "intuiting"
his thoughts or "thinking out" his intuitions . . . .
(T)here is no such thing as knowledge either of the particular or of the universal, but only of the individual:
and . . . the sense-datum (pure particular) and concept
(pure universal) are false abstractions when taken separately ((and)) yet, as elements in the one concrete object
of knowledge, the individual interpreted fact, are capable
of being analytically distinguished.
(EPH, 28-29).
In the 1924 essay Collingwood seems to reverse his
earlier position: he declares that "history and science are
not identical a parte subjecti" because "scientific thinking
is an abstract thinking, historical thinking a concrete thinking" (EPH, 45).

We recall from Religion and Philosophy that

by "a parte subjecti" Collingwood understands precisely the
activity of the knower gua historian, scientist, etc.--in contrast to "a parte objecti" which refers to the reality or object studied by a given form of knowledge (RP, 51; FR, 84-85).
In short, Collingwood seems to be saying here that, contrary
to his earlier judgment, there is an epistemological ground
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for distinguishing science from history--the distinction being that between abstract and concrete thinking respectively.
The apparent contradiction is reconciled somewhat when
one pays careful attention to the shift of levels between the
two essays--the first dealing with the praxis of the two kinds
of inquiry (" . . . regarded as actual inquiries

") , the

second with the ideals of the two forms of knowledge.

The dis-

tinction is important for an understanding of Collingwood's
emerging philosophy of history, and the point of view which he
adopts in Speculum Mentis.

Both science and history, he wish-

es to tell us, deal with individual facts, and both make use
of generalizations and the application of generalizations (particularization) to concrete cases.

But each proposes a differ-

ent ideal for itself.
Ideally, historical thought is the apprehension of a world
of fact. Actually, it is the presentation by thought to
itself of a world of half-ascertained fact: a world in
which truth and error are at any given moment inextricably
confused together. Thus the actual object of actual historical thinking is an object which is not "given" but
perpetually in process of being given . . . . The philosophy of history, therefore, is a study of historical thinking: not only psychological analysis of its actual procedure, but the analysis of the ideal which it sets before
itself. Historical thought is one among a number of attitudes taken up by the mind towards the objective world;
it is an attitude which assumes that there exists a world
of facts--not general laws, but individual facts--independent of the being known, and that it is possible, if
not wholly to discover these facts, at any rate to discover them in part and approximately. The philosophy of history must be a critical discussion of this attitude. (EPH,
44).
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But this distinction (based on mental dispositions,
be it noted) still does not extract Collingwood from his difficulties, since (a) to distinguish between what a form of experience or thought is ideally from what it is in practice, or
actually, is, on Collingwood's own grounds, to commit the error of realism (SM, 313; cf. RP, 8, 29-33; FR, 47, 66-68); and
more seriously, (b) the historian does not always deal with
the same set of "facts" as does the scientist--a point which
Collingwood had already acknowledged in his 1923 essay on the
New Idealism, wherein he recognized that the facts with which
the historian is concerned are consciously performed processes
in contrast to the events of nature: "that which has a history
. . . is a mind, for matter may change but it cannot be said
to have a history" (FR, 274).

To be subject matter for sci-

ence an event must merely be capable of

being thought.

With

events that are already thoughts the scientist has no direct
concern, since the facts which he is proposing to explain are
not artifacts but rather natural events.
Collingwood makes no note of these objective distinctions in his 1924 essay since he is limiting himself to a discussion of the differences in ideals between history and other
forms of knowledge.

Consequently he stresses the manner in

which the historian, as opposed to the scientist, seeks to express his judgments about the "facts" he is investigating.
Although both hypothetical and categorical forms are used in
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science and history, the scientist seeks to express his judgments primarily in the hypothetical mode, in which the

a~tece

dent is the ground of the consequent ("if equals be added to
equals, the sums are equal"), whereas the historian aims at
categorical judgments.

"The ideal of history, then, is to be

a single categorical judgment, articulated into an infinity of
coherent categorical judgments, asserting the reality and expounding the nature of an infinite individual world of fact
articulated into an infinity of individual facts" (EPH, 46).
The historian assumes the objective independence of these facts
from the knowing mind, so that "these actual happenings are
always the object of his thought, and never his thought itself"--this being the realistic bias of the historian (EPH,
46-47).
As in Speculum Mentis, which was published in the same
year as the essay under consideration, Collingwood is unclear
about what he understands by "categorical judgement," and his
example does not clarify his usage.

Collingwood uses as an

example of a categorical judgment used by scientists the statement:

"all whales are mammals"--which he then criticizes as

not truly categorical since it "does not imply an enumeration
of all actual whales but rather tells us that whatever we can
identify as a whale, if and when we do so identify anything,
we can further identify as a mammal."

The implication seems

to be that (a) categorical judgments do imply an actual enumeration of all the entities involved--that is, some sort of
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quantification; and (b) that categorical judgments as used by
scientists refer to their objects only hypothetically, and
hence fail to be truly categorical.

In the 1924 essays the

doctrine of categorical judgments is vague, and requires further clarification.
But Collingwood does further specify what sort of
"single categorical judgement" the historian's ideal would be,
and what the limitations of such an intentional object would
be.
The infinite whole of fact which it is the historian's
business to determine is . . . a world whose centre is the
historian's "immediate" perception, and whose radius is
measured by the depth to which he can see into the significance of that perception . . . . The world of every historian is limited by the limits of his knowledge . . . .
Each historian sees history from his own centre, at an
angle of his own: . . . so the various "perspectives" of
historians are arranged in a "space of perspectives;" each
historian is a monad which mirrors the universe from a
point of view that is irrevocably not any other's point of
view . . . . But a monad has no windows, and the historian
as such cannot do the work of co-ordinating the infinity
of possible perspectives. He can only travel from one perspective to another . . . . But in reflecting, that is
philosophizing, about his own thought he recognizes that
he is a monad, and to realize that one is in the "egocentric predicament" is to transcend it. When thought returns
upon itself and faces the question of its own relation to
its object, by criticizing the point of view from which it
has regarded that object it transcends this point of view.
(EPH, 53-55)4
4 Although Collingwood twice uses the expression,
"space of perspectives" in this essay, it never again occurs
in his writings. The term strikes the reader familiar with
Husserl and Lonergan as similar to the notion of "horizon."
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It is here that we have the rudiments of an answer to
the first of our two paradoxical questions at the beginning of
Section 3.

Although the historian's ideal is to articulate a

single categorical judgment, in practice he is always partially separated from the object of his thought, so that his
thought and its relation to its object is at best one of similarity and not one of total identity.

As an historian, then,

"he is always the spectator of a life in which he does not
participate: he sees the world of fact as it were across a
gulf which, as an historian, he cannot bridge" (EPH, 47).

But

as a philosopher the historian can also reflect on the fact
that he himself "is part of the world of fact, and that his
own historical thought is a product of the historical process
which he is studying" (EPH, 47).

In other words the historian

gua historian is limited by his "realist" assumption about the
independence of the facts he is observing, but the historian
gua philosopher is capable of transcending (by sympathetic interpretation and by critical reflection) this separation of
subject and object.

History is therefore the "self-knowledge

of mind" when it becomes self-consciously or critically reflective about itself, or when it becomes philosophy. (Cf. EPH,

85-86).
Furthermore the way in which history becomes critically reflective is by attending to the way in which historical
problems arise within the historian's own experience (EPH, 51-
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53).

Before something can become an historical issue "the

problem must arise within historical thought; it must, t-hat
is to say, arise somehow out of the attempt to perceive more
adequately the world that exists here and now for our perception" (EPH, 53).

Hence although Collingwood does not use the terms "encapsulation" and "re-enactment" in this essay, the concepts
and their relationships are the same as those which he expresses in the historical principle which we have called
"HIST-3" (number 5 of Table 4) in our summary of the Autobiography.

The experience in question, says Collingwood,

is
. subject to the distinction between truth and
falsehood: hence we have not only to read, but to criticize. The recognition of this truth is what differentiates history in the higher sense of the word from the mere
absorption and repetition of stories . . . . This critical
work is sufficiently difficult to require somewhat elaborate training, which involves the incidental construction
of . . . historical methods. As the word method suggests,
these sciences consist of empirical generalizations or
rules of procedure, instructing the student how to proceed
in typical cases . . . . Their business is to solve the
problem "how can the historian check his sources"? to
which the general answer is, "the historian who knows his
business can always invent methods of checking any
source." (EPH, 51-52).
The only element lacking in this account, as compared to that
of the Autobiography, is the fully developed notion of the
"real life" or "practical problems" which constitute the "superficial or obvious present" of the historian:

these elements

are added in his 1930 essay, "The Philosophy of History,"
Which we will consider presently.
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But we must observe in passing that in the above passage Collingwood is beginning to relate several concepts .which
are of very high importance for his later philosophy: (1) he
is beginning to acknowledge explicitly that there are levels
of meaning to the concept of history; (2) he recognizes that
in the higher sense of the term, truth and falsehood are distinguished by means of critical thinking; (3) that this critical thinking gives rise to historical methods; and (4) that
these methods consist of rules of procedure on how to proceed
in typical cases.

Furthermore (5) it is noteworthy that in

this 1924 essay (as well as in Speculum Mentis, published the
same year) he first recognizes that "the various forms of
thought (art, science, history, philosophy) are not species of
a genus," but rather form what he was later to call a "scale
of overlapping forms" such that "art and science are contained in history, not excluded from it: yet contained in a
form transmuted by their subordination to the historical end,"
while history "is not contained in this manner in art or science" (EPH, 48).
Similarly, the philosopher must in a sense be an historian
and the historian in a sense a philosopher; but the philosopher is suppressed in the historian, and the historian
is preserved but subordinated in the philosopher; history
is included in philosophy while philosophy is excluded
from history. (EPH, 49)
Here we catch a partial glimpse of an answer to the
second of our two paradoxical questions at the beginning of
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the previous section of this chapter: the realist is a philosopher who attempts to ignore the history of his own subject
matter, which, on Collingwood's view, is a self-stultifying
process.

Not only is realism the root of all forms of formal-

istic and abstract dogmatism (which would mean, in terms of
the account given in Speculum Mentis, that it erred as much
through neglecting history as it did through neglecting art,
religion, and science--that is, it neglected them as concrete
but partial modes of thought), but it is a philosophy which
neglects the historical appreciation of concrete fact, which
is its own basis.

The full flowering and ultimate consequence

of the realistic attitude towards the objects of knowledge is
history; but to deny that subject and object can ever be reconciled to one another (which is the same thing as to affirm
that objects of knowledge are unaffected by the knowing of
them) is to prevent the historical viewpoint from ever reaching its highest point of development--viz. a self-consciously
critical process, the self-knowledge of mind.
C.--But the complete answer to our two questions is
possible only by an explication of two further lines of
thought:

(1) the idea of history as a developmental process,

and (2) the nature of historical evidence.

The latter is de-

veloped in two essays published in 1928 and 1930, which we
shall consider shortly; the former is worked out in three essays in which Collingwood deals with the cyclic view of his-
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tory and its companion notion (in the 19th century at least)
the idea of historical progress.
In "Oswald Spengler and the Theory of Historical
Cycles" (1927) Collingwood criticizes Spengler for writing
history as though he were describing a natural phenomenon,
which reduces it to so many episodes in the natural lifecycle of an atomic "culture," which is elevated to the status
of a thing with definite characteristics.

Collingwood's ob-

jection to Spengler is similar in strategy both to his previous criticism of Croce and to his later criticism of Toynbee:

an historian cannot treat his subject matter as if it

were a natural entity with physical properties subject to natural laws, because it commits the positivistic error of regarding as given what in fact is constructed by the active
process of interpretation on the part of the historian.
These are not superficial flaws . . . . They are sacrifices of truth to method; they are symptoms of a logical
fallacy which underlies the whole book and has actually
been erected into a principle. The fallacy lies in the
attempt to characterize a culture by means of a single
idea or tendency or feature, to deduce everything from
this one central idea without recognizing that a single
idea, asserted in this way, calls up its own opposite in
order to have something to assert itself against, and
henceforth proceeds, not by merely repeating itself, but
by playing a game of statement and counter-statement
with this opposite . . . . (W)here ((Spengler)) fails is
in thinking out what he means by "characteristic." He
thinks that the characteristic is a fundamental something
whose logical consequences flow smoothly and unopposedly
into all its manifestations; whereas it is really the dominant partner in a pair of opposites, asserting itself
only so far as it can keep its opposite in check and
therefore always colored by the hidden presence and under-

220
ground activity of this opposite.

(EPH, 63, 65).

Now while Collingwood does not explicitly use the expressions
"event" and "process" in this passage, it is clear that his
critique of Spengler is based on the historical principle we
have called "LG" in our summary of the Autobiography.

Any

single idea, tendency, or feature of a culture in history
"calls up its own opposite" with which it plays a game of
statement and

count~r-statement--becomes,

in the terminology

of the Autobiography, a process the components of which are
not static characteristics that do not change, but rather
"turn into one another":
(W)hile recogn~z~ng that a given culture has a certain
self-consistent character, a fundamental idea which is
working itself out into a complete social life, we must
assert that this idea or character is not static but dynamic; it is not a single unchanged thing . . . but a process of spiritual development, an idea which grows out of
other ideas, in an environment of other ideas, which asserts itself against these other ideas through a process
of give-and-take in which it modifies them and is modified
by them in turn. (EPH, 73).
In "The Theory of Historical Cycles" (1927) and "A
Philosophy of Progress" (1929) Collingwood continues to develop the concept of history as a living thought-process rather than a dead set of events--first by showing that the cyclical view of history is a function of the limitations of the
historian's own knowledge, and secondly by locating the theory
of historical cycles within the context of range of possible
viewpoints that the historian can take toward his subject

221
matter.
In the 1927 essay Collingwood stresses the need for a
unifying principle in history in contrast to its pluralizing
tendencies, which culminate in taking its data as so many
atomic events.

In addition to being held together subjective-

ly by the historian's own thinking, it is held together objectively by a continuity of problems the successive resolutions
to which form the fabric of history.

So far as the historian

can see history as a whole, he sees it "as a continuous development in which every phase consists of the solution of human
problems set by the preceding phase" (EPH, 87).
But that is only an ideal for the historian; that is what
he knows history would look like if he could see it as a
whole, which he can never do. In point of fact, he can
only see it in bits; he can only be acquainted with certain periods . . . . At any given moment, therefore, the
historian can only present an interim report on the progress of historical studies, and there will be gaps in it.
These gaps will appear as breaches in continuity, periods
in which the historian loses track of the development . .
. . In this condition, we see history split up into disconnected episodes, each episode forming a relatively intelligible whole, separated from its neighbors by dark
ages. That is the point of view from which we see history
in cycles . . . . The cyclical view of history is thus a
function of the limitations of historical knowledge. (EPH,
87-89).
In "A Philosophy of Progress" (1929) Collingwood sets
out to answer the question he had posed in his 1927 essay on
historical cycles: do the moral categories of good and bad
have a place in the evaluation of the course of history (EPH,
77)?

His answer, in brief, is that "whether you think the
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course of events is an upward or a downward course depends not
on it but on you" (EPH, 109)--that is, on the presupposi.tions
of the historian.

Three views are possible:

the Greco-Roman

view in which history is a process of increasing decadence
from a presumed golden age; the 18th and 19th century European
view of history as giving evidence of progressive improvement
of human conditions and man's ability to solve his perennial
problems; and the more recent theory of historical cycles, in
which there is an alternation between periods of decadence and
of progress (EPH, 104-105).

Since the third is nothing more

than a combination of the first two, the real question is one
which gets at the basis on which one measures progress or decadence, and Collingwood suggests that in the end the question
is not so much factual or theoretical as much as it is practical.

The historian who works to preserve and improve what he

finds of value in the world and who therefore continues to
find the world as it is a better place on the whole than it
was, will view history as on the whole a progressive development leading to the present.

One who resigns himself to in-

activity finds it on the whole a worse place than it was in a
previous age; he feels that a past age is not again achievable,
and therefore writes as a pessimistic historian who views history as decadence.

And finally, one who finds that some

things at the present time are degenerate and require improvement (e.g. a present form of government) while others are already notably better (e.g. architecture and engineering) will
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find both elements of progress and decadence in history, and
opt for some version of a theory of historical cycles.

·But in

any case the question is decided by the limitations in the
present practical life of the historian:
The question whether, on the whole, history shows a progress can be answered, as we now see, by asking another
question. Have you the courage of your convictions? If
you have, if you regard the things which you are doing as
things worth doing, then the course of history which has
led to the doing of them is justified by its results, and
its movement is a movement forward.
(EPH, 120).
Here we not only have an illustration of Collingwood's use of
"HIST-4" to solve an historical problem, we also have the second phase of the answer to the first of our two paradoxical
questions.

The process of history is taken by the historian

as consisting of events that occur independently of his knowing them, but upon critical examination the nature or meaning
of these events is determined by the historian's judgment.
This judgment is limited by the limitations of the historian's
own mind.

But these limitations are not merely theoretical,

they are also practical: at the level at which the historian
is both agent and patient, or at the level in which subject
and object are identified, the historical processes are additionally determined by the historian (e.g. whether or not they
shall be progressive, retrogressive, or cyclical).
D.--If such a conclusion as this seems to destroy the
last shred of historical objectivity, the balance is restored
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in two further essays, "The Limits of Historical Knowledge"
(1928) and "The Philosophy of History" (1930), which complete
the sketch of Collingwood's development of the concept of history prior to 1932, and before he had written the series of
lectures which were later to be published as The Idea of History.
The 1928 essay argues that although the historian is
limited by the quantity and quality of the evidence he has at
his disposal, this does not mean that the historical sceptic
is correct in his claim that history is "the doubtful story of
successive events."

On the contrary, historical scepticism is

only the negative aspect of a full definition of history which,
when confronted by conflicting evidence, cannot stop short at
the critical confrontation of one statement by its contradictory, but must proceed to the dialectical task of showing why
one statement must be revised on the basis of another--why, in
short, criticism is a phase in the complete process of historical thinking, which must present its arguments on the basis
of all relavent evidence (EPH, 96).

What the historian is

seeking is not "what really happened," since this has about
the same status as the Kantian unknowable "thing in itself."
The past referred to by historical thinking is not, that is,
what is demanded by that permanent tendency in all thought
which is "sometimes called the plain man's realism--to think
of the object as a 'thing in itself,' a thing out of all re-
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lation to the knowledge of it, a thing existing in itself and
by itself" (EPH, 99).

Such thinking leads to the notion. of

a specious past--a "limbo where events which have finished
happening still go on," where the past is something still ex'
,.
isting in a "~ol\..,.oS T"OlTO~ of its own; a world where Galileo' s
weight is still falling, where the smoke of Nero's Rome still
fills the intelligible air, and where interglacial man is still
laboriously learning to chip flints" (EPH, 101).

On the con-

trary, what the historian seeks is a present filled with those
symbols of the past which Collingwood calls "evidence."
An event that has finished happening is just nothing at
all. It has no existence of any kind whatever. The past
is simply non-existent . . . . What the historian wants is
a real present . . . . He wants to reconstruct in his mind
the process by which his world--the world in those of its
aspects which at this particular moment impress themselves
on him--has come to be what it is. This process is not
now going on . . . . He is trying to know the past . . .
as it appears from its traces in the present . . . . (A)ll
historical thought is the historical interpretation of the
present. By leading to the present, it has left its
traces upon the present; and by doing that, it has supplied the historian with evidence concerning itself, a
starting point for his investigations. (EPH, 101-102).
The process of historical criticism, therefore, is a process
of confronting one piece of evidence with another, related
piece, from the point of view of establishing how the historian's own present came to be what it is (EPH, 98-99).
Thus far Collingwood has only determined that the historian's knowledge of the past is limited by evidence, and
that this evidence must be something that constitutes part of
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the historian's own present.

In "The Philosophy of History"

(1930) he not only refines the notion of evidence, but ~lso
adds a second set of limitations to historical thought, connects historical inquiry with Q-A logic, again attacks the
realists' conception of a specious past, and outlines several
of the remaining "principles of history" with which we are already familiar from the Autobiography--all this within the
very compact space of the four concluding pages of the essay.
First, with respect to evidence and the limits of historical knowledge:
History is knowledge of the past, and the past consists
of events that have finished happening. The past does not
exist and cannot be perceived; our knowledge of it is not
derived from observation and cannot be verified by experiment . . . . We come to know the past, not immediately,
but by interpreting evidence. This evidence (or data) is
something that exists in the present and is perceived by
the historian . . . . But data are not enough. They must
be interpreted. This requires principles, and the body of
principles constitutes historical method or technique. Some
of these principles are scientific in character, that is,
they concern particular groups of evidence . . . . Some
are philosophical, that is, they apply universally to all
evidence whatever, and compose the logic of historical
method. It is to this that we must refer such problems
as, the nature and limits of negative evidence, the possibility of analogical argument, and so forth. Data, on the
one hand, and principles of interpretation on the other,
are the two elements of all historical thought. (EPH, 13637).
This is one of those passages where the reader is confronted
with a direct contradiction.

Did not Collingwood, after all,

state in the Autobiography that history is not concerned with
past events (which begin and end) but with processes (which do
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not)?

Was this not the "first principle" of history ("LG")?

Here the interpreter must tread with extreme caution, but in
the process he will make a discovery of the first importance
in understanding how to treat the many direct contradictions
one finds in Collingwood's writings.

Making use of his "di-

alectical principle," Collingwood often begins an expository
section of his writing by making a statement that he thinks
corresponds to the ordinary beliefs of his reading audience,
and then in successive sentences and paragraphs, leads him beyond this point to the position he wishes to establish. 5 In
this case Collingwood is starting from the point of view of
the "plain man's realism"--that history is knowledge of an object, the past, which exists independently of his knowing it-and leads him to a modified notion of history as knowledge of
a significant present.

This is manifestly his intention, and

it is made clear by filling in the first ellipsis in the above
quote, and adding the concluding paragraph of the essay:
5cf. CRC, 9 May 1935, Collingwood to Ryle, p. 15:
"(I)n the work of any competent philosopher I find that the
part played by systematic fallacies is partial only; repeatedly, when real difficulties arise, his insight into the subject,
sharpened by the sense of the difficulty, leads him to reject
the fallacy even at the cost of inconsistency and to adopt a
better procedure than that which he had followed . . . . Now
this being so, a philosopher named as the victim of a fallacy
might . . . say to me: 'You pillory me unfairly; on page X, it
is true, I do fall into your fallacy; but on page Y I correct
it; you ought to take my work as a whole, and interpret X in
the light of Y; if you did so you would see that the error was
only a temporary slip at worst; and, at best, you might wonder
whether it was not merely the exploration of a provisional
point of view. '"
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A "realistic" theory, according to which knowledge is the
"apprehension of a really existing object," is ruled out
as absolutely inapplicable to history . . . . (T)he historian does not select, because no past facts are "there"
before him, to select from, until he has put them there
by sheer historical thinking . . . . Finally, since the
past in itself is nothing, the knowledge of the past in
itself is not, and cannot be, the historian's goal. His
goal, as the goal of a thinking being, is knowledge of the
present . . . . But, as historian, he is concerned with
one special aspect of the present--how it came to be what
it is. (EPH, 136-39).
We shall have occasion in the sequel to examine many
other instances where Collingwood seems to take back with one
hand what he had given with the other, but in the meantime we
should note that a successful gloss on these passages would be
something like the following:

"Although from the point of

view of the plain man's realism history is taken to mean knowledge of the past, where the past consists of events that have
finished happening, since the past does not exist (as the realistic theory might lead one to suspect) one must revise the
notion of the past to mean that aspect of the present which
gives indication (evidence) of how it has come to be what it
is--and this is the past the historian is concerned with."
Such a reading does not violate Collingwood's "first principle
of history," and in fact makes sinse of the complete passage
--especially its final paragraph.

But be it noted, it still

does not get Collingwood out of the woods, because the reader
is still puzzled by what it would mean for historical objectivity for the historian to "put" facts before himself "by
sheer historical thinking."

For a clarification of what this
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means we must next pay note to the role of Q-A logic in historical thinking:
The beginning of historical research is therefore not the
collection or contemplation of crude facts as yet uninterpreted, but the asking of a question which sets one off
looking for facts which may help one to answer it . . . .
And the question must be asked with some reasonable expectation of being able to answer it, and to answer it by
genuinely historical thinking . . . . We express this by
saying that a question does or does not "arise." To say
that a question arises, is to say that it has a logical
connexion with our previous thoughts, that we have a reason for asking it and gre not moved by mere capricious
curiosity. (EPH, 137)
Now although there is no mention in this passage of Q-A logic
as such, it is clear (e.g. from the discussion of a question's
"arising" by logical connection with the historian's own previous thoughts) that he has Q-A logic in mind, just as he had
described it in the Autobiography--short, that is, of an explicit discussion of the relation of questions and presuppositions.7

Hence this passage confirms that as of 1930 Colling-

6 cf. CRC, loc. cit., p. 17: "Thus it seems to me that
the individual 'proposition' assented to on any given occasion is assented to only in a context, never by itself; and
this context is not a fortuitous context but a necessary one;
I mean, 'It is not yet noon and the sun is shining' won't do
as a substitute for 'It is not yet noon and it is half-past
eleven.' The context is not (may I say?) a merely psychological context, consisting of anything else that we may happen to
be thinking at the time; it is a logical context, consisting
of other things which if we didn't think we couldn't think
what ex hypothesi we are thinking."
7This distinction would not be in the province of the
working historian anyway; and not even, according to the Essay
.£!.!. Hetaphysics, the task of the metaphysician. It is the task
of the logician. See EM, 54.
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~ood

was making use of the principle of history which we have

labelled "ARCH-1," and two of the corollaries of "HIST-3" in
our summary of the Autobiography. 8
Finally one finds an explicit statement of "ARCH-3"
in the 1930 essay:
All history must be the history of something particular,
and the most we can ever do is to express the present
state of knowledge concerning this particular subject.
As no history can be universal, so no history can be final
. . . . All history is thus an interim report on the progress made in the study of its subject matter down to the
present; and hence all history is at the same time the
history of history . .
(EPH, 138).
Here again we have Collingwood apparently contradicting himself, and then revising his previous statement.

In the first

part of the paper he states that second-order reflection on
history, viz. the philosophy of history, must show how history "is somehow a universal and necessary characteristic of
things, not merely a particular and contingent characteristic
of a certain group of things" ( EPH, 122).
"The philosophy of something" is a legitimate phrase
only when the "something" in question is no mere fragment of the world, but is an aspect of the world as a
whole--a universal and necessary characteristic of things .
. . . If there is to be a philosophy of history, history
must be . . . a universal and necessary human interest,
the interest in a universal and necessary aspect of the
wor 1 d. ( EPH, 12 2-2 3 ) .
8 It also, incidentally, states what Collingwood means
by a question "arising"--i.e., that the question has a "lQg~ connection with our previous thoughts, that we have a
reason for asking it . . . . " ( SM, 13 7).
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If history is concerned with a "universal and necessary aspect
of the world," then how is it that "all history must be the
history of something particular"?

And how can all history be

at the same time the history of history without infinite regress?

The answer, insofar as one is possible on Colling-

wood's grounds, is the same for both problems:

"history" is

an equivocal term, with layers of meaning which it is the work
of the philosopher to distinguish--but to distinguish in a
manner which cannot but violate the expectations of someone
committed to the logic of the abstract universal.

If one con-

siders history in terms of its limitations (both by its given
evidence and by the historian's own principles of interpretation) history always deals with something particular; but if
one regards history as that aspect of the present which explains how that present carne into being, history deals with a
universal and necessary aspect of the world.

This sort of

distinction is only possible from the philosophical point of
view--the historian is not explicitly aware of it.

But Col-

lingwood views these levels of meaning of the concept of history not as several static definitions separate from one another but as themselves part of a developmental process in
which the idea of history is progressively realized.
In the intermediate part of the 1930 paper (clearly
a prototype of his later lectures on The Idea of History--cf.
EPH, xxxiii) Collingwood shows how the step which elevates
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history to the rank of a philosophical science was taken:
The essence of this development is the doctrine of the
individual judgement. Ordinary logic distinguishes the
individual judgement "This S is P," from the universal
judgement "All S is P." Now, says Croce, "This S is P"
is history, "All S is P" is science. But whenever we say
"All S is P" we have before our minds a "this S." . . . .
"All S is P" means "This S, in its character asS, is P."
When the element of individuality is taken away we have,
not a universal judgement "All S is P," but nothing at
all. This conception can be expressed by saying that all
knowledge is historical knowledge (individual judgement)
and that science is history with its individual reference
neglected. (EPH, 135-36).
We shall have occasion in the sequel to return to this theme
in connection with some of Collingwood's later remarks about
historical and scientific judgments, about the concrete universal, and about the structure of philosophical concepts.
But for now it is sufficient to notice that the formal opposition between universal and particular judgments is taken (by
Croce and, on approval, by Collingwood) to be overcome by the
individual judgment of history, which is not merely a particularized universal judgnent, but a judgnent distinguishable
from a particular judgment as the base-line of its intelligibility (when individuality is taken away we do not have a uni9
versal judgment but "nothing at all").
But such distinctions
as these are made by the philosophy of history which, as Collingwood was so often to point out, is not something different or separate from history itself, but is history with its
presuppositions made explicit (cf. EPH, 125).
9This view: is later criticized by Collingwood (IH, 303).
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5.

Conclusion.

In our survey of Collingwood's essays in the philosophy of history between 1920 and 1930 we managed to find
direct or indirect evidence which sustantiates his claims in
the Autobiography concerning the development of his ideas on
the relation of philosophy and history--with one notable oversight.

One principle that is totally missing in these essays

is the one we have called "HIST-4"--history as the science of
human affairs.

It is the absence of this principle that mars

his discussion of the object of history, so that it seems that
the object of history is the whole of changing reality, and
hence "science is history with its individual reference neglected."
Now it so happens that not only is this principle the
central issue of his 1936 British Academy lecture, "Human Nature and Human History" (IH, 205-31; cf. A, 116-17, n. 1),
but the principles of history which we have called "HIST-1,
-2, -3, and -4" appear almost verbatim in this essay.

Even

assuming that Collingwood read the substance of his 1936 lecture back into his earlier essays on the philosophy of history,
and that therefore the development of his ideas on the relationship of philosophy and history was not as complete as he
said it was as of 1930, the real question that arises in understanding Collingwood's early reconciliation between history
and philosophy concerns the manner in which he finally dis-
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tinguishes them within some sort of unity.
unity would that be?

For what kind of

History, science, art, etc.--his "forms

of experience" in Speculum Mentis--are not, he insists, species of a common genus, "knowledge," as the realists had asserted.

That meant that each of the forms of experience has

an epistemology proper to it.

At the same time Collingwood

feels obliged to show that all forms of experience are manifestations of a single process, mental activity, and are
therefore variations on a single theme.
We have already had occasion to notice that Collingwood was not entirely successful in his several attempts to
distinguish history from other forms of knowledge solely on
the grounds of the manner in which they express their judgments.

In his 1922 essay on science and history he admitted

that both of these forms of experience make use of particular
and universal judgments and therefore cannot be separated on
the basis of the sorts of judgments they use.

But in his

1930 paper he asserts that the judgment peculiar to history is
individual judgment ("This S is P") which he distinguishes
both from the particular judgment ("Some S is P") and from the
universal judgment ("All Sis P").

But since judgments of

science are merely the judgments of history with their individuality suppressed, it follows (as Croce had said) that "all
knowledge is historical knowledge" and that "science is history with its individual reference neglected" (EPH, 136).

But
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then it would seem that science is a species of history, or
that both of these are (as Speculum Mentis seems to leave one
believing) unsuccessful forms of philosophy.

In any event

we have the sort of genus-species situation within knowledge
that Collingwood had hoped to overcome.

On the other hand the

attempt to distinguish different sorts of knowledge on the
grounds of their subject matter is equally unsuccessful.

If

history deals with a "universal and necessary aspect of
things"--i.e. their "becoming"--then it is clear that it is
indistinguishable from the science of nature, since everything
in nature is also subject to a process of becoming (EPH, 12224).

Starting from either direction then, one arrives at the

conclusion that the forms of knowledge are indistinguishable
from one another.

"Everything," Collingwood writes in 1930,

"has a past; everything has somehow come to be what it is;
and therefore the historical aspect of things is a universal
and necessary aspect of them" (EPH, 124).

On this account

..

there would not only be a history of Greece and Rome, but of
the San Andreas Fault and the moon.
Perhaps Collingwood assumed that the reader would recall what he had written in his 1923 essay on the New Idealism, where he says that "that which has a history

. is

a mind, for matter may change, but it cannot be said to have
a history" (FR, 274), and would supply this reservation as the
distinguishing feature of history.

But he does not tackle the
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issue explicitly in his published writings until his British
Academy lecture of 1936, where it is assaulted head on and
solved in the manner described in the Autobiography.
The thesis which I shall maintain ((writes Collingwood in
"Human Nature and Human History")) is that the science of
human nature was a false attempt--falsified by the analogy
of natural science--to understand the mind itself, and
that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by
the methods called scientific, the right way of investigating mind is by the methods of history . . . . Since the
time of Heraclitus and Plato, it has been a commonplace
that the entire world of nature is a world of "process" or
"becoming." But this is not what is meant by the historicity of things; for change and history are not the same
. . . . (H)uman history shows change not only in the individual cases in which . . . ideals are realized or partially realized, but in the ideals themselves . . . . The
processes of nature can therefore be properly described as
sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot.
They are not processes of mere events but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes
of thoughts; and what the historian is looking for is
these processes of thought. All history is the history
of thought. (IH, 209-11, 215--emphasis mine).
Collingwood's solution to the problem then is to distinguish between two classes of intentional objects--mere
events and "actions" of historical agents, the latter having
deliberate thought as part of its essential structure.

Na-

tural science deals with the former, history with the latter.
But Collingwood is also saying something further in this essay, and that is that the processes with which historical inquiry deals are developments of a self-making mind (IH, 226).
What exactly "mind" is, and what part "thought" plays in the
life of men with minds, is something that Collingwood works
out in some detail in The Principles of Art and The New Levi-
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athan.

But the notion of mind as a self-making activity is

explicitly present in Speculum Mentis, and goes as far back
as Religion and Philosophy.
In the latter Collingwood wrote, it will be recalled,
that "there is no such thing as human nature in the sense of
a definite body of characteristics common to every man," and
that therefore "the question to be asked about mind is not
what it is, but what it does; a question with which the logic
of things and qualities does not deal" (RP, 164-65; FR, 266).
In Speculum Mentis the doctrine of mind as a self-making activity is put forward as the final realization of all knowledge:
Knowledge polarizes itself into abstract or erroneous and
concrete or true. Abstract knowledge is the same as error, because, separating what is thought to be from what
is, it erects that which it thinks into a false object
over against itself, an external world . . . . But in concrete knowledge the mind sees itself face to face, and
knows even as it is known. Here the object is the subject
. . . in the sense that the object finds its very life
in being known by the subject, the subject in knowing the
object . . . . In an immediate and direct way, the mind
can never know itself: it can only know itself through
the mediation of an external world, know that what it
sees in the external world is its own reflection. Hence
the construction of external worlds--works of art, religions, sciences, structures of historical fact, codes of
law, systems of philosophy, and so forth ad infinitum-is the only way by which the mind can possibly come to
that self-knowledge which is its end. (SM, 313-15).
In Collingwood's view the process of creation of these "external worlds"--of art, religion, science, history (as historiography), and philosophy--is the very process of history, and
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the historian in the very best sense must be the one who can
recreate all these processes over again by "re-thinking"_ them
in his own historical imagination.

In the process of doing

so, and in confronting the "evidence" of these worlds in a
critical fashion, he not only discovers the past

to which he

is heir but re-creates that past, and in the process builds
the structure of his own consciousness:
Man has been defined as an animal capable of profiting
by the experience of others. . . . The body of human
thought or mental activity is a corporate possession,
and almost all the operations which our minds perform
are operations which we learned to perform from others
who have performed them already. Since mind is what it
does, and human nature, if it is a name for anything
real, is only a name for human activities, this acquisition of ability to perform determinate operations is the
acquisition of a determinate human nature. Thus the
historical process is a process in which man creates for
himself this or that kind of human nature by re-creating in his own thought the past to which he is heir.
(IH, 226).

That such a view, so eloquently expressed and so close to the
standpoint of European existentialism, would bring Collingwood to loggerheads with behavioral psychologists requires no
special demonstration; we shall see in a future chapter how
this aspect of Collingwood's philosophy developed into the
anti-positivistic polemic in the Essav on Metaphysics.

His

antipathy to behavioral psychology is neither something entirely new in his philosophy nor is it inconsistent with its central tenets.
~Philosophy

We have already seen that as early as Religion
Collingwood assaulted "psychology" as the pseudo-
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science of mind, since it treats of mental activities as mere
events (RP, 42; FR, 77).

And we have had occasion to notice

that Collingwood's fundamental view of human mentality makes
deliberate activity (in a manner yet to be explained) its central and irreducible aspect.

But the issue of immediate in-

terest here is the support that one finds throughout Collingwood's philosophy, and not merely in the period following the
appearance of the Autobiography, for the reconciliation of
history and philosophy through the concept of mind as a selfmaking activity.

Although "HIST-4" does not appear explicitly

prior to the 1934 British Academy Lecture, it is a principle
latent but operative in his early philosophical writings, and
takes no great feat of interpretive skill to discern in his
discussions concerning history.
It remains to pull all of these strands together into
some sort of summary of our survey of Collingwood's earlier
reconciliation of philosophy and history.

What we have seen

emerging from Collingwood's essays on the philosophy of history is a discussion which not only confirms most, if not all,
of what he had said about his discovery of the "principles of
history" as he described them in the Autobiography, but in addition a fuller discussion of several of these topics which
parallels and complements the autobiographical sketch.

The

main ideas of this complimentary account can be summarized in
tabular form as follows:
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TABLE 6
THE MEANINGS OF HISTORY
1.

(EPH-1) "History" is an ambiguous term, the meanings of
which display a progressive and orderly development with
both a temporal and logical structure, the highest point
of which relates the diversity of these meanings in the
unity of a philosophical concept.
(EPH, 39-40, 124-25).

2.

(EPH-2) History understood as the ideal of the historian
is the knowledge of a unified and meaningful whole of acts
of historical agents, expressed in a single categorical
judgment.
(EPH, 46).

3.

a.

The objective aspect of this ideal is the drama of
history as a single developmental process, which consists of the successive resolution of problems relating to human self-consciousness (in the form of art,
religion, science, etc.).

b.

The subjective aspect of this ideal is the continuity
of this drama provided by the historian's own consciousness, i.e. his expectation that the object of
history will be an organized and coherent whole. Minimally this is the view that history has a plot.
(EPH, 37, 111, 137-38).

(EPH-3) History understood as the practice of the historian consists of the two fundamental elements: historical
data, or evidence, and principles of interpretation. Each
of these limits the ideal anticipations of the historian.
( EPH, 13 7).
a.

Objectively, historical thinking is limited by the
evidence which provides the data for historical analysis. Such data (i.e., traces of the past existing in
the present) requires critical analysis before serving
as evidence of (for or against) any historical thinking at all. -(EPH, 136).

b.

Subjectively, historical thinking is limited by the
historian's own "point of view"--the principles of in-
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terpretation he brings to the data
Such principles include the nature
negative evidence, the possibility
gument, views of history as cyclic
gressive, etc. (EPH, 89, 137).

he is analyzing.
and limits of
of analogica~ aror linearly pro-

4.

(EPH-4) At the level at which theory and practice (and
subject and object) are identified, the historian is also
an historical agent, not only observing history but making
it. This is the philosophical concept of history, in
which subject and object are identified--where, in the
case of history, the historian is both agent and patient.
(EPH, 46, 49, 120).

5.

(EPH-5) The philosophical concept of history is concerned
with a fully articulated answer to the question, "How has
the world (of human affairs) as it now exists come to be
what it is''? The answer to this question is conceived as
the first stage of an activity to either keep it that way
or to initiate an alteration of it. (EPH, 89, 92, 102,
109, 120; cf. EPA, 144).
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One must pay careful attention therefore to which
level of significance the particular use of the term "history"
refers in any given passage in Collingwood's writings.

To ac-

cuse Collingwood of "radical historicism" in his later years
(as critics do who read the Essay on Metaphysics without seeing it in the context of his other writings on history) may
be either utterly true or totally false, depending on what one
understands by "history" and "historicism."

As a philosophi-

cal concept, history is identified with philosophy, and therefore the reduction of philosophy to history is the identification of philosophy with itself--a harmless tautology.

On the

other hand as an empirical concept (the collection of events
which Collingwood calls raw data, or the uninterpreted evidence, of history), history is not only not identical with
philosophy, but can hardly be said to be identical with itself.

Nevertheless in our examination of Collingwood's later

philosophy of history we shall have to attend to the manner
in which he tries to retain a criteria of historical objectivity while yet rejecting the realistic historian's emphasis on
extra-mental "facts."

But meanwhile we must turn now to what

Collingwood understood by his "identities" in conjunction
with the issue of what he expected of a "rapprochement" philosophy, and therefore what method he used to achieve this end.

CHAPTER VI
RAPPROCHEMENT, RELIGION, AND ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE
1.

Introduction.

Just as in his discussions of Q-A logic and the philosophy of history, Collingwood made his approach in the Autobiography to the discussion of a need for a new branch of philosophy, devoted to the work of reconciliation, from a critique
of realism.
It was during World War I and his daily reflections
on the Albert Memorial that he discovered the "vulgar error"
of the realists--their false belief that problems of philosophy were eternal, and that different philosophies were different attempts to answer the same questions (A, 60).

The first

instance he cites of his own clear recognition of the truth
about eternal problems came in political theory, where it became obvious to him that the political theories of Plato and
Hobbes are not two theories of the same thing--the "nature of
the state"--because there were genuine differences between the
ideal states (and not just the empirical ones) being discussed
in each case, ideals that are ignored in treating them as if
each intended the same thing (A, 61).

There is a relation be-

tween them, but the relation is not the sameness of an abstract
243
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universal, but the sameness of an historical process; and the
difference between one thing which in the course of that process has turned into something else (A, 62).

Collingwood

went on, he says, to apply this "clue" to the problems of ethics and metaphysics, and in the case of the latter it bore
fruit in his ultimate discovery that metaphysics is an historical science (A, 63-65).

And finally, he found that his dis-

covery could be generalized to the whole field of philosophy:
"By degrees I found that there was no recognized branch of
philosophy to which it did not apply" (A, 67).
Later in the Autobiography (in Chapter XII, "Theory
and Practice") Collingwood picks up the discussion of rapprochement again and spells out the nature of his reconciliation in
ethics.

In addition to his reconciliation of history and phil-

osophy (as instanced in his reflections on the political notion of the state) he was also working on a rapprochement between theory and practice in order to counteract the "moral
corruption propagated by the 'realist' dogma that moral philosophy does no more than study in a purely theoretical spirit
a subject matter which it leaves wholly unaffected by that investigation" (A, 147).

In so doing he subjected the familiar

topics and problems of moral philosophy first to an historical
treatment (to show, presumably, how the problem developed as
an historical process wherein the differences were truly integral to it and changed the nature of the problem as it developed), and secondly to an analytic treatment (which, by criti-
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cal argumentation, both differentiated the problem into its
correlative parts, and then showed them to be aspects of one
and the same

identical entity).

Naturally enough

in a chap-

ter on theory and practice, the example Collingwood used was
one of action--first distinguished as moral, political, and
economic, and then unified insofar as every action is moral,
political, and economic--not separated into three classes,
but seen as three characteristics, distinguished and yet
united in any actual act (A, 148-49).
We have recalled these passages here to remind the
reader not only of the anti-realist context of Collingwood's
remarks about rapprochement, but also to recall the two phases
(historical and analytic) of his earlier reconciliational
philosophy.

We have said enough in the previous section about

the historical phase of his rapprochement methodology to give
the reader a sense both of how he felt it should be carried
out and what its intrinsic and unresolved problems were.

In

this section, therefore, we shall concentrate on Collingwood's
"analytic" phase.

In doing so we must pay heed to one further

proviso:
These were the lines on which I treated the subject in my
lectures of 1919. I continued to lecture upon it yearly
during the whole remainder of my life at Pembroke College,
with constant revision. The scheme I have just described
obviously represents a stage in my thought at which the
rapprochement between history and philosophy was very incomplete . . . . The rapprochement between theory and practice was equally incomplete. I no longer thought of them
as mutually independent; I saw that the relation between
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them was one of intimate and mutual dependence, thought
depending upon what the thinker learned by experience in
action, action depending upon how he thought of himself
and the world . . . . But this was only a theoretica1 ~
lrochement of theory and practice, not a practical one.
A, 149-50).

If we are to approach this topic in Collingwood's early writings, therefore, in the spirit of the Autobiography, we must
not only take into account the sense of the term "analytical"
as used by Collingwood, but also the fact that he regarded
this "analytic" to be incomplete.

How it was completed (and

the sense in which his early analytic was incomplete) Collingwood leaves to the reader to work out for himself (A, 149). 1
The evidence from Collingwood's writings is insufficient to establish what the actual topic was to which he first
applied his rapprochement method; although he lectured on ethics and political philosophy since 1919, his first publications specifically on these subjects were not until six years
later (cf. "EPS," 1925), and by then both Religion and Philosophy and Speculum Mentis had appeared.

While it is true

that he treated the subjects in ethics and political science
in these later publications much as he says he did in the Autobiography, for our purposes the earliest instance, in his pub1 The only further clue the reader has from the Autobiography is Collingwood's unreserved praise for his Essay on
Philosophical Method, which he recommends as his "best book
in matter; in style, I may call it my only book" (A, 117-18).
The reader must conclude that as of 1933 rapprochement methodology was fairly complete.
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lished writings, of rapprochement is in the area of religious
philosophy.

Not only is religion as a "unified life of ·all

the faculties" the first published topic on which Collingwood
exercised his early reconciliational technique, but it provides us with an index as to how that technique was modified
between 1916 and 1924, when Collingwood once again dealt with
the subject in Speculum Mentis.
2.

Religion, Philosophy, and the Incomplete Rapprochement.
At the time of his writing of Religion and Philosophy

(published in 1916, but written some time earlier--see RP, v)
the analytic phase seems to be only recourse Collingwood resorted to in his treatment of philosophical problems, the historical phase being only implicit in what he was saying, not
in what he actually did. 2 We have already seen an example of
this analytic phase in Collingwood's treatment of the identity
of philosophy and history.

Consequently we expect him to be-

gin with a pair of concepts presumed to be isolated or "separated" from one another.

In this case the reconciliata (the

2Actually Speculum Mentis, for all its discussion of
history and its relation to philosophy, does not actually display in its compositional format any more concern for the historical development of its subject matter than does Religion
and Philosophy, except that the former has that same vague reference to historical development of forms of experience as
does Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. But cf. SM, 50-55 (an
"ages of man" analogy), and21-=18T.

248

term we shall henceforth use for viewpoints to be held together in the relationship of rapprochement) are religion·and
philosophy. But from the first words of the book we are aware
that the orientation of the discussion to follow is primarily
philosophical:
This book is the result of an attempt to treat the Christian creed not as a dogma but as a critical solution of
a philosophical problem. Christianity, in other words, is
approached as a philosophy, and its various doctrines are
regarded as varying aspects of a single idea which, according to the language in which it is expressed, may be
called a metaphysics, an ethic, or theology. (RP, xiii).
Collingwood also specifies the sense in which he understands
the terms "religion" and "philosophy," at least for the purposes of discussion in this book:
Just as every man has some working theory of the world
which is his philosophy, some system of ideals which rule
his conduct, so every one has to some degree that unified
life of all the faculties which is a religion . . . . We
apply the term religion to certain types of consciousness,
and not to others, because we see in the one type certain
characteristics which in the others we consider to be absent. Further investigation shows that the characteristic marks of religion, the marks in virtue of which we applied the term, are really present in the others also,
though in a form which at first evaded recognition. (RP,
xvii-xviii).
Collingwood did not follow up these clues about the
presence of one form of consciousness in other forms until
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. 3
Specu 1urn Mentls,

and while it is interesting to note that

the germ of his later doctrine of a "scale of forms" is _present in this early discussion of the nature of religion, in
Religion and Philosophy the strategy he follows is based not
on the construction of a phenomenology of forms of experience,
but rather on the analytic method of his earlier (and still incomplete) rapprochement.

Therefore he begins with what already

amount to theories of religion, but theories which treat of
religion as if it had no direct relationship to philosophy.
Furthermore it is to be noted that Collingwood does not start
out with a definition or description of religion that omits
its philosophical aspect (e.g. "primitive religions") and then
try to derive philosophy from this description.

He starts out

rather with "anti-intellectual" theories of religion--religion
viewed as (mere) ritual, as conduct, or as feeling--that is,
theories that deny that religion has an intellectual element
and therefore deny that it is identical with philosophy.

Each

3 rn addition to examining the relations of religion
to philosophy, history, and conduct (morality), Collingwood
recognized a "fourth question" concerning the relation of religion to art, but declined to deal with the issue in Religion
and Philosophy, promising to discuss the nature of metaphor,
prose, and the philosophy of language (all being in the province of art) in a future volume (RP, xvi). In Speculum Mentis he recalls this promise, and indicates to his readers the
extent to which he felt the earlier work to be deficient (SM,
108, n. 1).
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of these theories is then subjected to a critique, and in the
process of denying the premise (that religion is mere ritual,
mere conduct, or mere feeling, each without an intellectual
element) he affirms the consequence that creed is not nonessential to religion.
(a) The claim of religion to be mere ritual is based
on anthropology's examination of religions of lower culture,
which purport to show that ritual is prior to creed.

But Col-

lingwood argues that aside from the issue of what relation
there is between primitive and modern religions (which may be
one of analogy only), the theory still lacks an account of how
ritual practices arise in the first place.

The necessary na-

ture of ritual implies a grounding in fears, and the ritual
act is performed because the primitive people assume the universe to be governed by certain powers, and that their acts
will somehow please or influence these powers in ways beneficial to the tribe.

But such a judgment aboutthe nature of the

powers that govern the universe is a primitive theory, and the
belief that acts will influence that power is creed.

(RP, 6-7;

FR, 45-46).
(b) Similarly the view that holds that doctrine has
little or no bearing on conduct, and therefore holds that religion is primarily a system of rules guiding conduct, ignores
the fact that action relies on knowledge of the situation
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which calls for application of the rule.

There is no such

thing as conduct divorced from knowledge or knowledge divorced
from conduct.

Furthermore the conduct that is being recom-

mended presumes a judgment that certain sorts of conduct are
good and others badt which is a judgment based on creed:

it

is the presumption of the truth of the moral creed that results in the good act.

(RPt 7-9; FR, 46-49).

(c) Finally, religion as pure feeling trades on the
ambiguities of the word "feeling," which in some cases (as
when it refers to very indefinite and indistinct states of
mind) seems to rule out any truly intellectual element, but
in others (as when it implies absolute and positive conviction coupled with an inability to offer proof or explanation
of the conviction) it does not rule out knowledge per se but
actually means the same thing as knowledge, albeit unreasoned.
But in the first case one could hardly call such feeling religious, because it does not hold to any truth at all, being
too indistinct and indefinite (not all indefinite states of
mind are therefore religious, nor are religious states of
mind indefinite).

And if feeling just means emotion, it must

at least admit to a kind of emotion that is appetition for the
desired thing--in this case, God--and consequently presumes
some knowledge of God as desirable.

In any event religious

feeling requires some intellectual element.

(RP, 11; FR, 49).
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It can be seen from these arguments that if there is
any "reduction" of religion that is to occur, at least Collingwood will not be content to let this be the humiliating reduction of religion to a lesser form of experience.

Whether he

allows for a kind of exalting reduction by assimilating it to
a "higher" realm remains to be seen.

But these passages (and

especially when taken with the perceptive analysis of Christian
beliefs concerning the fall and redemption of man, in the concluding chapters of the book) show a refined sense of awareness of the subject matter of religion, and an unwillingness
to have it sullied by inappropriate and reductive comparisons.
Now at this point the reader would expect (if the "analytic" follows the pattern of the discussion of the relation
of philosophy and history) a criticism of the view that philosophy has no religious element, the implication being that if
it is not the case that philosophy does not have a religious
element, then philosophy must have an essential religious dimension just as religion must have an element of philosophy.
In other words, insofar as philosophy is essential to religion
and religion to philosophy, religion and philosophy mutually
imply one another and are hence identical (that is, nonseparate).

But what one finds instead in Religion and Phil-

osophy is an identification of the two by their object,
coupled with a denial that there is any such thing as a separate "philosophy of religion"--separate, that it, from theology
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or creed.
(T)he theory of knowledge or logic does not consider differences of the object, but only processes of the subject;
and therefore there is no distinction between the philosophy of religion (as theory of religious knowledge) and
the theory of knowledge in general. If there is a general
philosophy of knowing, it includes religious knowledge as
well as all other kinds; no separate philosophy is required
. . . . If the philosophy of religion is indistinguishable
from philosophy as a whole, what is the relation of philosophy as a whole to religion or theology? Philosophy is
the theory of existence; not of existence in the abstract,
but of existence in the concrete; the theory of all that
exists; the theory of the universe . . . . Now if philosophy is the theory of the universe, what is religion?
We have said that it was the theory of God and of God's
relations to the world and man. But the latter is surely
nothing more or less than a theory of the universe . . . .
Religion and philosophy alike are views of the whole universe . . . . If religion and philosophy are views of the
same thing--the ultimate nature of the universe--then the
true religion and the true philosophy must coincide . . . .
(RP, 15-18; FR, 53-55).
We have already seen that Collingwood identified history and philosophy in much the same way--as both dealing with
"knowledge of the one, real world."

This occurs, in fact, in

a chapter in which the relation between history and religion
is being discussed, and the implication towards which the reader
seems to be compelled is that since religion and philosophy
are identical, and since history and philosophy are identical,
religion is identical with history.

The conclusion of the

chapter even suggests that science is also not anti-religious,
and therefore, by implication, identical with religion, philosophy, and history.
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It goes without saying that such a Mulligan stew of
subjects is more than a reader can be expected to digest.

To

simply identify religion and philosophy seems not only to lead
to the confused state wherein what can be said as proper to
each is now predicable of the other (as if one could resolve
an honest dispute about some aspect of reality by engaging in
prayer or sacrifice, or that one might celebrate ritual syllogism on a Sabbath morning and thereby appease a reasoning god),
but renders suspect the autonomy of all other forms of thought
as well.

If two kinds of knowledge are identified by refer-

ence to their object, and if there is no distinction in the
processes of the subject whereby a "philosophy of" something
and a theory of knowledge in general may be distinguished,
then there seems to be no remaining way of distinguishing between two ways of knowing the same thing, and consequently between science, religion, history, and philosophy.

But then

on what grounds can one even distinguish between subjective
processes of knowledge and objective correlates of these processes?
These consequences of his position are not altogether
evaded by Collingwood, as we see in a later chapter of Religion and Philosophy where he argues as follows:
My imagination of a table is certainly a different thing
from the table itself, and to identify the two would be
to mistake fancy for fact; but my knowledge of the table,
my thought of it in that sense, is simply the table as
known to me, as much of the table's nature as I have dis-
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covered. In this sense, my "thought about" the table-what I think the table to be--only differs from the table
itself if and in so far as I am ignorant of the table's
real nature.
My thought of the table is certainly not
something "like" the table; it is the table as I know it.
Similarly, your thought of the table is what you know of
the table, the table as known to you; and if we both have
real knowledge of the table, it seems to follow that our
thoughts are the same, not merely similar; and further,
if the mind is its thoughts, we seem to have, for this
moment at least, actually one mind; we share between us
that unity of consciousness which was said to be the mark
of the individual. (RP, 100-01; FR, 172-73).4
Even with the proviso that in life "real knowledge" or the
knowledge of the real nature of something (even artifacts,
judging from the example) is seldom if ever perfect, so that
"in a sense, no two people ever do, or ever could, think or
will exactly the same thing" (RP, 106; FR, 177), such an assertion puts an intolerable strain on the notion of identity.
For even if my knowledge of the table were "real knowledge,"
it would seem strange to assert that my concept of the table
is subject of predication in the same sense that the table is
--and therefore capable of supporting articles placed on it,
4 In a footnote to this passage Collingwood denied that
his argument placed him in an idealistic stance: "I believe
that the argument I have tried to express contains little if
anything which contradicts the principles of either realism
or idealism in their more satisfactory forms." (RP, 101; FR,
173). It is interesting to note that in his later philosophy
when he puts forward his theory of historical re-enactment,
which makes a similar claim to the identity of mind as in the
present paragraph, he also juxtaposes it against both realists
and idealists--see IH, 282-302.
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capable of physical destruction with sufficient mechanical
force, etc.

And to assert that we never have "real know-

ledge" of anything seems to grant so much ground to scepticism that the argument in point seems futile.
Since Collingwood's rapprochement program is precisely one of showing that two forms of thought are not "separate" but rather are "the same"--whether that sameness be the
sameness of an historical process or the sameness of question
to which they are the responses--it is clear that at the root
of reconciliation philosophy is a notion of identity that on
the face of it (from our above example) is under disruptive
pressures which threaten to split it assunder.

For (a) if

"the same" means merely "not different," then when two forms
of thought are said to be "the same" they are being said to
be "not different," and in their indifference they are not
only no longer two forms of thought (and so the comparison is
fatuous), but they are also indistinguishable from nothing at
all; 5 but (b) if "the same" means "similar in some, but not
all characteristics" then when two forms of thought are said
to be "the same" they are being said to be "similar and dis5The situation is aggravated rather than ameliorated
in the case of the forms of knowledge, since Collingwood specifies their objects, in each case, to be the "whole universe"
or "all of existence," which leaves no room..§! parte obtecti
for a distinction between them. And since the forms o knowledge have been identified with each other and with philosophy,
a distinction ..§! parte subjecti is also impossible.
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similar" in specifiable ways--which is precisely what Collingwood seems to be denying.
But lest we be charged with a case of unfair pillory,
we hasten to add that Collingwood shows even in Religion and
Philosophy that he is aware of the difficulty, and goes so far
as to try to meet it head on.

In the same chapter froQ which

the table example is drawn (a chapter, incidentally, which
deals with intersubjective identity as the grounds of possibility for religious unity of God, man, and universe) Collingwood distinguishes between an abstract and a concrete unity,
and says that "the unity whose possibility we are concerned
to prove is the fully concrete identification, by their own
free activity, of two or more personalities" not as a universal condition but as an ideal (RP, 106-07; FR, 178).
A person is undoubtedly himself, and can never help being
himself, whatever he does; but this merely abstract unity,
this bare minimum of self-identity, is much less than
what we usually call his character or personality. That
is rather constituted by the definite and concrete system
of his various activities or habits . . . . The same distinction applies to the unity of a society. In one sense,
any kind of relation between two people produced a kind
of social union and identification; in another sense, only
the right kind of relation unifies them, and a different
relation would destroy the unity. In the first case,
their union is what I call the purely abstract unity; in
the latter, it is the concrete unity that has to be maintained by positive and harmonious activity. (RP, 107-08;
FR , 1 7 8- 79 ) .
Aside from the question of what the "right kind of relation"
might be, or by what criteria one decides rightness and non-
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rightness of relations, there is still the puzzling and as yet
unresolved question as to what the distinction between abstract and concrete unity refers to.

Collingwood's answer

seems to rely on a modification of the relation of whole and
part:
But is unity the same as identity? There seems at first
sight to be a very decided difference between saying that
two things are part of the same whole, and saying that
they are the same thing; the parts of one thing seem to
be themselves quite separate and self-existent things,
possibly depending on each other, but each being what it
is itself, and not the others; while the whole is simply
their sum. We have already expressed doubts as to the
strict truth of this conception . . . . (I)f a whole was
to be knowable, it must be of such a kind that the parts
are not simply added in series to one another, but interconnected in such a way that we can somehow say that each
part is the whole. In that case each part would also be
in a sense the others . . . . Each part has its own nature,
its own individuality, which is in the strictest sense
unique; and apart from the contribution made by each several element the whole would not exist. Change one part,
and the whole becomes a different whole. Not only does
the whole change, but the apparently unchanged parts
change too. (RP, 108-10; FR, 179-80).
Collingwood uses the instance of any whole consisting of
three parts, x, y,

~--whether

that whole be a machine with

three working parts, a society of three members, a stanza of
three lines, or a syllogism containing three propositions.
In such a system the definition of the part x can only take
the form of a definition of the whole xyz, since the "thing"
itself is "only a relation, an interchange, a balance between
the elements which at first we mistook for its parts" (RP,
112-13; FR, 182-83).
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The attempt to evade this analysis of relations and
relata by pointing to the difference between what a thing is
in itself and what it is in relation to its context or the
whole of which it is a part is also, Collingwood says, unsuccessful, since "the character or self of a thing, what it is,
cannot be distinguished from its relations" (RP, 112; FR, 182).
Even though its "internal relations" seem not to change when
a change of context or of its "external relations" occurs, it
is impossible to deprive a thing of every context (as one
would presumably be forced to do to prove that what it is in
itself is not affected by its context), so that one can do no
more than to replace one context with another. 6 Whether the
"context" be spatial or temporal does not greatly affect the
argument, since "the history of a thing in the past and its
capabilities for the future are as real as its present situation" (RP, 111; FR, 182).
But even this analysis of the relationship of parts
to whole, although presumed to be correct and even essential
for his argument, is regarded by Collingwood as a variety of
abstract unity.

It is merely the lowest possible sort of

6 collingwood seems unaware that his argument at this
point begs the question: to "change a context" does not ordinarily mean to deprive a thing of all contexts, so to assert
the impossibility of the latter does not affect the argument
that there is a difference between what a thing is in itself
and what it is in relation to its context.
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whole, the necessary, abstract unity of its elements.

It is

not yet the "contingent unity of co-operation" between consenting minds that is required for a community of persons.
Since Collingwood wishes to show that all personalities are
components of a whole (the universe) and therefore "necessarily identified with each other and the whole, that is, with
the universe considered as homogeneous with them, an absolute
mind, God" (RP, 114; FR, 184), this minimum, abstract unity,
although essential, falls short of the mark; it leaves us with
an abstract God.
(T)he error lies in mistaking this fundamental assumption
for the final conclusion; in assuming that this elementary,
abstract unity is the only one which concerns us . . . .
To call this formless and empty abstraction "the Absolute"
is merely to abuse language; and to suppose that this is
all philosophy has to offer in place of the concrete God
of religion is completely to misunderstand the nature and
aim of philosophy . . . . The Absolute . . . is not a label for the bare residuum, blank existence, which is left
when all discrepancies have been ignored and all irregularities planed away . . . . A real philosophy builds its
Absolute (for every philosophy has an Absolute) out of the
differences of the world as it finds them, dealing individually with all contradictions and preserving every detail that can lend character to the whole . . . . The formless and empty Absolute of this abstract metaphysic perished long ago in the fire of Hegel's sarcasm . . . ((as))
the pseudo-Absolute, the "night in which all cows are
black" . . . . (RP, 114-16; FR, 184-86).
We shall return in a moment to what Collingwood understands
by "the Absolute," but for now we wish to show that in contrast
to the abstract Absolute Collingwood proposes a "concrete identity of activity":
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A mind is self-identical in this sense if it thinks and
wills the same things constantly; it is identical with
another, if it thinks and wills the same things as that
other . . . . Now these two cases are typical first of the
self-identity of God, and secondly of his identity with
the human mind . . . . Further, this divine mind will become one with all other minds so far as they share its
thought and volition; so far, that is, as they know any
truth or will any good. And this unity between the two
is not the merely abstract identity of co-existence, but
the concrete identity of co-operation. (RP, 116-19; FR,
186-88).
In Religion and Philosophy, however, Collingwood attempts little more than to show how such a unity is possible;
since he has not built his Absolute "out of the differences of
the world" as he found them, but rather built them out of abstract concepts by dialectical analysis, his philosophy of religion at this stage remains an unfulfilled promise.

Further-

more the reader is left unsatisfied how there can be "other
minds" at all, or how one distinguishes between the mind of
God and the minds of men when they are thinking and willing the
same thing.
We have covered a lot of ground since initiating our
discussion about Collingwood's rapprochement philosophy, and
it may be helpful here to pause and survey the territory.

(1)

We have seen that Collingwood claimed in the Autobiography
that prior to 1932 he had only partially worked out his

~

prochement philosophy, to the point where he saw that the relation between reconciliata was one of "intimate and mutual
dependence."

(2) As the first published example of this par-
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tial reconciliation we took up the analysis of religion and
philosophy in the book of that name, his first publication.
(3) In contrast to the reconciliation of philosophy and history which we examined in the previous section (and found to
involve an argument that showed history and philosophy to mutually implicate one another, and therefore to be "identical"),
the reconciliation of religion and philosophy took a more complex and circuitous route.

(4) The strategy of the latter

argument turned out to rely on the epistemological assumption
that forms of knowledge, and even minds, which intend the same
object are identical--thereby identifying religion and philosophy as forms of knowledge about "all of existence" or "the
universe," and incidentally identifying all other forms of
knowledge as well.

(5)

Collingwood recognized that this was

a kind of abstract identity, and attempted to correct this abstract notion of identity with a discussion of "concrete identity"--which turns out to mean a contingent unity of the activity of co-operation between minds. (6) Such an identity is
the only true Absolute sought by philosophy and religion alike;
therefore they are reconciled by sharing a common ideal object.
On route from reconciliation to Absolute we discovered
a number of subsidiary issues, which we shall find of importance in considering Collingwood's further development of the
notion of rapprochement.

(1) In Religion and Philosophy, at

least, Collingwood displayed both a remarkable sensitivity for
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the issues confronting persons who attempt to reflectively understand their religious consciousness, and an equal obteuseness about the "division of knowledge" into provinces, to the
point where the forms of knowledge--science, history, art-appear as species of the genus, "knowledge" (although he never
explicitly says this).

(2) But in trying to sort out the con-

fusion that results from identifying forms of knowledge with
each other, we discovered that for Collingwood there are levels
of meaning for the concept of identity, just as there were levels of meaning to the concept of history.

So when two recon-

ciliata are said to be "identical" or "the same" one must carefully attend to which sense of "identity" is being used.
have observed at least three uses of the term so far:

We

(a) a

bare, abstract identity in which terms are related only as members of a class or genus; (b) a (dialectical) identity of whole
and part, in which relations and relata are so intimately connected that any change in a part necessarily implies a change
in the relations and in the whole, and vice versa; and (c) a
concrete identity of mental activity, in which persons may cooperate in thinking truth or in doing good.

The first two in-

volve relations of necessity, the third a relation of contingency.

The first two are also abstract, the third is fully

concrete.

(d) vfuile the self-identity of the Absolute mind,

or of God, is not specified as a fourth kind of identity, it
is at least put forward as the limiting case of the concept
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of identity--the self-identity of truth, in all its diversity, with itself (RP, 117-20; FR, 186-190).

(3)

For each

sense of the term identity there corresponds a sense of the
term "separate"--so that there will be (a) separate members
of a class (abstract separation--entities treated as mere
instances of a class), (b) separate elements of an organic
whole (dialectical separation), and (c) personal separateness
(concrete separation--if the unity of cooperation breaks down,
for example).

We would have to presume that a separateness

or disunity in the self-identity of the Absolute mind or God
would be impossible; the disunity would occur between God and
man, and would fall into the category of concrete separation. 7
(4) Finally the reader is left to his own devices to decide
what would constitute an instance of the first sense of the
term, "identity," as well as its corresponding sense of separation, insofar as Collingwood's examples from the second meaning (what we have called dialectical identity and separation)
--namely a three-part machine, society, poem, or syllogism
(he even refers later to the stones forming the arch of a
house)--seem to leave little room for an example of something
that is not an "organic whole."
7This issue is taken up by Collingwood in the concluding chapters of Religion and Philosophy in the discussions on
evil, the self-expression-or God in man (in the person of the
Christ), and God's redemption of man (RP, 122-93; FR, 192-211,
251-69). These are interesting and occasionally profound
chapters and utterly repudiate the thesis that Collingwood
had neither interest nor insight into the nature of religious
consciousness.
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3.

Speculum Mentis:

Rapprochement and Developing Series.

Some of these themes and the issues they raise appear
again in Speculum Mentis, and others in essays published between 1916 and 1926.

In a footnote in Speculum Mentis Col-

lingwood proposes that his chapter on religion be taken as a
correction of the views he put forward in Religion and Philosophy, and says his "mea culpas" for the oversights of that
8
earlier work:
With much of what that book contains I am still in agreement; but there are certain principles which I then overlooked or denied, in the light of which many of its faults
can be corrected. The chief of these principles is the
distinction between implicit and explicit. I contended
throughout that religion, theology, and philosophy were
identical, and this I should not so much withdraw as qualify by pointing out that the "empirical" (i.e. real but
unexplained) difference between them is that theology makes
explicit what in religion as such is always implicit, and
so with philosophy and theology. This error led me into
a too intellectualistic or abstract attitude towards religion, of which many critics rightly accused me; for instance . . . I failed to discover any real ground for the
distinction not only between man and God, but between man
and man . . . . (SM, 108, no. 1; emphasis mine).
The way in which Collingwood revised the conception of
his forms of knowledge and their relations is based on a more
careful analysis of the language of art, religion, science,
8The fact that Collingwood here and elsewhere explicitly acknowledges changes in his position on topics discussed
in previous writings should alert the reader to beware of any
claims by overzealous interpreters to find a radical consistency in all of his writings. It should also, however, be a
warning to all who claim a "radical conversion" where no such
change of heart is acknowledged explicitly by Collingwood.
For an other explicit acknowledgement, see PA, 288, n. 1).
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and history, as well as on a careful delineation of what the
claims of any one form are (explicitly) as distinct from what
the limitations of these claims are (implicitly) when seen
from a "higher" viewpoint. 9 He withdraws his previous assertion that epistemology (in the guise of logic) "is a masterscience having jurisdiction over the whole field of knowledge"--which he now regards as "pure intellectualism" (SM,
49); and he condemns all identifications of philosophy with
religion, science, art, or history as "barren abstractions"
9The "implicit-explicit" distinction, although singled
out by Collingwood as very important and the essential difference between the argument in Speculum Mentis and that of Religion and Philosophy, is difficult to define in terms general
enough to be acceptable to all levels of the scale of forms of
knowledge as they are presented in the later work. Collingwood's characterization of the distinction tends to be in terms
of mental dispositions. "In any given experience," he writes,
"there are certain principles, distinctions, and so forth of
which the person whose experience it is cannot but be aware:
these I call explicit features of the experience in question
. . . . On the other hand, an observer studying a certain form
of experience often finds it impossible to give an account of
it without stating certain principles and distinctions which
are not actually recognized by the persons whose experience
he is studying . . . ((for example)) theology makes explicit
certain principles which are implicitly, but never explicitly,
present in religious consciousness; and in general what we
call philosophy reveals explicitly the principles which are
implicit in what we call everyday experience" (SM, 85, n. 1).
However in the course of the argument it becomes clear that
what may be implicitly assumed in one form of experience (e.g.
religion) may become explicit either in the next form (e.g.
science) which appears as its successor in t~eveloping series, or by the "dogmatic philosophy" of that form itself--the
philosophy which is engendered by a form of knowledge when it
attempts to justify itself as a total outlook on reality.
Roughly, then, the "implicit-explicit" distinction is the distinction between something presumed and something asserted by
the expression of a form of experience.
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(SM, 246; cf. FR, 91).

Having served his time on the Pro-

crustean couch of logic, Collingwood is bent upon correcting
his previous mistakes, and rises now to the occasion by .
roundly condemning the view that the five forms of experience
are species of a genus, which may be substituted for one
another or taken up in any order.

They now form a series,

and in this series there is an element of denial and distinction:
(O)ur forms of experience are not mere species of a genus,
because each denies the others; and because they are not
species they have not that indifference with regard one
another which characterizes abstract logical classifications. They must form an order of some kind . . . . But
what is even more important than the actual order is the
suggestion of serial arrangement as such. For a series of
terms implies that each term is as it were built upon or
derived from its predecessor and therefore does not start
in vacuo, is not wholly fresh embodiment of the universal,
but is essentially a modification of the term before.
Hence even if we only recognized three terms, and made a
series by alternating them, abcabcabc . . . , there would
be no repetition, for the second a would be not the mere
first a again, but ~ modified by having been developed
through b out of c; the third a would be a modified by the
same process in the second degree; and so-on. (SM, 55;
cf. SM, 206-07).
We now see a glimmering of an answer not only to the
question of what the way was in which Collingwood modified his
original rapprochement philosophy, but also the way in which
the "sameness of question" turns out to be not the sameness of
a universal but the sameness of an historical process.

The

modification consists in the addition of a notion of what Collingwood would later call a "scale of forms" to the analytic
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phase of his di-phasic (now tri-phasic) method of reconciliation.

We shall see in a moment the radical way in which

this modifies the notion of identity; but just on the analogy
of his three-term system, it is clear from the comparison of
this system with that offered in Religion and Philosophy that
there is a shift of emphasis here from the mere assertion that
the change of relations in a three-term system implies a change
in the relata (in a system of dialectical identity) to the
specification of how that change affects the relationship.
The terms are related not merely "internally" (Collingwood
avoids the "internal-external" metaphor in Speculum Mentis)
but in an ascending series, in an order of development, such
that when a term changes it is changed through the agency or
mediation of another term in the series into something further
which incorporates the others (its predecessors) into itself.
But this is the way that Collingwood had defined historical
change in his 1927 and 1929 essays on the philosophy of history:

history is a process of spiritual development, a dyna-

mic rather than static concept, in which ideas grow out of
other ideas and modify these previous ideas while being modified by them (EPH, 73).

The manner of identification of the

forms of knowledge and the sameness of historical problems
converge on the concept of a developmental series.
Collingwood is quick to reassure the reader that although the forms of experience and the stages of history dis-
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play a developmental structure, the life of mind is "not the
rotation of a machine through a cycle of fixed phases," and
consequently one should not expect to have his nose held to
a "dialectical grindstone" (SM, 56).

It will be recalled

from Religion and Philosophy that the "identity of cooperation" (which we now recognize as the identity of historical
processes) was regarded as a contingent identity, and not a
necessary one.

Consequently it is not surprising that at the

very beginning of a work which is to spell out the stages of
development of a mind through successive forms of experience,
stages which parallel the development of consciousness in mankind as a whole (cf. SM, 50-54), Collingwood should feel
bound to deny that the relation between phases is one of compulsion or necessity--and this importation of contingency is
a measure of Collingwood's distance from Hegel.
On the other hand (as will be recalled from our previous discussion of Speculum Mentis)--the test of each of
these forms of experience (each of which claims not only to
give the truth but "to give the absolute or ultimate truth
concerning the nature of the universe, to reveal the secret
of existence, and to tell us what the world really and fundamentally is" (SM, 41)) is to be its inherent self-consistency.
The "prize of truth" for which they all strive is to be gained
by the form of knowledge which is self-consistent, or which
proves its claim by "demonstrating the necessary inconsistency
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of the other forms" (SM, 45).

But then it would seem that

the grindstone of dialectical necessity that Collingwood seems
anxious to keep away from the noses of his readers is kep·t
whirling a few inches away (perhaps to sharpen an analytical
blade).

How does a form of knowledge, which retains its

claim to truth by demonstrating both its inherent selfconsistency and the inherent and essential inconsistency of
rival forms of knowledge--how does it do so without displaying itself as the necessarily true form of knowledge and the
necessary successor to its predecessors?

For if the other

forms are inherently inconsistent, then it is clear that they
cannot of themselves achieve ultimate truth, and therefore of
necessity fail.
By now the reader should expect that the solution to
the problem will more likely be to revise the notion of necessity than to withdraw one or the other of the pair of contradictory claims. 10 But to get an idea of how Collingwood
actually viewed the manner in which such a series of terms
are related we must (once again begging the reader's indulgence) take another look at the argument of Speculum Mentis.
In so doing we shall deliberately take a different route from
the one Collingwood laid out for his readers.

Instead of be-

ginning with artistic experience and proceeding through the
10 This is Rubinoff's strategy: see CRM, 61, 176-83.
These passages are also the most flagrantly Hegelian in his
whole book.
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others until we reach philosophy, we shall begin where we left
off in our discussion of Q-A logic, i.e., with science, and
work first backwards to religion and then art, and then forward to history and philosophy.
Our reason for this strategy is primarily to test this
new requirement for rapprochement:

for if (a) the forms of

knowledge constitute a series wherein each term is a modification of the one before, then in an analysis of a successorform one should find traces of its predecessor--traces that
will, when analyzed show how the successor-form is "built
upon or derived from" its predecessor.

Thus in the analysis

of science which constituted much of our discussion of Q-A
logic, we should be able to detect a religious element, and
in the latter an artistic element.

And if (b) there is no di-

alectical necessity involved in the series then when we progress from science to history the latter will resolve the inconsistencies of the former without being the necessary outcome of it, or necessarily implied by it.

In short, when

viewed retrogressively there will be necessary relations exhibited between terms in the series; when viewed progressively
these relations will appear to be contingent.
One more final note before beginning our survey.
From our discussion of the analysis of science in Speculum
Mentis we notice that scientific consciousness is characterized in terms of (1) the sort of ideal object it intends to
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grasp, (2) the faculty of mind by which it habitually operates, (3) its characteristic mode of expression, and (4) its
fatal weakness, or inner contradiction, that renders it to be
an unstable mode of knowledge.

Besides these four, Colling-

wood further characterizes it (5) by the consequences it has
for human action, insofar as it generates, when taken as a
guide for conduct, a particular form of ethics.

While import-

ant for Collingwood's rapprochement between theory and practice, and therefore another partial confirmation of his contention in the Autobiography that he sought to carry his program of reconciliation even into the realm of ethics and conduct, we propose to ignore this fifth aspect here in order
not to further tangle the knotted threads of our argument.
4.

Speculum Mentis:

Retrogressive Identity.

Science, as described in Speculum Mentis, is the conscious attitude of regarding its object always as an instance
of a universal law (SM, 158-63).

It operates by a faculty of

understanding, which distinguishes between universals and particulars, and assumes that universals can be separated or isolated (abstracted) by thought and studied apart from its instances (SM, 166-67).

Instances of such universal laws are

not regarded as having mutual relations among themselves other
than those specified by the law (SM, 162, 166-167).

But sci-

entific laws are not merely statements of what would be the
case if certain uniform conditions obtain (the hypothetical-
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deductive aspect of science), science also seeks to assert its
laws as holding in the real world, and therefore referring to
individuals or to the world of facts perceived by observers
(the categorical-inductive aspect of science) (SM, 177, 183).
In epigrammatic form, science is the form of consciousness
which intends an object which can be expressed in universal,
referentially true assertions.
Now it is not difficult to see that this sort of consciousness presupposes and depends for its existence on subordinate acts of consciousness.

Scientific consciousness pre-

supposes a distinction between universals (concepts, laws)
and the particulars (perceptions, instances) to which they
apply--a distinction, Collingwood insists, which is essential
and irreducible for scientific thinking, given the sort of object (ideal) it intends. 11 But a distinction between a universal and something particular is a distinction between something merely entertained as a meaning (in imagination) and
something to which this meaning refers as a real instance (in
perception); it is not only an assertion, but an assertion
with a referent, i.e., a real object (EPH, 135-36; cf. SM,
11 collingwood states that "mathematics, mechanism,
and materialism are the three marks of all science," but he
reduces all three of these essential characteristics of science to the "assertion of the abstract concept"--they are all
"products of the classificatory frame of mind" (SM, 167).
For Collingwood's later view of what the characteristic marks
of modern science are, see IN, 13-27.
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238-39).

It is, as we said, both hypothetical (a possible

meaning) and categorical (referential).

As hypothetical sci-

entific consciousness is the exercise of making supposals,
of entertaining questions and formulating hypotheses--all of
which imply the consideration of an object without reference
to its truth or falsity, or to its existence or non-existence.
This is the defining characteristic of imaginary objects, and
Collingwood's claim is that imagined objects are what the
forms of consciousness known as religion and art intend.

For

art the entertainment and expression of imagined objects is
necessary and sufficient to it as a mental activity; for religious consciousness there is the additional requirement that
its objects be taken as truly existing--it is not indifferent
to the existence of its object as is artistic consciousness
(cf. EPA, 137-41).
Therefore it is clear that (1) if scientific consciousness requires that its object be expressed in scientific assertions, and (2) if scientific assertions essentially imply a
distinction between universals and particulars, and (3) if
this distinction demands expression in hypothetical assertions
which (4) are not only entertained as possible meanings but
also (5) are taken as categorically true, or as truly referring to particulars, and finally (6) if the latter two activities (that is, (4) and (5)) are characteristics essential to
artistic and religious consciousness respectively, then (7)
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we have demonstrated that scientific consciousness essentially and necessarily contains elements (or structures) .that
are characteristically religious and artistic.
If this is an acceptable summary of the argument in
the first three portions of Collingwood's "dialectic of experience" it seems to be saying too much and too little at the
same time.

Is it not asking too much to expect us to believe

that before a law of nature is taken to be scientific it must
first be grasped artistically and then religiously--first
painted by an artist and then worshipped by a priest? 12 This
12 co 11 ~ngwoo
·
d d oes po~nt
·
· · ~n
· h er~tance
·
to an exp 1 ~c~t
of religion and art in science, but he presents it in the form
of a mental disposition--a "bias toward abstraction." He
writes: "This bias is allowed unconsciously to control its
development . . . . Because the abstractness of science is a
perpetuation of the abstractness of religion, science most naturally arises out of a religion which has not overcome this
abstractness, that is to say, out of a non-Christian religion.
Hence European science has its roots in the religion of pagan
antiquity . . . . Science in the modern world is science Christianized, science fed by a religious consciousness in which
the primary abstractness of religion has been cancelled by the
notions of incarnation and atonement. This gives the distinction between the a priori science of the Greeks and the empirical science of the modern or Christian world. But religion,
even in the form of Christianity, never really transcends its
abstractness . . . . The aim of science is to avoid this fault;
Greek science aims at avoiding the specific fault of Greek religion, modern science at avoiding that of Christianity,
namely, its liability to misinterpretation in a sense which
makes God an arbitrary tyrant, whose very gifts are an insult
to a free man. The history of European science begins with
the breakdown of a religious view of the world in the mind of
ancient Greece, and the concepts of Greek science appear as a
kind of depersonalized gods" (SM, 160-61). It appears that
Collingwood would have agreed with Cornford against Burnet:
"Principium sapientiae (quae scientiae) timor dei."
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is something of the impression one gets by a forward reading
of Speculum Mentis.

But in reversing directions we see that

it obviously is not what he has in mind.

Collingwood is not

speaking generically--he is not saying that one and the same
object of consciousness is first taken as an art-object and
then as a religious object and finally as a science-object.
He is making what appears to be a logical point--that forms
of consciousness and their characteristic modes of expression
are bound to one another in a logically necessary fashion,
such that in thinking scientifically one cannot help but also
think (in an implicit way) religiously and artistically (but
not necessarily vice-versa).
But then is this not saying too little?

Our previous

objection concerning the reduction of the forms of consciousness to one another as species of a genus seems to apply here
as well.

Surely in scientific consciousness there is an ele-

ment of creed, if one takes creed as the form ofexpression of
a consciousness which assumes its object to be real and asserts itself in statements about that object that are assumed
to be true and distinct from other statements about it which
are false.

But to take the object of religious consciousness

to be creed in this sense is to reduce religion to its mode
of expression, and this would be an error as grievous as
merely taking it as an event in the brain, insofar as both ignore what is properly and peculiarly being asserted by reli-
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gious statements.

Religion is not particularly concerned with

objects sliding down inclined planes or the displacements of
fluids by solid objects of a given weight; and science is not
particularly concerned with the effect that natural laws will
have on the moral behavior of those who believe in them.

Fur-

thermore religion expresses itself not only in credal assertions, but in exclamations, questions, petitions, demands,
apologies, etc.

By focusing on the mode of expression, and on

only one mode at that, Collingwood seems to be ignoring what
it is that is being expressed Qy that mode, and this is the
sort of formalism Collingwood had criticized psychology for
employing.

And nothing is added by relating a mode of expres-

sion to a faculty of consciousness, since the same objection
can be raised about the mode of consciousness which takes its
object a certain way, but does not specify what is peculiar
to the object it is so taking.
These objections would be more biting if it were not
for the fact that Collingwood spends an entire chapter of
Speculum Mentis trying to say what religion is, not only generically (as a form of consciousness sharing characteristics
with other forms) but specifically.

Religion is a form of

consciousness which intends an object which is a unified whole
(like the object of art), which is ultimately real (like the
object of science and unlike the object of art), and which is
taken as sacred or holy--that is, deserving of adoration (un-

278

like both science and art):
God, we are told by theologians, is the ultimate reality,
conceived as spirit; spirit omnipotent, omniscient, creative, transcending all sense of immediacy, yet immanent
in his church. But this language, well enough in theology,
is very far from natural to religion . . . . From the
simple and unsophisticated point of view of the religious
consciousness, it is not the spirituality nor the immanence of God that is important, nor even his power or goodness, but his holiness, the necessity of falling down before him in adoration. This sense of the holiness of God
is the explicit differentia of the religious experience.
(SM, 118-19).
As in Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood is anxious not to
characterize religion in a reductive fashion, so he is at pains
not to be content, as some writers on religion had been, to
describe "the holy" as a feeling of uncanniness for the divine.
If it is a feeling, writes Collingwood, and one which is a universal characteristic of religion, "it must be bound up with
its essential nature, and capable of being deduced from it"
(SM, 119).
Holiness is to religion what beauty is to art. It is the
specific form in which truth appears to that type of consciousness. As religion, therefore, is a dialectical development of art, so holiness is a dialectical development
of beauty. Now religion is art asserting its object. The
object of art is the beautiful, and therefore the holy is
the beautiful asserted as real . . . . Further, holiness,
like beauty, polarizes itself into the positively holy
(God) and the negatively holy, that which we are forbidden
to find holy or worship, the devil and all his works. But
specifically, holiness is asserted as real, and therefore
God is regarded as not our own invention, not a fancy work
of art, but a reality, indeed the only and ultimate reality. Hence that rapture and admiration which we enjoy in
the contemplation of a work of art is in the case of God
fused with the conviction that we here come face to face
with something other than ourselves and our imaginings,
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something infinitely real, the ground and source of our
own being. It is this fusion which constitutes the sense
of holiness, and forms the basis and motive of worship.
Neither the real nor the beautiful is as such the proper
object of adoration: it is only the aesthetic attitude
towards ultimate reality, or conversely the elevation of
beauty into a metaphysical principle, that constitutes
worship. (SM, 119-20).
Once again it is necessary to enter a caveat here
against the possible misinterpretation of Collingwood's intent.

In analyzing religion as a form of consciousness which

intends an object that is defined by holiness, and then by
defining holiness in terms of the object of artistic consciousness (the holy as the "beautiful asserted as real"), Collingwood is not simply saying that religion elevates an artobject, asserts its reality, and then falls down in worship
of it.

That he does not mean this is clear from his comments

about idolatry:
(T)he enemy of religion is idolatry, or the attempt to
worship an object which, however exquisite to the artist's
eye, cannot claim to be the ultimate reality. The sin of
the idolater is to worship his own works of art known to
be such. This is not true religion, because true religion
worships the real God, no mere figment of the imagination
. . . . (I)n religion the mind becomes aware that it is in
danger of illusion. God and religion are correlative; and
to doubt the reality of God is to deny the validity and
legitimacy of religion. There are no religions without a
god or gods: what have passed by that name have been
either philosophies, or religions whose gods have escaped
the eye of the observer, or a kind of mechanical contrivance put on the market by a deluded or fraudulent inventor. (SM, 119-20).
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In defining religious consciousness as the artistic
object asserted as real, therefore, Collingwood is attempting
to characterize what is actually a unified whole by means of
terms drawn both (a) from a lower form of consciousness (art),
which forms one of religion's distinguishable (but not truly
separate) elements, and (b) from within that form of consciousness itself (the assertion of God as ultimate reality).

But

the lower term, in this case the artistic object, "the beautiful," is transformed into something different--into "the holy"
or something deserving of worship.

If "the beautiful" is tak-

en generically, then "the holy" is a specification of that
genus in such a way that the generic essence is modified by
the specific difference of religious consciousness to the extent that it becomes identified with it:

the genus, in short,

is identified with the variable--the beautiful is asserted as
real.
Now we have just seen that a very similar state of affairs appears to be the result of Collingwood's analysis of
scientific consciousness.

The genus provided by religious

consciousness (creed: the assertion of the imagined object as
real) is modified by what is specific to scientific consciousness (the principle of abstraction) to become not an object of
faith and worship but an object of scientific inquiry--the
conception of reality as particular instantiations of universal laws.

And we see again from this analysis that the object
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of religion (God as ultimate reality) is not taken over by
scientific consciousness without modification:

laws of nature

are not merely the worshipped God reduced to the status of
universals.

The object of scientific consciousness takes the

generic essence of religious consciousness as already abstract:
it takes up only the notion of an imaginary object asserted as
real and leaves aside the sacred or holy aspect of the object
of religious consciousness.

It becomes, in terms Collingwood

does not employ, wholly profane science.
We see therefore a very important exemplification of
what Collingwood's modification of the notion of identity was
in Speculum Mentis.

The relationship between forms of know-

ledge is as good an illustration as one can expect to find of
what Collingwood meant by a "developing series" in which each
term is a modification of the one before.

It is also the ba-

sis upon which he will construct his analysis of a "scale of
forms" in the Essay on Philosophical Method:

"In a philoso-

phical scale of forms the variable is identical with the
generic essence itself" (EPM, 60).

We do not have to proceed

much further in our retrogressive survey before discovering
another anticipation of a doctrine in the Essay on Philosophical Method:

in a scale of forms there is no zero end of the

scale, the minimum realization of the generic essence lying
not at zero but at unity (EPM, 81).

In this case the minimum

specification of the genus, "object of knowledge," is the ob-
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ject of artistic consciousness.
It is no accident that art occupies the primary position in Collingwood's survey of the forms of experience because to be an object of consciousness at all is to be entertained as an object in imagination, without which even perception is impossible (SM, 204-05; EPA, 57).
The first stage in this process ((viz. the life of spirit
or awareness or consciousness)) is the life of art, which
is the pure act of imagination. This is not only empirically the first stage observable in children and primitive
peoples, it is necessarily the first stage. Awareness in
itself . . . is an act of consciousness which presents to
itself an object of whose relation to other objects it
takes no cognizance . . . . (I)n religion that indifference
to the distinction between real and unreal, which is the
essence of art, is abolished. Religion is essentially a
quest after truth and explicitly conscious of itself as
such a quest. (EPA, 141).
Once again it is necessary to enter a word of caution
to avoid a misunderstanding.

Collingwood is not saying that

art first asserts, then withdraws the aspect of truth or falsehood, or the reference to reality.
all:

Art is not asserting at

its "apparent assertions are not real assertions but

the very suspension of assertion"--and the non-assertive, nonlogical attitude towards an object of consciousness, the indifference to its reality or unreality, is imagination (SM,
60).

That is why art is prior to the other forms of conscious-

ness, and even the discussion of its essential nature as the
activity of imagination is not taking place from within artis-
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tic consciousness itself, but is thought's way of describing
its most primitive function.
To imagine is to refrain from making a distinction which
we make whenever we think: the distinction between reality and unreality, truth and falsehood. Therefore imagining is not a kind of thinking, nor is thinking a kind
of imagining, for each negates the specific nature of the
other . . . . Hence the relation between imagination and
thought is that thought presupposes imagination, but imagination does not presuppose thought . . . . As thinking
presupposes imagining, all those activities whose theoretical aspect takes the form of thought presuppose art;
and art is the basis of science, history, "common sense,"
and so forth. Art is the primary and fundamental activity of the mind . . . . It is not a primitive form of
religion or science of philosophy, it is something more
primitive than these, something that underlies them and
makes them possible. (EPA, 54-55).
But although artistic consciousness is the suspension
of assertion (and it will be recalled from Chapter V that the
suspension of assertion is one of the ways Collingwood defines
a question and an hypothesis), it is not simply the "blooming,
buzzing confusion" that William James ascribed to the world of
pure sensation.

Artistic consciousness has at least the co-

herence necessary to hold its object together as a single entity, and in so doing it makes a rudimentary distinction between beauty and ugliness.

It is this minimal activity that

permits us to call it consciousness or mental activity at all.
Insofar as imagination is a constructive activity (which ultimately issues in the creation of works of art) it is a representative of mental consciousness striving to see its world
as a whole, the whole in this case being the imagined object,
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the work of art (SM, 63-65).

And even though art proclaims

its refusal to be bound either by any necessary relation to
the world of reality, or by the restrictive, rule-governed
world of thought, it nonetheless utilizes, at least implicitly the minimum realization of thought in its application of
the principle of beauty:
Now this process of imagining a whole, or creating a work
of art is . . . no mere rudderless drifting of images across the mind; it is a process of unification in which the
mind strives to see its world as a whole, the "world" being just the work of art which for the time being absorbs
the whole gaze of the mind . . . (T)he whole comes into
imaginary existence only in the critical process of experimenting with its parts . . . . The law of this process,
its guiding principle, is beauty . . . . Now art as such
has nothing to do with principles or laws . . . . ((But))
beauty is not a concept. It is the guise under which concepts in general appear to the aesthetic consciousness.
Beauty means structure, organization, seen from the aesthetic point of view, that is, imagined and not conceived.
(SM, 65-66).13
The work of aesthetic consciousness, then, is the creation of
coherence in its minimal form.

"When one imagines," writes

Collingwood, "one must imagine something; it must be a definite and not a self-contradictory imagination, and hence the
necessary unity of the work of art" (SM, 70).
13
Although the general sense of what Collingwood is
saying about beauty and art is clear, it is difficult to understand how beauty can be the "law of this process" of unification, "its guiding principle-:"and still not be a concept.
Perhaps Collingwood is trying to present it arter the fashion
of Kant's a priori forms of intuition, space and time, which
were also not concepts. Collingwood's later esthetic drops
the notion of beauty altogether, while retaining the theory
of imagination: see PA, 37-41, 137, and 149.
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We see in the experience of art what Collingwood takes
to be the minimum sense of unity--the identity of a coherent,
imagined object in terms of structure or organization, its
ability (from the point of view of consciousness) to be held
before the gaze of consciousness as an object to it.

To para-

phrase Collingwood, to be one is minimally to be a coherent
object of imagination, without consideration of truth or falsity, reality or unreality.

But concern only for internal co-

herence is what is ultimately responsible for what Collingwood
calls the "monadism of art:"
Every aesthetic act is an individual internally organized
by the harmonious fitting-together of subordinate aesthetic acts . . . . Works of art always ignore one another
and begin each from the beginning: they are windowless
monads; and this is because they are acts of imagination,
from which it necessarily follows that they are careless
of mutual consistency and interested only in their internal coherence . . . . The work of art is a monad, and monadology is the philosophy of art. (SM, 71-72).
Since art as imagination is necessarily the fundamental form of consciousness, it is clear that we have reached
the end of the line in our retrogressive survey of the forms
of consciousness (at least those starting with science and
its subordinate forms) necessarily presupposes its predecessors; each of the subordinate forms, that is, is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for its superordinate form,
without which it could not be what it is.

And although Col-

lingwood is not altogether rigorous in exhibiting this dependence at all the levels of description we found him giving
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of the forms of consciousness (i.e. as intentional structures,
as objects of consciousness, as modes of expression, and as
14
faculties of mind),
the main outlines of the rapprochement
identity, when approached retrogressively, are clear--and its
ideal limit is the minimal form of unity as the coherent object of imagination.
5.

Speculum Mentis:

Progressive Identity.

When Collingwood begins the chapter on science in
Speculum Mentis he summarizes the failure of both art and religion to fulfill the promise that they hold out as being complete and independent forms of consciousness.

In so doing he

takes up not what they are in themselves (forms of conscious14While it is relatively easy to find passages in
Speculum Mentis and elsewhere that illustrate the retrogressively necessary relationship of forms of consciousness, the
basis for this relationship is given in terms of intentional
structures (the way that consciousness intends its objects),
faculties (imagination, understanding, faith, reason), and typical modes of expression (hypothesis, assertion, etc.), but
not always in terms of their objects. When religious consciousness transforms "the beautiful" into "the holy" the
transition between objects, while highly abstract, is fairly
explicit. But when science takes up its object one might expect that "the holy" would now become "the true" or "the abstract universal" or some such entity. But Collingwood does
not carry forward the analogy, perhaps because "the truth" is
what is intended by all forms of thought as such, from science
on up; or perhaps, again, because thought self-conscious of
itself as such is best dealt with in its expressive mode in
linguistic forms. But from the point of view of Speculum
Mentis, Collingwood clearly felt that the different descriptive terms we have distinguished were just different ways of
characterizing the same entities--art, science, religion, etc.
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ness or intentional structures), nor what they intend as
ideal objects, nor as faculties of mind, but the way they
manifest themselves--art as imaginative expression, and
ligion as credal assertion.

re~

It is in this form that they

most clearly show their failure to achieve fully satisfying
results.
Art and religion, to the superficial observer, are forms
not of thought but of language. Art . . . is simply
language itself, language in its pure form apart from any
meaning . . . . Art is not pure language, but thought failing to recognize that it is thought, mistaking itself for
imagination. Religion is . . . a dialectical development
of art, art realizing that it is not bare imagination but
assertion, and then proceeding to misinterpret its own assertions and to suppose itself to be asserting the image
or word when it is really asserting the meaning of the
word. In a special sense both art and religion are thus
linguistic functions, forms of expression rather than
forms of thought. (SM, 154).
But if art and religion are both "phases in the history of a
mind, preceding its attainment of complete mastery over the
means of expression," science represents thought's completion
of this development in the recognition that language is the
servant of thought rather than either the whole of thought (as
art assumes) or thought's master (as religion assumes) (SM,
155).

Scientific consciousness explicitly distinguishes be-

tween metaphorical and literal meaning, and hence between
thought and language (SM, 157).

It does so by the assertion

of the abstract concept, as we have already seen, and the historical locus of this event was in the world of post-Homeric
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Greece, where scientific concepts appeared first in the guise
of depersonalized gods (SM, 158, 160-61).

Whereas (a) art

fails completely to recognize the claim of thought on its conscious activity, being totally absorbed in the technique of
expression, and (b) religion only minimally recognizes the
claim of thought but misinterprets it by identifying thought
with its own expression, language with reality, (c) science
represents thought fully conscious of itself as thought,
thought expressed rather than concealed (SM, 154-55).
From the point of view of the modes of expression of
the forms of consciousness, then, each is an incomplete fulfillment of what thought is trying to achieve:

each only par-

tially conceives of an object which will fully satisfy its
(the mind's) requirements.

But when taken as ultimate and in-

dependent statements about what consciousness is, and what the
relationship of consciousness is to its object, they are not
only incomplete they are errors--mistakes that consciousness
makes about itself and about its object.

When made explicit

by the labors of thought, these errors appear not as inadequacies of modes of expression but as actual contradictions
within that mode.

Thus art appears to non-assertively assert,

religion to not mean what it says it means, and science appears to non-referentially refer (SM, 242-43; cf. SM, 311).
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Now if one were of a formalistic cast of mind, which
Collingwood clearly was not, one might easily demonstrate that
from contradictory statements everything follows of necessity
(because anything, including further contradictory statements,
can be derived from any rule which allows contradictories to
stand as simultaneously true).

Therefore when any form of

knowledge is shown to rest on a presupposition (when what it
implicitly presumes is made explicit) that is inherently
false, or self-contradictory, it would automatically rule out
the possibility that any other form of self-consistent knowledge could proceed from it--and certainly not of necessity.
Therefore from the collapse of one form of knowledge by selfcontradiction no other form of knowledge can follow of necessity, and the progressive dialectical process, as we anticipated, would show no necessity:

the relation of succession is

not one of necessity but of contingency.
But this is not Collingwood's route.

We saw in a pre-

vious chapter (Chapter IV) that Collingwood's commitment to
an anti-realist position concerning the relation of knower
and known necessitated the conclusion that any such error
that consciousness makes about its object recoils on itself,
altering the nature of conscious activity itself (SM, 241).
When a form of consciousness is shown to express itself in an
inconsistent manner, like the rift in the sail of a schooner,
it need not abandon ship, because it has a greater resiliency
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than strict logic might allow.

It can repair its own damages

by transforming itself into something that at first sight it
was not--spontaneous and reflective thought.

Therefore imag-

inative consciousness (art) can recognize that it is not utterly free of the imposition of thought, since it presumes a
guiding principle of selectivity (the idea of relevance) in
the construction of a coherent work of art (SM, 97). The consciousness of this controlling element in artistic creation
is the birthplace of art criticism, and of esthetic philosophy
(SM, 98-100).

The distinction that is introduced is one of

form and content, of the manner in which meaning in art is
expressed as opposed to what is being expressed by that form
(SM, 96).

This distinction is the beginning of scientific
15 an d recognlzlng
.
. .
. . conconsclousness,
t h e d anger t h at artlStlc
sciousness may at this point cease to be itself and become
science, esthetic philosophy--thought conscious of itself as
art--resists the absorption of its primary form (artistic experience) by attacking science, perhaps in the form of an intuitionism that is read back into science as its (science's)
essential nature (SM, 262).

Esthetic philosophy "reduces all

philosophical problems to terms of imagination or intuition,"
which describe the world as one of pure change, a monadic
world in which every event isnew in the sense of irrelevant
15 Notice that Collingwood here at least implicitly acknowledges that it is possible to pass directly from art to
science--but only through the intermediary of some sort of explicit thought process, such as art criticism.
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to what went before (ibid.).
The same dogmatic service of thought can be performed
for the other forms of experience, and it is this polymorphous
perversity (Collingwood of course does not use this phrase,
apt as he may have found it) that prevents the phases of the
dialectical series of forms of knowledge from becoming necessarily successive.

Once a form of consciousness has at its

disposal a battery of modes of expression (questions, assertions, supposals, etc.) provided by the capacities of thought,
it can respond to the threat of destnrtion of itself by its
own inner dialectic (self contradiction) either by becoming
explicitly what it was only implicitly (rational thought, for
example, instead of pure imagination; assertion instead of
mere questioning) or by transforming itself into another form
altogether (transforming the object of art into the object of
religion, for example).

Art can defend itself by becoming

art-criticism or esthetic philosophy or it can allow itself to
be absorbed by religion, science, or history as one of its
essential constituents.

Religion can develop a dogmatic de-

fense as theology, science can develop a dogmatic defense as
metaphysics and logic, and history (peculiarly enough, as we
noted earlier) can develop a dogmatic philosophy in the form
of realism; or each could be transformed in its successor
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(SM, 260-87). 16
We have at this point shown, therefore, how Collingwood, true to his epistemological assumptions, has maintained
the contingency of the forward motion of his process of reconciliation between the forms of knowledge.

Progressive

rapprochement identity (according to the position proclaimed
in Speculum Mentis, at least) consists in the unifying activity of a form of consciousness, deliberately attempting to
preserve its integrity by overcoming errors which become manifest when its implicit assumptions are explicitly expressed.
Since it can overcome error in a variety of ways, and with
differing degrees of success, the possible modes of succession
of thought forms are not fixed, and contingency in the progressive direction is preserved.

The ideal limit to the process

of overcoming expressed errors is total self-consistency, or
absolute knowledge.

Such a knowledge would not only grasp its

intentional object in a non-misleading way, but would also account for the errors that it has made in achieving this totally adequate knowledge.

Therefore it cannot intend an object

that is utterly one, a bare blank identity (the abstract Absolute), but a unity-in-diversity, one for which differences
are essential, a "concrete universal."

But a concrete univer-

16 Although strictly speaking, tertium non datur, I see
no reason why Collingwood would object to the suggestion that
a form of experience could simply remain what it is, ignoring
the contradiction within itself.
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sal as an absolute object would have to be an infinite whole
of fact, and a whole in which subject and object are not ·conceived as separate, but identified.

Ideal maximal progressive

rapprochement identity, therefore, is one of complete identity
of subject and object. 17
Since there is a whole battery of problems that arise
in connection with Collingwood's concluding chapters of Speculum Mentis, especially concerning this progressive rapprochement identity in the form of "absolute knowledge," we propose
to deal with these problems as a series of disputed questions
with which we will close this chapter.
6.

Disputed Questions.

(1) Why do forms of consciousness succeed one another?
Collingwood's descriptive phenomenology does not set out to
answer this question, but it certainly does "arise"--even on
his own sense of that term.

If there is no necessity (meaning

logical compulsion) in the forward direction in a scale of
forms of knowledge, then it would seem not merely contingent
that they succeed one another but utterly accidental, even
gratuitous or miraculous.

Is the reader to assume a "nisus"

or innate striving toward greater adequacy of thought?

Does

17 sources for the statements in this paragraph (the
argument is nowhere, of course, stated as such by Collingwood)
include: SM, 238-41, 288-97. More detailed, explicit references will be given in section 6, question 2.
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thought have an inborn natural tendency to supersede or overreach or transcend itself and thus create different forms of
itself?

Is the logical requirement of self-consistency a mo-

tive force at all levels of consciousness?
In

his "Outlines of a Philosophy of Art" (published

one year after Speculum Mentis) Collingwood actually does posit a "nisus towards self-consciousness" at all levels of consciousness (EPA, 144), but in Speculum Mentis he does not give
a consistent answer to this question.

On the one hand, in the

introductory and less precise passages of the book, Collingwood seems to lean towards the "nisus" thesis, if we may so
call it, insofar as he assumes that the disease of modern man
is self-alienation, the separation of the forms of experience
one from another, and the cure for this disease to be their
"reunion in a complete and undivided life" (SM, 36).

But on

the other hand, Collingwood denies that there is anything like
a fixed "human nature" (SM, 296)--a denial he defended throughout his lifetime, and against which he threw all the weight of
his reflections on the nature of history as a "self-making activity."

But if there is no such thing as a fixed human na-

ture, not even in the minimal sense of the term, then it is
hard to account for any tendency for consciousness to become
altered at all.

In fact it seems utterly groundless to assert

that consciousness would seek to grasp a fully satisfactory
object unless there are fundamental and irreducible character-
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istics of consciousness as an activity, and what could this be
but a minimally essential human nature?
Collingwood does not acknowledge the problem at all in
Speculum Mentis, the assumptions upon which it builds its argument being (1) that knowledge and consciousness exist (but in
a divided state), and (2) that these mental activities claim
fully satisfactory ideal objects (cf. SM, 39).

It is not un-

til he attempted a more complete analysis of mental activity
in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan that the
emotive-expressive aspects of mental activity was fully integrated into his philosophy of mind.
(2) Even assuming that, for whatever reason, the forms
of consciousness do succeed one another in a scale of developing forms, and in much the way Collingwood describes them, is
there any end-point to the series?

We have seen in our retro-

gressive survey of the forms of consciousness that there is a
terminal point at the "lower" end inasmuch as the consideration by consciousness of a whole object, its mere entertainment by imagination, is the minimal sense in which intentionality can grasp its object at all.

But we have also seen that

the imaginary object is intended without consideration of its
reality or unreality (i.e. without reference), and that this
is the root sense of abstraction, insofar as the act which
grasps an imaginary object does so by ignoring (Collingwood
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will later say by "suppressing") its relations to any and all
other objects.

And abstraction, as the negative side of in-

tentionality, is also the act by which consciousness cuts

it-

self loose from its object, or sets the object apart as "separate" from itself.

But this is the primitive act of separa-

tion of subject and object, the root error of realism.
From this analysis it is not surprising that the repair to the torn fabric of consciousness will be the reunification of subject and object by an act that is the very opposite of abstraction--viz. reconciliation.
lingwood's strategy in Speculum Mentis:

This in fact is Colthe termination of

the scale of forms is philosophy (which succeeds history), and
whereas history achieves concrete knowledge (and therefore
rectifies implicitly the abstractness of science), philosophy
achieves absolute knowledge (and therefore overcomes the last
vestige of abstraction in the form of history's separation of
subject and object--the historian contemplating a world of
facts, and not fully aware that he is more than merely an observer of those facts) (SM, 238-39; cf. SM, 242-43, 311, and
EPA, 143-44).
We shall see in a moment what the subject matter of
this absolute knowledge is, and how it leads to further difficulties unresolved in Speculum Mentis.

For now it is suf-

ficient to notice that the argument that Collingwood provides
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for us as a justification for the transition from history to
philosophy does not appear to leave us with any alternative,
and thus threatens the contingency of the forward dialectic.
He not only argues (a) that if the distinction or separation
between subject and object is invalid, then the last veil
hung between the mind and its object falls, revealing (not
Salome but) the mind itself in mirror reflection--the "speculum mentis" of his title; but also (b) that on either of two
mutually exclusive alternatives, the result (the identity of
subject and object) follows:
If subject and object are opposite, then they can only
exist in synthesis: well and good. But if they are distinct concrete facts, they both fall within the world of
fact, and of this world it remains true that everything in
it determines the whole and everything else, it follows
that subject and object are just as inseparable on this
hypothesis as on the other. For the concept of the world
of fact as the concrete universal has destroyed any distinction between a logic of opposition and a logic of difference.l8 The fundamental principle of history itself,
namely, the concreteness of the object, thus makes it impossible for the object to ignore the subject, and compels
us to recognize an object to which the subject is organic,
in the sense that the subject's consciousness of it makes
a real difference to it as a whole and to all its parts
. . . . Being known, whether truly known or erroneously
known, must make a difference to the object: to deny this
. . . is to turn one's back on concrete thought and revert
to the fallacies of abstraction. (SM, 244; emphasis mine).
With this passage it appears that the veil is not so
18 collingwood here anticipates another doctrine of
the Essay on Philosophical Method: "the kind of opposition
which is found among philosophical terms is at once opposition and distinction" (EPM, 75).
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much dropped as torn down, revealing not only the mirror of
the mind but Collingwood's own presuppositions, and it becomes clear that the position he is advocating is naked epistemological idealism (albeit of an unusual variety).

The sus-

picion (if one still needs convincing) is further confirmed in
a later passage in a section dealing with the historical form
of dogmatism, in which Collingwood praises German idealism for
killing "scientific realism--the popular philosophy of today-as dead as a door nail" ( SM, 28 7).
But the admission also threatens Collingwood's entire
philosophical enterprise in Speculum Mentis.

For if the for-

ward movement of the dialectic of experience is not propelled
by necessity, then the final transition, even more so than all
the intermediate ones, seems hypothetical at best and arbitrary
at worst.

But the above passage, as the underlined words show,

seems to contradict the thesis that the dialectical progression is not one of logical necessity. 19 The reader is shot as
19 cf. SM, 292-93: "Not that such creation of an external world is capricious. The mind cannot simply think whatever it pleases, or even imagine whatever it pleases. It is
bound by the laws of its own nature to this extent, that even
though it can deform its nature by misconceiving it, it can
never deform it out of recognition, because misconceiving is
after all a kind of conceiving. Its scientific concepts, its
religious imagery, its aesthetic imaginings must grow out of
the soil of fact, and that fact is just its own nature as that
stands for the time being. This necessity of all its actions,
ignored in the life of imagination, is though ignored not done
away. It is transformed, by being ignored, from a ratio~al necessity to the blind necessity of instinct .
. The d~scovery of necessity . . . is the achievement of the religious consciousness; but this necessity is there from the first."
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from an historical cannon into the realm of idealistic philosophy.
We shall see in the next question that Collingwood's
attemp~to

escape from the consequences of his own argument

by denying that his position commits him to a metaphysical
form of idealism are not convincing enough, as they stand, to
exonerate his "absolute knowledge" from self-contradiction,
and consequently from the necessity of positing even a further
form of consciousness to repair the damage.
(3) Does philosophy have an object?

The reader of

Speculum Mentis is well aware that Collingwood wants philosophy
to be a form of knowledge that (a) is self-consistent, (b) is
self-consciously reflective, and (c) achieves the object of
self-knowledge in a manner that escapes, or overcomes, the
errors of subordinate states of consciousness (SM, 45-46,
247-49).

We have just seen that Collingwood hopes to fulfill

these conditions in the guise of absolute knowledge.

By as-

serting that the differentia of absolute knowledge is the
identity of subject and object (SM, 249), Collingwood argues
that he has found a kind of knowledge that fulfills all the
requisite conditions.

(a) If it is identical with its ob-

ject, there is no "externality of the object," and therefore
no place for necessary inconsistency to conceal itself.

And

(b) so also it is not knowledge of an object that is other
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than itself, but is rather that object knowing itself.

But

(c) the problem of inconsistency arises once again the instant
one attempts to see how such a knowledge achieves its object
in a manner that escapes error. 20
The reason for this is that the instant one attempts
to import any content into the abstract formula "the identity
of subject and object" the air becomes murky with the gaseous
remains of previous errors.

The object of philosophy, he

says, is not that of art, religion, science or history because
each of these forms of knowledge intend an object that is assumed in some sense to be independent of the subject (SM, 30609).

Yet what the philosophical form of consciousness reflects

on is nothing other than the succession of worlds created by
art, religion, etc.
In an immediate and direct way the mind can never know
itself: it can only know itself through the mediation of
an external world, know that what it sees in the external
world is its own reflection. Hence the construction of
external worlds . . . is the only way by which the mind
can possibly come to that self-knowledge which is its
end. (SM, 315).
Absolute knowledge, therefore, consists in nothing more than
a survey of the succession of errors by subordinate states,
20 In fairness to Collingwood it should be pointed out
that he says that absolute knowledge is not secure from error,
but rather it is called absolute because "in it there is no
element of necessary and insurmountable error" (SM, 295).
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recognized as such by a form of consciousness that takes its
object to be nothing other than itself.

But each of these

subordinate forms of consciousness when recognized as illusory
(erroneous portrayals of an object separate from the mind
which contemplates it) are absorbed into philosophy:

there is

no "map of knowledge" because "there are no autonomous and mutually exclusive forms of experience" (SM, 306).

Philosophy

is therefore the consciousness of something which is also the
consciousness of nothing.
The same conclusion follows if one proceeds in another
direction--from a description of absolute mind.

Here Colling-

wood's rejection of all possible content is even more sweeping.
He says that whether the life of the spirit be described by a
group of categories, a group of laws, a group of presuppositions, a world of objects, or a series of stages, it is an
erroneous description of absolute knowledge because the descriptive terms are "versions of a single error:

the error

of abstraction, of failing to realize that subject and object,
condition and conditioned, ground and consequence, particular
and universal can only be distinctions which fall within one
and the same whole, and that this whole can only be the infinite fact which is the absolute mind" (SM, 310).

But there-

cognition of this "infinite fact" is an act which "abolishes
the notion of an external world other than the mind" (SM, 310).
But then it would seem that the infinite world of fact is
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abolished with the external world, the baby discarded with
the bath water, and absolute knowledge is left with nothing
to contemplate.
Collingwood's attempts to evade the contradictory aspects of the concept only tend to add to one's puzzlement.
For example he says that the abolition of an external world
other than mind does not imply the abolition of the distinction between suject and object:
These distinctions are only abolished by the coincidentia oppositorum which is the suicide of abstract thought,
and conserved by the synthesis of opposites which is the
life of concrete thought . . . . But in abolishing the notion of an external world other than the mind we do not
assert any of the silly nonsense usually described by unintelligent critics as idealism. We do not assert that
the trees and hills and people of our world are "unreal"
or "mere ideas in my mind," still less that matter is
nothing but a swarm of mind-particles. The very essence
of trees and hills and people is that they should be not
myself but my objects in perception: they are not subjective but objective, not states of myself but facts
that I know. None the less, my knowing them is organic
to them . . . . They and I alike are members of one whole,
a whole which the destruction of one part would in a
sense destroy throughout . .
(SM, 310-11).
But then what is this "whole" in which "subject and object are
identified" and which nevertheless is one for which externality
is an illusion; which is an "infinite world of fact" and yet
not "one stupendous whole" (SM, 299)?

How does a synthesis of

opposites differ from a coincidence of opposites, unless the
identity that is that synthesis is identifiable,
recognizable?

describable~

If absolute knowledge is self-knowledge, and if
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in it subject and object are identified, and if self-knowledge
is only possible through the intermediation of subordinare
forms, then how is it possible for objects of consciousness
not to be "mere ideas in my mind"?

Is it any wonder then that

in the "progressive reduction of art, religion, science and
history to philosophy" not only is it the case that "each one
of these lives disappears; but philosophy itself disappears as
completely as any" (SM, 293), leaving not so much as the smile
of the Cheshire cat?
Now one might grant that what Collingwood is dealing
with in these enigmatic passages is a mystery surpassing understanding, the mystery of self-consciousness and its existence in a world that appears external to the mind which nonetheless knows it.

One might grant that in grappling with such

a mystery one cannot help but lapse into forms of speech that
are contradictory, the sort of language familiar to mystics
and spiritualists.

One might be so lenient with him, were it

not for the fact that Collingwood himself is claiming consistency for what he is saying, that he uses logical criteria
for deciding if the claims of consciousness can live up to
their expressed performance, and that what he has led the
reader of Speculum Mentis to expect is a coherent account of
what it means to be a fully adequate form of knowledge.
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Therefore we cannot rest content with accepting this
state of affairs as a fitting conclusion to his search for
rapprochement.

We have the right to demand that if a "higher"

form of consciousness is itself inconsistent on logical
grounds, if it cannot live up in its performance to what it
had promised, we must either (a) declare it to be an exception to the rule of consistency, or (b) posit an even higher
state of reflective
ages.

consciousness to further repair the dam-

But it is easy to see that so long as a state of con-

sciousness is distinct from its object, alternative (b) leads
to an infinite regress, and therefore the goal of Speculum
Mentis (and progressive rapprochement) will be forever frustrated, because self-knowledge will never be possible:
volves a contradiction in terms.

it in-

And the first solution (a)

acknowledges that the criteria of consistency (a supposedly
higher form of consciousness--absolute knowledge) be affirmed
as itself inconsistent.

But then why not absolve any of the

lower forms from an equivalent necessity to be self-consistent?
Why not stop the series with history, for example?

What need

is there for philosophy?
As we shall see in a future chapter, Collingwood's solution was to opt for alternative (a), which is what we might
expect for someone who felt himself to be committed to the Socratic view of philosophy as self-knowledge.

But in taking

this route Collingwood provided philosophy with one of those
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rare occurrences--a bonafide metaphysical paradigm.

If the

criteria of consistency is itself inconsistent it may be so
either by (1) asserting something to be both true and false
at the same time and in the same manner, or (2) by asserting
something that is neither true nor false.

In the Essay on

Metaphysics Collingwood took the latter option, and spelled
out the consequences of this doctrine as a theory of "absolute presuppositions" which are the basis for truth and falsity without being themselves true or false (EM, 21-33).
(4) If absolute knowledge collapses for want of a coherent object, how are the various forms of consciousness described in Speculum Mentis reconciled to one another?

Or does

Collingwood's early rapprochement philosophy end in complete
disaster?

Is retrogressive identity the only acceptable basis

for rapprochement?
We have had occasion in previous chapters, and this
chapter is an extension of these reflections, to remark on
the peculiar usage that Collingwood has for terms that appear
as key words in all of the contradictory texts cited above-"other than . . . , separate from . . . , identical with . .
. , the same as . . . ," etc.

These terms, and the under-

standing of them in context, count greatly toward contributing
to the sense or nonsense of what Collingwood is trying to say
in these highly elliptical and abstract passages.

It is also
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crucial for an understanding of rapprochement philosophy,
since the entire effort of reconciliation is to show that
the reconciliata are not "other than" or "separate from" each
other, but are rather "identical" or "the same as" each other
as parts of a "concrete whole."
Now we recall from section 2 of this chapter that in
Religion and Philosophy four sorts of identity can be distinguished--abstract, dialectical, concrete, and absolute.
The first two were bound, we noted, by relations of necessity,
the latter two by relations of contingency.

We also noted

that each had a corresponding sense of "separate."

If we come

fresh from this discussion to the present problem in Speculum
Mentis, we notice several interesting shifts in meaning, and
as usual with Collingwood, a small investment of careful attention to these shifts yields dividends for the interpretative speculator.
If we return, for example, to the transition from history to philosophy we notice that the object of history is
taken to be the "concrete universal" and that this "infinite
whole of fact" is taken to be an object that ostensibly satisfies the mind:
There is thus no feature of experience, no attitude of
mind towards its object, which is alien to history. Art
rests on the ignoring of reality: religion, on the ignoring of thought: science, on the ignoring of fact; but with
the recognition of fact everything is recognized that is
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in any sense real. The fact, as historically determined,
is the absolute object. The mark of the absolute object
is individuality, for individuality is concreteness. The
object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this
is concretely articulated into parts each of which is
again individual, and so to infinity . . . . The object as
a system of fact so organized, is objective throughout,
for every part is a true microcosm, and is truly infinite
. . This absolute whole is the concrete universal
. . It is the system of systems, the world of worlds . . .
The principle of its structure is not classification, the
abstract concept, but the concrete concept, which is relevance, or implication . . . and the logic of history is
the logic of the concrete universal. (SM, 218-21).
Aside from the fact that it is hard to see why an absolute
mind knowing such an object would not be "one stupendous
whole" (SM, 299) if its object is a "system of systems" and a
"world of worlds," we notice an additional peculiarity in this
passage.

The description of the concrete universal corres-

ponds fairly closely to the description of both dialectical
and concrete identities as we discovered them in Religion and
Philosophy.

(1)

The relations and relata are connected not

as abstract particulars subsumed under an equally abstract
genus, but as parts of a whole such that the parts reflect
the whole and the whole reflects the parts--therefore a dialectical identity.

But (2) they are also described as con-

crete in the sense of individual--and thus (like the identity
of cooperation between minds in Religion and Philosophy,
wherein the two minds share that unity between them which is
taken to be the mark of the individual, and therefore become
one mind) a concrete identity.

If Collingwood is truly press-
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ing these two sorts of identity into doing service in the
single notion of the concrete universal, then it is not surprising that we should find in it relations of both necessity
and contingency, since dialectical identity involved relations
of necessity, and concrete identity involved relations of contingency.

In the concept of the concrete universal, then, we

have an attempt to express the overlapping of two senses of
identity; it is therefore an instance of what Collingwood will
later call the "overlap of classes" in his Essay on Philosophical Method (EPM, 26-53).

Which brings us to our next ques-

tion.
(5) Is there any way that absolute identity as the
ideal for progressive reconciliation can be made intelligible?
Unfortunately the suggestion from the last paragraph,

i.e.

that the concrete universal as an overlap-concept might be
expanded to become the absolute object, runs headlong into
the subject-object contradictions we have been at pains to reconcile.

On the one hand the concrete universal turns out to

be the absolute object, thus accounting for the fact that the
identity of history and philosophy, while a "barren abstraction" like all such identifications, is less misleading than
the others (SM, 246).

On the other hand the object of his-

tory fails to be the object of philosophy, because the historical consciousness fails to be fully aware of the identity
of subject and object.

History as a separate form of con-
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sciousness fails to apprehend the concrete universal (an infinite whole of fact) because of a remnant of the original
sin of the mind--the abstract separation of subject and object (SM, 237-38); the historian simply cannot grasp an "infinite given whole of fact," and therefore in confronting the
the panorama of history and the virtual infinite of historical evidence the historian must select his materials, arrange
21
them into periods, etc.--all acts of abstraction.
It is at this point that Collingwood introduces his
hypothetical identity of subject and object by an act of absolute consciousness:

"If therefore the infinite given whole

of fact is the nature of the knowing mind as such, our problem is solved, and the possibility of knowledge is vindicated"
(SM, 241).

Once again we are brought to the brink of complete

disaster for Collingwood's voyaging vessel of consciousness:
the fabric of his mainsail is, as we have seen, ripped from
top to bottom by inner contradiction.
In Religion and Philosophy, at least, he left an escape route open in the form of the Absolute Mind as God, with
whom men may contingently be united through identity of pur21 Collingwood's description of historical abstractness is almost Heideggerian: "History, which seems to be essentially remembrance, is only possible through forgetfulness,
a forgetfulness which in destroying what it takes away makes
it impossible for us ever to understand what is left" (SM,
236).
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pose with Jesus Christ.

In Speculum Mentis this door also

seems to be shut, both by his explicit assertion that the absolute mind is the mind of individuals and not that of iome
"world spirit" which he rejects as a "myth" (SM, 298-99), and
his affirmation that the absolute mind is the mind of each of
us (SM, 298). 22
Fortunately, there is more than one way to reach absolute knowledge, and while we have been preoccupied with a
discussion of consciousness and its objects, we have lost
sight temporarily of another approach to the subject--one
which Collingwood himself, in his haste to reach the absolute
22 once again, in fairness to Collingwood it must be
said that in this passage he says that "the mind of which we
are speaking . . . must at least be the mind of each of us .
. . . " (SM, 298), thus leaving the way open for the insertion
of a higher mind which does not share the inherent failing of
human nature. But in a passage where the life of absolute
mind is described by means of the religious metaphor of the
fall and redemption of man, he seems to reject this possibility. The metaphor likens the fall of man to the loss of absolute knowledge through an act which forever separates subject and object, and redemption to the regaining of this knowledge through an act of divine transcendence--the incarnation. In his fallen state man fails to achieve self-knowledge: "not knowing himself as he ought to be, he cannot
know himself as he actually is. His error is implicit just
because it is complete" (SM, 269). However Collingwood criticizes the metaphor as having one flaw: the "transcendence
of God." He has also asserted that "no one can worship the
absolute" (SM, 151), and furthermore that the point of entry
of God into a philosophical system marks unerringly the point
at which it breaks down (SM, 269). Finally, the reader might
also recall that Collingwood maintains that there is no fixed
human nature, so that the imagery of the fall is further
flawed insofar as it is inapplicable to man.
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standpoint, may have overlooked.

We noted above (section 4)

that in the beginning of the chapter on science Collingwood
called art and religion "forms not of thought but of language"
(SM, 154).

We have also seen him carry out his analysis of

the explication of implicit errors of successive forms of
consciousness in terms of their linguistic forms--expression
(art), assertion (religion), etc.

Even his discussion of

knowledge as question and answer tends to focus on the language of conditionals, hypotheticals, assertions, and implications.

In this

di~cussion

hint which is later

Collingwood drops an intriguing

picked up in his discussion of the nature

of philosophical thinking.

Discussing symbol and meaning in

his chapter on religion, Collingwood writes:
To distinguish a symbol from its meaning is to put oneself in the way of explaining or translating the symbol.
Now it is a matter of common observation that religion
never explains itself . . . . To ask for explanations is
the mark of extreme sophistication; in other words, it is
the mark of the life of explicit thought . . . . Art is
untranslatable, religion cannot translate itself. Art
cannot be translated because it has no meaning except the
wholly implicit meaning submerged, in the form of beauty,
in the flood of imagery. Religion cannot translate itself
not because it has no meaning . . . but because, although
it has a meaning and knows it has a meaning, it thinks it
has expressed this meaning already. And so it has, but
only metaphorically; and this metaphorical self-expressio~
this fusion of symbol and meaning, requires translation
. . . . For literal language is only language recognizedly
metaphorical
. . (SM, 128-30).
We have seen that in his apology in Speculum Mentis
for the sins of Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood pointed
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to the failure to recognize the distinction between symbol
and meaning in religion as his major oversight in that earlier work (SM, 108, n. 1).

And we also noted that when he

originally published Religion and Philosophy he deliberately
declined to deal with the issue of religious language (RP,
xvi).

And we have seen that in Speculum Mentis the distinc-

tion appears as the singular way that the error implicit in
religion is made explicit--religion "asserts the reality of
what is only a symbol and thereby treats a symbol as though
it were a concept" (SM, 153).

The same might be

shown for

all the other forms of consciousness: each manifests its latent error in the form of inadequate or self-contradictory
expressions.

Not only religion requires translation, it

seems, but all the forms of consciousness: when science, for
example, achieves explicit thought, it does so by means of
its ability to express meaning in several ways, by means of
overlapping metaphors in the form of alternative hypotheses
and equivalent mathematical expressions, thus overcoming the
fixed formulas of religious dogma (cf. SM, 155-57).
In the chapter on philosophy this line of thought is
picked up again, and provides us with a possible key to unscramble many of the paradoxes of absolute thought:
We have hitherto allowed ourselves to say that in art,
religion, and so forth the substance of truth was present, but was concealed in an inadequate form: that, for
instance, religion actually solved the riddle of life

313
but presented its solution in a mythological form. This
implies that the task of philosophy, regarded as the philosophy of religion, is the simple translation of this solution of the riddle of life out of the language of_mythology into that of philosophy . . . . Translation itself is
based on the fact that the meaning takes new colour and
shines with a new light when we express it in different
words. To set the meaning as an abstract self-identity
over against the language makes translation pointless: to
swamp it in a mere immediate union with the language itself makes translation impossible . . . . (T)hought in its
concrete form is not indifferent to its own choice of
language. It realizes that an unsuitable linguistic form
affects its own inmost being, and that what we have called
merely formal error is in reality material and essential
error. Our distinction between formal error and material
error was, in fact, only an abstract way of stating the
very important fact that no error is wholly erroneous, but
is always capable of a dialectical development into truth
by simply bringing to light what is already implicit in
it: what the thinker, as we paradoxically say, "really
means," but "does not know that he means." This process
of translation into progressively adequate language is
simply the dialectical self-criticism of thought. (SM,
252-53).
I have quoted this passage at length because it is so
important, so capable of being overlooked, 23 and so pregnant
with possibilities.

For (1) if philosophy is the process of

making explicit what is implicit in other modes of thought,
and (2) if the implicit errors of these modes of consciousness
are only made explicit when expressed or translated into language, and (3) if the dialectical development of error into
23 collingwood himself seems to have overlooked its
significance, both in the conclusion of Speculum Mentis, where
the suggestion is not followed up, and later in The Principles
of Art, where the significance of language for thought and the
role of philosophy as translation appear as discoveries,
rather than as a development of a line of thought already initiated ten years earlier. Cf. PA, Chapter XI, pp. 225-69.
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truth is a process of translation into progressively more adequate language (the dialectical self-criticism of thought),
then it is clear that (4) absolute knowledge in the form of
philosophy is the translation, by dialectical self-criticism,
of expressions of subordinate forms of consciousness, into increasingly more adequate language.

One is tempted to say (as

Collingwood does not) that the object of philosophy is expressed in absolute language--i.e. language purged not of all
error but only of its element of necessary and insurmountable
error.
What such a language would be like is a matter for
speculation, although Collingwood's later writings provide us
with a few clues.

It would have a peculiar grammar and the

Essay on Philosophical Method and the methodological chapters
of the Essay on Metaphysics are attempts to provide us with
an informal account of what that grammar is like.

It will

deal with problems of the sort provided by art, by science,
and by history, and The Principles of Art, The Idea of Nature, and The Idea of History are examples of what it would
sound like when these problems are translated by philosophical consciousness into a more adequate language.

And it

would attempt to formulate an idea of what an object would be
like that would totally satisfy the mind, and these reflections are presented in the Essay on Metaphysics--Collingwood's
last word on the religious foundations of contemporary thought.
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But aside from what an absolute language would be
like, it is clear that the conception outlined in the quotation above has the potentiality for clarifying some, if.not
all, of the difficulties we found with the notion of absolute
knowledge.

(1) If the differentia of philosophy is taken to

be the identification of subject and object, the difficulties
with this conception arise when it is described in terms of
consciousness and its object--the stumbling block always being self-consciousness.

But if absolute knowledge or phil-

osophy is described not in terms of consciousnessbut of language, then this particular difficulty disappears:

language

is quite capable of being self-referential, of discussing and
describing itself, and of introducing modifications to overcome errors in the expression of its more primary forms (e.g.
"natural languages").

Not only are subject and object iden-

tified insofar as both are embraced within the same whole--a
world of language in which pronouns, reflexive forms, and
self-referential assertions are all possible; but the subject
is also both a receiver of meaning and a creator of meaning
in this world.

Therefore a change in one part (e.g. the cre-

ation of a new meaning--a poetic metaphor, a new scientific
hypothesis) necessitates a change in the whole (the interconnected world of meaning) and in all the other parts (related meanings).

Since the subject here is a user of lang-

uage, he is identified with objects not immediately (he does
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not actually "become" the object) but through the mediation
of subordinate expressive acts--through the unreflective use
of the language of art, religion, science, and history.

He

becomes one with his object not actually but virtually, symbolically, by an identity of meaning.
(2) As a world of language the "concrete universal"
(as expressed judgment) could understandably be a "world of
worlds" and a "system of systems."

As an expressive form

characteristic of philosophy it contains elements both hypothetical (calling forth alternative possible meanings) and
categorical (in its referential determination of a given meaning); and in philosophical discourse the concrete universal
can be engaged in questioning (like art), answering or asserting (like religion), abstracting (like science) or referring (like history).

And it can claim adequacy at all these

tasks without being "one stupendous whole," since not all entities are linguistic. 24 And even though not all entities
are linguistic, there would still be no externality, no element of necessary and insurmountable error, insofar as there
are no non-linguistic entities that are not capable of being
24
rhe terms "linguistic" and "linguistic expression"
must be taken as having the widest possible extension--including not only the utterances of natural languages, but all
sorts of artificial languages as well (including mathematics
and logic) and even works of art (music, painting, dance,
etc.). Cf. PA, 252-69.
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described, referred to, or translated into linguistic entities.

Therefore none are in principle "external to" or· "se-

parated from" a subject.

Linguistic expression makes the

whole world of objects, real and possible, actual and fictitious, true and false, accessible to the user of language,
the subject.
(3) Philosophy as translational activity preserves
the contingency (and hence the freedom) of the progressive
movement of rapprochement insofar as there is no necessity to
translate something erroneously expressed unless one is committed to the creation of, or preservation of, a higher mode
of expression.

Philosophy as translation aims at consistency,

but not strictly speaking a formal consistency, but rather a
consistency of coherent meanings--meanings which cannot help
but overlap in specifiable ways, rather than abstract meanings which are mutually exclusive.

And even though it aims

at consistency, there is no fixed set of rules which prescribe a one-to-one translation of one set of terms into
another.

Translation must have a certain flexibility, aiming

as it does at the transmission of meaning rather than at mimetic correspondence.

Translation of meaning is impression-

istic rather than photographic:

its rules are not necessar-

ily the rules of strict formal correspondence, but vary from
loose metaphor to verbatim literal and grammatical transformational analysis.

One cannot even say that the same ideal
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is always adhered to, for in poetic translation a strict,
word-by-word translation would be undesirable, even ridiculous.

But philosophy, if nothing else, interprets itsel~ as

a guardian of meaning rather than a keeper of rules.

As such

the forward motion of philosophy is towards progressively
more adequate meaning, and the means to achieving this is, if
not the opposite of necessary inference, at least independent
of it.

Its resources are the resources of freedom rather than

those of necessity.
(4) The ultimate identity that would serve as a maximal ideal for a progressive rapprochement would therefore be
an identity of meaning, where through an identification of
meaning and meant, subject and object (knower and known) are
identified.

The world of experience thus reconciled is an ab-

solute built out of the differences of the world as it finds
them, but not by a principle of abstraction (which leaves
something always unsaid) but by the progressive consolidation
of a world of expressed meanings, of articulated facts,
bound together in such a way that the whole (itself a meaning) could not be what it is without its parts (which themselves are, or have, meanings) and vice versa.
But we have been allowing ourselves the license of an
unrestricted flight of Collingwoodean fancy.

How much of it

Collingwood might have agreed with, we can only surmise.

But
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there is little doubt that his rapprochement philosophy is
capable of the sort of flexibility that would include modifications along the lines we have suggested here; for indeed,
for two or more reconciliata to reach rapprochement means for
them to have, and to be shown to have, not the same objects
unaffected by the knowing of them, but the same meaning.

